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California Supreme Court Survey

June 1985 - August 1985
The CaliforniaSupreme Court Survey is a brief synopsis of recent decisions

by the supreme court. The purpose of the survey is to inform the readerof the
issues that have been addressed by the supreme court, as well as to serve as a
startingpointfor researchingany of the topical areas. The decisions are analyzed in accordance with the importance of the court's holding and the extent

to which the court expands or changes existing law. Attorney discipline cases
have been omitted from the survey.
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I.

ANTITRUST
Efforts by private individuals to influence government
action, even though unethical and illegal, are not
within the scope of either the Sherman Act or the
CartwrightAct, regardlessof an anti-competitive
purpose or effect: Blank v. Kirwan.

In Blank v. Kirwan, 39 Cal. 3d 311, 703 P.2d 58, 216 Cal. Rptr. 718
(1985), the court upheld defendants' demurrers because plaintiff's
complaint failed to state a cause of action under the California restraint of trade statutory scheme known as the Cartwright Act. See
CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 16700-26 (West 1976 & Supp. 1985).
In 1978, the City of Bell (hereinafter the City) enacted an ordinance legalizing private poker clubs and a zoning ordinance approving a twenty acre parcel of land as the only location in the City in
which poker clubs could operate. Trammell Crow Company owned
the twenty-acre tract and leased it to private individuals who had applied for and received poker licenses. Plaintiff had also applied for a
poker license but was refused because he had not obtained property
within the specially zoned tract.
Plaintiff brought a cause of action against City officials and two

private individuals who had obtained licenses. He asserted that they
had conspired to use inside information to monopolize the operation
of poker clubs in the City. Defendants demurred to plaintiff's first
amended complaint, admitting that they had influenced the government to get the ordinances passed. The trial court sustained the demurrers without leave to amend, and plaintiff appealed to the
supreme court.
The Cartwright Act is California's statutory scheme for restraint of
trade and provides in part that "every trust is unlawful, against public policy and void." CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 16726 (West 1976).
The Act defines a trust as any "combination of capital, skill or acts by
two or more persons. . . [t]o create or carry out restrictions in trade
or commerce." Id. § 16720. Plaintiff asserted that defendants violated the Cartwright Act when they conspired to monopolize the
poker club licensing in the City of Bell.
Since the Cartwright Act is modeled after the federal Sherman
Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1982), California courts look to the
Sherman Act and cases construing it to interpret the Cartwright Act.
See Matin County Board of Realtors, Inc. v. Palsson, 16 Cal. 3d 920,
549 P.2d 833, 130 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1976). Regarding government influence and its relation to the Sherman Act, the principal law is commonly known as the Noerr-Penningtondoctrine. The law states that
"the Sherman Act does not prohibit two or more persons from associating together in an attempt to persuade the legislature or the executive to take particular action with respect to a law that would
produce a restraint or a monopoly." Eastern Railroad President's
Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 136 (1961).
Thus, according to the Noerr-Pennington doctrine attempts by individuals to influence government do not even fall within the scope of
either the Sherman Act or the Cartwright Act. The only exception
to the Noerr-Penningtondoctrine is when attempts to influence government are shams; in those situations the Sherman and Cartwright
Acts are controlling.
Plaintiff's complaint contended that the private party defendants
had influenced the local government to obtain a monopoly in the
poker club business. This is exactly the kind of conduct that the Noerr-Penningtondoctrine protects. As the supreme court pointed out,
nothing precluded the plaintiff from procuring land and petitioning
the City Council to rezone it to allow the operation of a poker club.
The court therefore concluded that plaintiff's allegations did not constitute a cause of action since the defendants' conduct was not within
the scope of either the Sherman or Cartwright Acts.
Plaintiff contended that the case fell within the "sham" exception.
However, the court refused to conclude that the defendants' actions
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constituted a sham. It was clear that they had made efforts to influence the actions of the local government. Though the defendants' actions may have been illegal or unethical, they still did not violate the

Cartwright Act. See Bustop Shelters v. Convenience & Safety Corp.,
521 F. Supp. 989, 995 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). The court noted that defendants' could be prosecuted under other criminal statutes.
The court's holding in Blank reiterates the well settled doctrine
that efforts to influence government do not fall within the scope of
the Cartwright Act, even though the influence upon government officials may have been unethical and illegal. Thus, the demurrer to
plaintiff's amended complaint, which asserted a violation of the Cartwright Act, was properly sustained without leave to amend because it
did not constitute a cause of action under the Cartwright Act.
MIssY
II.

KELLY BANKHEAD

BANKING AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS

Federalregulations notwithstanding,a bank overdraft
charge of six dollars may be unconscionable: Perdue v.
Crocker National Bank.
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Perdue v. Crocker National Bank,1 on a motion for demurrer,
the plaintiff was awarded the opportunity to prove his contention
that the defendant's overdraft fee is prohibited by state law. The suit
was filed as a class action. 2
The plaintiff, a bank depositor, sought injunctive and compensatory relief against Crocker National Bank (hereinafter the Bank) for
its practice of charging customers six dollars for processing checks
drawn on accounts without sufficient funds (hereinafter NSF).3 It
was alleged that this charge was set unilaterally by the Bank and increased without justification, even though the actual cost of process1. 38 Cal. 3d 913, 702 P.2d 503, 216 Cal. Rptr. 345 (1985). The majority opinion
was written by Justice Broussard, with Chief Justice Bird, Justices Mosk, Reynoso,
White, Breiner, and Savitt concurring. Justices White, Breiner, and Savitt were assigned by the Chairperson of the Judicial Counsel.
2. The suit was filed in 1978 on behalf of all persons with checking accounts at
defendant Bank. A subclass was specified as all persons who have paid overdraft
charges to the Bank. Id. at 920, 702 P.2d at 508, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 350.
3. The six dollar fee for a draft without sufficient funds is referred to as the NSF
charge.

ing an NSF check is approximately thirty cents. 4 Based upon these
allegations, the plaintiff asserted five causes of action. The Bank demurred to each cause of action. The demurrers were sustained by
the superior court without leave to amend, after it had taken notice
of the fact that the plaintiff had previously filed three similar complaints in another action. The court of appeal affirmed the holding.
II.

A.

SUPREME COURT'S TREATMENT OF THE ALLEGATIONS

ContractualRights to Impose the NSF Fee

In the first cause of action, the plaintiff contended that the signature card did not authorize NSF fees. This contention was based on
the rule that when one party has total control over the prices or performances to be rendered, the contract formed is illusory and unenforceable. 5 Recognizing that this rule of law applies only if the total
discretion granted to one party has the effect of relieving that party
of any real contractual duty, 6 the court noticed that the Bank and depositors had reciprocal promises. Therefore, as a matter of law, the
Bank was found to have a contractual right to charge depositors the
NSF fee.
However, the Bank's discretionary power to charge fees carried a
concommitant duty of exercising that power in accordance with good
faith and fair dealing.7 The plaintiff therefore was granted leave to
amend to seek a determination of whether the Bank exercised good
faith in setting its fees.S
B.

Unconscionabilityof NSF Fees

In order to prove that the Bank's NSF charges were unconscionable, plaintiff alleged that the Bank, being in a superior bargaining position, forced depositors to pay a service charge that is much greater
than the actual cost to the Bank. Furthermore, the signature card
imposed no obligation on the Bank, but gave it the power of termination at will.
California Civil Code section 1670.5 specifies that a court may re4. Plaintiff mentioned in his petition for hearing that a high reasonable estimate
for the NSF fee would be about one dollar. Thus, the Bank allegedly made between
600 and 2,000 percent in profit on the NSF charge. Id at 928, 702 P.2d at 513, 216 Cal.
Rptr. at 355.
5. Automatic Vending Co. v. Wisdom, 182 Cal. App. 2d 354, 357, 6 Cal. Rptr. 31, 33
(1960).
6. When a promisor has no duty because of his broad discretionary power the
promise is illusory and lacking in consideration. Id.
7. Id. at 358, 6 Cal. Rptr. at 33. See Annot., 49 A.L.R.2D 508 (1956). See also Annot., 91 A.L.R.3D 1237 (1979) (application of U.C.C. § 2-305, CAL. COMM. CODE § 2305
(West 1964), to open price terms in a contract).
8. Lazar v. Hertz Corp., 143 Cal. App. 3d 128, 141, 191 Cal. Rptr. 849, 857 (1983).

[Vol. 13: 427, 1986]

CaliforniaSupreme Court Survey
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

fuse to enforce an unconscionable contract or an unconscionable
clause within the contract. 9 A contract of adhesion will not be enforced if it contains a provision that does not fall into the reasonable
expectations of the weaker party, or is unduly oppressive when considered in its context. However, the allegations in this case, which
characterized the Bank's agreement with the plaintiff as an adhesion
contract, did not automatically make it unconscionable i 0 Furthermore, plaintiff's conclusory allegation that the price was unconscionable was not sufficient to warrant an evidentiary hearing under
section 1670.5(b). Nonetheless, an inquiry into the contract's purpose,
setting, and effect would be necessary, 1 and, since plaintiff's case
would turn upon further allegations and proof as to the circumdemurrer was
stances of the transaction, dismissal on
12
inappropriate.
The court rejected the Bank's contention that the NSF fee could
not be unconscionable since it was set at an amount equal to the market price. Naturally, it is unlikely that a court would find a price set
in a freely competitive market to be unconscionable, but the price
charged by an oligopoly' 3 is not free from scrutiny. Moreover, other
considerations are also relevant to the analysis. Included among
them are the cost of the goods or service to the seller, the inconve4
niences imposed on the seller, and the true value of the item.'
The court ultimately held that plaintiff's allegations, though not
sufficient to prove unconscionability, did adequately state a cause of
action for unconscionability.' 5 The alleged 2,000 percent profit the
16
Bank earned from the NSF fee and the nature of the signature card
9. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1670.5(a) (West 1985). This section of the code is very similar to the Uniform Commercial Code section 2-302. California had deleted this provision of the U.C.C. until enacting section 1670.5 in 1979.
10. Perdue, 38 Cal. 3d at 925, 702 P.2d at 511, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 353. See also Graham v. Scissor-tail, 28 Cal. 3d 807, 820, 623 P.2d 165, 172-73, 171 Cal. Rptr. 604, 612
(1981).
11. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1670.5(b) (West 1985).
12. Perdue, 38 Cal. 3d at 926, 702 P.2d at 512, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 354.
13. An oligopoly is defined as, "a market situation in which each of a few producers affects but does not control the market." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL
DICTIONARY 793 (1971).
The court did not discuss the market status of Crocker National Bank in this context. Since a business that is part of an oligopoly will be held to a different legal standard in price-setting, it is presumed that the lower court will have to address this issue
should Crocker contest the implication on remand.
14. Perdue, 38 Cal. 3d at 927, 702 P.2d at 512, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 354.
15. Id. at 928, 702 P.2d at 514, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 355-56.
16. In fact, the contractual language appears in print so small on the card that

made it look as though the Bank had structured a one-sided transaction in which the Bank had all the rights and the depositor had all
the duties.
C

Bank's Acts of Unfair Competition

Plaintiff alleged that the Bank had committed two acts of unfair
competition. First, the Bank used the signature card in a deceptive
and misleading manner in that it failed to disclose the legal authority
the card gave it to impose NSF charges. Second, NSF fees have been
arbitrarily and unfairly waived for certain customers. The California
Business and Professional Code defines unfair competition as a busi17
ness practice that is unlawful, unfair or fraudulent.
In dealing with plaintiff's allegations the court found the first one
ambiguous. It was uncertain if the allegation was that the Bank represented the signature card to customers in a deceptive manner, or if
the card itself was deceptive. However, under either interpretation
the court stated the plaintiff had sufficiently alleged that the Bank
engaged in unfair competition by stating that it deceived or misled its
8
customers.1
The court found a substantive defect in the second allegation. The
required showings under the rules of the Unfair Practices Act19 were
not stated in any of the plaintiff's allegations. It was only stated that
arbitrary waiver of the NSF fee for certain customers shifts the true
cost of processing NSF checks to other customers. Even if this were
proven to be true, such would not suffice to show unfair
competition. 20
D.

NSF Charge as an Unlawful Penalty

To adequately plead the fifth cause of action, the plaintiff averred
that depositors impliedly promised to refrain from writing NSF
checks. Writing such a check, the plaintiff contended, was a breach
many people would not be able to see it. Id. at 928, 702 P.2d at 513, 216 Cal. Rptr. at
355.
17. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17200 (West Supp. 1985).
18. Perdue,38 Cal. 3d at 929, 702 P.2d at 514, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 356. See CAL. Bus.
& PROF. CODE § 17200 (West Supp. 1985). Because the plaintiff is seeking only injunc-

tive relief in this cause of action, he need not show that he was himself injured. He
need only prove that members of the public are likely to be deceived. Id. § 17500. See
also Chern v. Bank of America, 15 Cal. 3d 866, 876, 544 P.2d 1310, 1316, 127 Cal. Rptr.
110, 116 (1976).
The court in the principal case seemed to actually be describing the elements of the
prohibited conduct in section 17500 of the Business and Professions Code, rather than

section 17200.
19. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 17000-17101 (West 1964).
20. Id. § 17071. See also Hladek v. City of Merced, 69 Cal. App. 3d 585, 138 Cal.
Rptr. 194 (1977); Dooley's Hardware Mart v. Food Giant Markets, Inc., 21 Cal. App. 3d
513, 98 Cal. Rptr. 543 (1971).
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of his contract with the Bank. Thus, the Bank's NSF charge, being
far in excess of the actual damages of thirty cents, was a collection of
liquidated damages in violation of Civil Code sections 1670 and 1671.21
A damage clause that seeks to collect an amount disproportionate
to actual losses is invalid since a wronged party may collect only the
amount of the actual damages.22 Notwithstanding the invalidity of
such damage penalties, the court held that depositors made no promise to refrain from writing NSF checks. 23 Therefore, the NSF charge
could not be construed as an agreement for liquidated damages, and
the court affirmed dismissal of the fifth cause of action without leave
24
to amend.

III.

THE COURT'S TREATMENT OF PREEMPTION

The Bank argued that federal law preempted any attempt by the
State of California to regulate banking service charges. It specifically
set forth three arguments. First, banks are empowered to accept deposits and to exercise all incidental powers necessary to carrying on
the business of banking. 25 Also, bank directors are required to refrain from any practices that are unsafe or unsound. 26 An NSF
21. CAL. CIv. CODE § 1671(d) (West 1985). Generally, a contractual provision authorizing liquidated damages is valid only if it represents what the parties reasonably
anticipated as a fair average for compensation in the event of a breach. Perdue, 38 Cal.
3d at 930-31, 702 P.2d at 515, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 357 (citing Garrett v. Coast & Southern
Fed. Savings & Loan Ass'n, 9 Cal. 3d 731, 511 P.2d 1197, 108 Cal. Rptr. 845 (1973); Better Food Markets v. American Dist. Teleg. Co., 40 Cal. 2d 179, 253 P.2d 10 (1953)). See
also Annot., 63 A.L.R.3D 50 (1975); Annot., 42 A.L.R.2D 591 (1955).
22. Shapiro v. United California Bank, 133 Cal. App. 3d 256, 184 Cal. Rptr. 34
(1982); Hoffman v. Security Pacific Nat'l Bank, 121 Cal. App. 3d 964, 176 Cal. Rptr. 14
(1981). See also Jacobs v. Citibank, N.A., 61 N.Y.2d 869, 462 N.E.2d 1182, 474 N.Y.S.2d
464 (1984).
23. Perdue, 38 Cal. 3d at 932, 702 P.2d at 516, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 358. In Shapiro, the
court held that an express agreement to pay NSF charges does not constitute an implied promise to not write overdrafts. One way in which implied promises are found is
when it appears from the contractual language that the promise was so clearly within
the contemplation of the parties that they deemed it unnecessary to express it. Shapiro, 133 Cal. App. 3d at 262, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 38.
The supreme court in the principal case noted that the Bank offers a service in
which overdrafts are covered automatically by the customer's credit card account. Perdue, 38 Cal. 3d at 924, 702 P.2d at 510, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 352. The existence of this service supports the refusal to find an implied contract on this issue, and is consistent
with the standard expressed by the Shapiro court.
24. Perdue, 38 Cal. 3d at 932, 702 P.2d at 516, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 358. The court also
modified Shapiro and Hoffman, in dicta, by expressing disagreement with the fiction
that an overdraft check is an application for an extension of credit. Id.
25. 12 U.S.C.A. § 24 (West 1945 & Supp. 1985).
26. Id. §§ 1818(b), (e). "The phrase 'unsafe and unsound banking practice' is

charge low enough to avoid an attack of unconscionability might also
be inadequate to discourage the writing of such checks. Thus, not
only are banks empowered to set NSF fees without being inhibited
by state law, an adequate and substantial fee is mandated. Second,
when Congress deregulated interest rates, 27 it contemplated that

banks would charge higher service rates to depositors. Charges for
services that were previously subsidized by below market interest
rates on deposit accounts would now have to be raised. Further, as
suggested by an agency regulation, Congress intended that such
charges would be set in a market that is free of state regulation. 28
Third, the Code of Federal Regulations expressly preempts state laws
in the area of service charges set by national banks.29 After estabwidely used ... and one of the purposes of the banking acts is clearly to commit the
progressive definition and eradication of such practices to the expertise of the appropriate regulatory agencies." Groos Nat'l Bank v. Comptroller of Currency, 573 F.2d
889, 897 (5th Cir. 1978).
27. Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, Pub.
L. No. 96-221, 94 Stat. 132 (1980); Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982,
Pub. L. No. 97-320, 96 Stat. 1469 (1982).
28. 12 C.F.R. § 7.8000(a) (1985).
29. Id. § 7.8000. The entire section is read as follows:
Charges by national banks
(a) All charges to customers should be arrived at by each bank on a competitive basis and not on the basis of any agreement, arrangement, undertaking,
understanding or discussion with other banks or their officers.
(b) Establishment of deposit account service charges, and the amounts
thereof, is a business decision to be made by each bank according to sound
banking judgment and federal standards of safety and soundness. In establishing deposit account service charges, the bank may consider, but is not limited to considering:
(1) Costs incurred by the bank, plus a profit margin, in providing the service;
(2) The deterrence of misuse by customers of banking services;
(3) The enhancement of the competitive position of the bank in accord with
the bank's marketing strategy;
(4) Maintenance of the safety and soundness of the institution.
(c) A national bank may establish any deposit account service charge pursuant to paragraphs (a) and (b) of this section notwithstanding any state laws
which prohibit the charge assessed or limit or restrict the amount of that
charge. Such state laws are preempted by the comprehensive federal statutory scheme governing the deposit-taking function of national banks.
Id.
Sections (b) and (c) were added by the Comptroller of Currency on March 10, 1984.
Section (a) was amended on December 2, 1983. Even though it appeared that the
Comptroller was promulgating the regulations to influence the resolution of the principal case, the court found no impropriety in this. Perdue, 38 Cal. 3d at 935, 702 P.2d at
518, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 360.
The Office of the Comptroller of Currency is charged with the supervision and regulation of national banking associations. 12 U.S.C.A. § 1 (West Supp. 1985). See also Id.
§§ 4.1-4.19 (1985) (description of the office of Comptroller). Wide discretion is given to
the Comptroller in the performance of his duties. His judgment will not be disturbed
unless his decision is arbitrary, capricious or contrary to law. First Nat'l Bank of
Lamarque v. Smith, 610 F.2d 1258, 1264 (5th Cir. 1980). The courts should give great
weight to any reasonable construction of a regulatory banking statute by the Comp-
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lishing its power to review the federal regulations 3o and the congressional acts authorizing them the court rejected all three arguments.
It determined that section 7.8000 of the Code of Federal Regulations31 was not promulgated by the Comptroller of Currency to eliminate state regulation. Further, nothing in the legislative history of
the enabling acts evidenced congressional intent to occupy the field
32
of bank service charges to the exclusion of the states.
The court reasoned that proper interpretative regulation is one
that interprets the language of the federal statute, fills the gaps in
statutory coverage or explains how the Comptroller will exercise his
discretion. Section 7.8000, however, went far beyond that by radically
altering the roles of the states and the Comptroller in bank regula33
tion, it was therefore contrary to congressional intent.
The court finally stated that information presented at a later stage
of the case may result in a different conclusion than what it decided
on demurrer. However, at the early stages in the trial nothing inditroller, as he is charged with the enforcement of these statutes. Investment Co. Inst. v.
Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 626-27 (1971).
Generally, a regulatory enactment is only valid if notice of the new regulation is
given and a public hearing is held. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553
(1982). An exception to this is for a ruling that is interpretative, as opposed to legislative. Id. § 553 (A). For a discussion of the distinction between interpretative and legislative rules, see K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT § 5.03 (3d ed. 1972).
The Perdue court determined that section 7.8000 of the Code was an interpretative
rule. Therefore, it is entitled to great weight, but is not binding on the courts. Perdue,
38 Cal. 3d at 936, 702 P.2d at 518, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 361. Cf. Jacobs v. Citibank, N.A., 61
N.Y.2d 869, 462 N.E.2d 1182, 474 N.Y.S.2d 464 (1984).
The New York counterpart to the California Supreme Court, in deciding the same
issue as in the principal case, held that imposing limits on NSF fees of federally
chartered banks is a task properly left with the Comptroller of the Currency. In
reaching this decision, deference was given to section 7.8000(a) of the Code. Id. at 872,
462 N.E.2d at 1183, 474 N.Y.S.2d at 465.
The Perdue court distinguished Jacobs by noting the difference in the trial stages.
The New York case was on appeal of a motion for summary judgment, while Perdue
was being decided on a motion of demurrer. It was presumed that the plaintiffs in Jacobs simply failed to meet the requisite standard of proof to support their allegations.
In Perdue, the issue was only the sufficiency of the allegations. Perdue, 38 Cal. 3d at
927, 702 P.2d at 513, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 355.
30. The court's analysis of the law authorizing judicial review by the state courts
of federal regulatory law, and the appropriate standards, is very comprehensive and
lengthy. Particularly notice footnotes 19-43 of the case for the justifications and rationale. Perdue, 38 Cal. 3d at 933-44, 702 P.2d at 516-24, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 358-66. But as
a general rule states may exercise judicial review of federal laws, but must follow the
ruling of the Supreme Court and enforce federal laws over state acts that are inconsistent. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 20 (2d ed. 1983).

31. 12 C.F.R. § 7.8000.
32. Perdue, 38 Cal. 3d at 937, 702 P.2d at 520, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 361-62.
33. Id. at 941, 702 P.2d at 523, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 365.

cated that allowing plaintiff to proceed on his claims of lack of good
faith, unfair competition and unconscionability would impair the
3
Bank's viability. 4
IV.

CONCLUSION

A unanimous court concluded that the superior court erred in sustaining defendant's demurrer to all five causes of action without
leave to amend. Federal regulations proffered by the defendant
notwithstanding, the plaintiff was permitted to prove his contentions
in further proceedings. If the plaintiff can show that the NSF
charges are unconscionable and the Bank is involved in deceptive or
misleading pratices, he may receive compensatory and injunctive
relief.

35

JAMES B. BRISTOL

III.

CIVIL PROCEDURE
A.

California Code of Civil Procedure section 409(a) does
not deny equal protection in the context of judicial
foreclosures: Arrow Sand and Gravel, Inc. v. Superior
Court.

In Arrow Sand and Gravel, Inc. v. Superior Court, 38 Cal. 3d 884,
700 P.2d 1290, 215 Cal. Rptr. 288 (1985), the court found that California Code of Civil Procedure section 409(a) did not deny equal protection in the context of judicial foreclosures by limiting the recording
of a notice of lis pendens to plaintiffs or to defendants who file a
cross-complaint. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 409(a) (West Supp.
1986). This decision was based on the 1982 legislative amendment to
the Code of Civil Procedure section 701.680(a) which established that
the foreclosure sale of real property "is absolute and may not be set
aside for any reason." Id. § 701.680(a) (West Supp. 1986).
The plaintiff brought an action for judicial foreclosure on certain
property to which the defendant held title. The trial court granted
summary judgment for the plaintiff, and the defendant filed a notice
of lis pendens announcing his intent to appeal. The court granted
plaintiff's motion to expunge the notice pursuant to section 409.1 because defendant had not filed a cross-complaint. Id. § 409.1. The defendant appealed from the decision arguing that the trial court's
construction of section 409 violated equal protection.
34. Id. at 943-44, 702 P.2d at 524-25, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 366-67.
35. Id. at 944, 702 P.2d at 525, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 367. For an in depth analysis of the

issues presented by the plaintiff on NSF fees, see Note, Bank Chargesfor Insufficient
Funds Checks, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 599 (1981) (authored by a student who was clerk to
the counsel representing the plaintiff in an earlier proceeding of Perdue).
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Under the common law, a lis pendens notice was filed to notify all
persons not a party to the action that any interest acquired in the
property was subject to the pending judgment. Without such notice
the non-party purchaser would not be affected and would hold clear
title. Kendall-Brief Co. v. Superior Court, 60 Cal. App. 3d 462, 468,
131 Cal. Rptr. 515, 519 (1976).
Applying those principles, the supreme court held that since section 701.680(a) supersedes the party-nonparty distinction, the filing of
a lis pendens notice affords no additional protection to real property
interests. Thus, equal protection was not denied to defendant. Additionally, for purely academic interest, filing the notice would not
have given the defendant any additional protection because, as is usually the case, the plaintiff purchased the property in question. A
party to the action is given actual notice when he purchases land subject to a rendered judgment. Albertson v. Raboff, 46 Cal. 2d 375, 379,
295 P.2d 405, 408 (1956). The court therefore upheld the trial court's
construction of section 409.1 as requiring a party to have filed a complaint before filing a notice of lis pendens.
DAYTON

B.

PARCELLS III

B. A foreign manufacturer which makes no direct sales in
California may be required to defend a products
liability action in California if the corporation has
sufficient contacts with California,avails itself of the
California market, and it is reasonable to require the
corporation to defend a lawsuit in California: Asahi
Metal Industry Co., Ltd. v. Superior Court.
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Asahi Metal Industry Co., Ltd. v. Superior Court,] the California
Supreme Court considered the issue of whether California can constitutionally exercise personal jurisdiction over a manufacturer of component parts which made no direct sales in California, but had
knowledge that a substantial number of its parts would be sold in finished products in California. The defendant, a Japanese corporation,
argued that it did not have the required minimum contacts with California to be required to defend a lawsuit there.
1. 39 Cal. 3d 35, 702 P.2d 543, 216 Cal. Rptr. 385 (1985). Opinion by Chief Justice
Bird, with Justices Kaus, Broussard, Reynoso, and Grodin concurring. A dissenting
opinion was authored by Justice Lucas, with Justice Mosk concurring.

II.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In 1978, Gary Zurcher was severely injured when he lost control of
his Honda motorcycle and collided with a tractor rig. His wife, a passenger, was killed. The accident was allegedly caused by a sudden
loss of air and an explosion in the rear tire of the motorcycle. Both
Zurcher and his wife were California residents, and the collision occurred on a California highway.
Zurcher filed a products liability action naming Cheng Shin Rubber Indus. Co., Ltd., the Taiwanese manufacturer of the tube, and
Sterling May Co., Inc., the California retailer, as defendants. Cheng
Shin then filed a cross-complaint seeking indemnity from its codefendant and from Asahi Metal Indus. Co., Ltd., the manufacturer of
the tube's valve assembly.
The trial court denied Asahi's motion to quash service of summons
finding that Asahi had the requisite minimum contacts with California and that jurisdiction was fair and reasonable. The trial court relied on a number of factors in its decision: (1) the significant number
of tubes with Asahi valve assemblies sold in California, (2) the
number of valve assemblies Asahi sold to Cheng Shin, (3) Cheng
Shin's substantial business with California, and (4) Asahi's knowledge that its valve assemblies would be incorporated into tubes sold
in California. The supreme court denied Asahi's petition for a writ of
mandate to compel the trial court to grant its motion to quash service
of summons.
III.

A

BRIEF HISTORY OF MINIMUM CONTACTS

At one time, the power of a state to adjudicate claims and subject
persons to its authority only extended to the state's boundaries. 2 It
was not until 1945 that this rule was completely overruled in International Shoe Co. v. Washington.3 That case established a new test
whereby a state would have jurisdiction over a party if that party had
certain minimum contacts with the forum state. 4 The Court later
emphasized that "the relationship between the defendant and the fo2. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 720 (1877).
3. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). See also Note,
World-Wide Volkswaqen v. Woodson: Minimum Contacts in a Modern World, 8 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 783, 784 (1981); See generally Woods, Pennoyer's Demise: PersonalJurisdiction After Shaffer and Kulko and a Modest Prediction Regarding World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 20 ARIZ. L. REV. 861 (1978).
4. International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316-17. The new minimum contacts test was
stated as follows:
[D]ue process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment
in personam, if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he have
certain minimum contacts with it such that maintenance of the suit does not
offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.'

Id.
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rum must be such that it is 'reasonable . . . to require the corporation to defend the particular suit which is brought there.' "5
Over the past several years, the minimum contacts doctrine has
been "substantially relaxed."' 6 In McGee v. International Life Ins.
Co.,7 the United States Supreme Court attributed this broadening of
the scope of the minimum contacts doctrine to technological advances
in transportation and communication and to the development of interstate and international trade.
Although the minimum contacts requirements have been relaxed,
they have not entirely disappeared. In Hanson v. Denckla, the Court
stated, "It is essential in each case that there be some act by which
the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting
activities within the
forum state, thus invoking the benefits and pro'8
tection of its laws.
In World-Wide Volkswagen Co. v. Woodson, a recent products liability case, the United States Supreme Court stressed the importance
of foreseeability in determining minimum contacts. 9 The Court held
that the "foreseeability that is critical to due process analysis is not
the mere likelihood that a product will find its way into the forum
State. Rather, it is that the defendant's conduct and connection with
the forum State are such that he should reasonably anticipate being
haled into court there." 10 Furthermore, the Court argued that a
state will not be exceeding its powers under the due process clause,
"if it asserts personal jurisdiction over a corporation that delivers its
products into the stream of commerce with the expectation that they
will be purchased by consumers in the forum State."11
5. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980) (quoting
InternationalShoe, 326 U.S. at 317).
6. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292.
7. McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 222-23 (1957). The Court
ruled that the California resident met the minimum contacts test.
8. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958) (citing InternationalShoe, 326 U.S.
at 319). Hanson held that it would be a violation of due process to permit a Florida
probate court to assert in personam jurisdiction over a Delaware trustee administering
a trust established in Pennsylvania by a testatrix who subsequently moved to Florida.
Hanson, 357 U.S. at 245-56.
9. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297.
10. Id. The plaintiffs in this action were involved in an automobile accident in
Oklahoma while travelling from New York to Arizona in a car they had purchased in
New York. Id. at 295. The Supreme Court held that Oklahoma lacked jurisdiction
over the distributor and retailer because neither corporation sold cars to Oklahoma
customers nor sought to serve the Oklahoma market in any way. Id. at 299.
11. Id. at 297-98. See Gray v. American Radiator and Standard Sanitary Corp., 22
Ill. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961). The plaintiff in Gray was injured in Illinois when a

The courts have distinguished between local retailers or distributors and major manufacturers.12 The courts consider whether the
distributor or manufacturer "benefits legally from the protection provided by the laws of the forum state for its products, as well as economically from indirect sales to forum residents." 13 Therefore, a
manufacturer may be subject to a forum's jurisdiction when a retailer
(or maker of component parts) is not, because the manufacturer
serves a broader market and it derives a substantial benefit from
14
serving that market.
In addition to the minimum contacts principles discussed above,
California has three prerequisites which must be met before a court
may properly assert jurisdiction over a person or corporation.15
There must be adequate notice and the opportunity to be heard, some
relationship between the state and the party to establish that the
court is competent to hear the case, and compliance with any stateimposed jurisdictional requirements (such as the statutory procedure
for service of process). 16 The California long arm statute sets guidelines for one of these state-imposed jurisdictional requirements. 17 In
Asahi, the court considered the foregoing principles in order to decide whether to assert jurisdiction over the Japanese corporation.

IV. MAJORITY OPINION
In its analysis of Asahi's contacts with California, the court first
pointed out that Asahi has no offices, property or agents in California
nor does it solicit business or make direct sales in California.' 8 However, the court argued that because Asahi knew that some of the
valve assemblies it sold to Cheng Shin would be incorporated into
hot water heater made in Pennsylvania exploded. The court allowed the assertion of
jurisdiction over the Ohio manufacturer of the heater's safety valve even though the
valve was not directly sold in Illinois. The court held that the valve company derived a
substantial benefit from the sales of the water heaters in Illinois and indirectly
benefitted from the protection of the Illinois law.
12. Gray, 22 Ill. 2d at 432, 176 N.E.2d at 761.
13. DeJames v. Magnificence Carriers, Inc., 654 F.2d 280, 285 (3d Cir. 1981).
14. Nelson v. Park Indus., Inc., 717 F.2d 1120, 1125-26 (7th Cir. 1983). It was held
that Wisconsin could assert jurisdiction over a Hong Kong manufacturer and distributor because they were aware of the retailer's distribution scheme and derived economic
benefit from the sales in Wisconsin. Id. at 1126-27.
15. 1 B. WITKIN, CaliforniaProcedure, Jurisdiction § 76 (1970). See also 16 CAL.
JUR. 3D Courts §§ 76-83 (1983).
16. WITKIN, supra note 15, at 601.
17. Section 410.10 of the California Code of Civil Procedure permits California
courts to exercise jurisdiction on any basis not inconsistent with the California or
United States constitutions. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 410.10 (West 1973). See generally
Note, Alien Corporationsand Aggregate Contacts: A Genuinely Federal Jurisdictional

Standard,95 HARV. L. REV. 470 (1982); Comment, Asserting Jurisdictionover Nonresident Corporationson the Basis of ContractualDealings: A FourStep Proposal,12 PAC.
L.J. 1039 (1981).
18. Asahi, 39 Cal. 3d at 48, 702 P.2d at 549, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 391.
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products to be sold in California, it should reasonably have anticipated being haled into the California courts.1 9
Additionally, the court emphasized that Asahi purposefully availed
itself of the California market and the benefits and protections of
California's laws. 20 The court was evidently not impressed by the
dissent's speculation that products sold in California represented only
.25% of Asahi's gross income. Rather, the court was impressed by the
fact that this .25% equalled approximately 270,000 valves sold in California between 1978 and 1982.21 The court stressed the fact that
World-Wide Volkswagen did not require that the defendant endeavor to sell its product in the forum state. Rather, "[i]t required
only that the defendant 'delivers its products into the stream of commerce with the expectation that they will be purchased by consumer
in the forum State.' "22
The court noted further that a critical fact is whether a defendant
is aware of the distribution system and "[i]f they were aware, they
were indirectly serving and deriving economic benefits from the national retail market established by [the retailer], and they should reasonably anticipate being subject to suit in any forum within that
market where their product caused injury." 23 The court found that
Asahi was aware of the fact that a substantial number of its valve
systems were being used in tubes sold in California. Therefore,
24
Asahi had the required minimum contacts with California.
The Court concluded its inquiry with a discussion of whether asserting jurisdiction is fair and reasonable. If minimum contacts exist,
the due process clause also requires the court to determine whether
the jurisdiction is fair and reasonable. 25 The court must balance the
inconvenience to the defendant in having to defend itself in the forum state against both the interest of the plaintiff in suing locally
19. Id. at 48-49, 702 P.2d at 549-50, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 391-92. See World-wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297.
20. Asahi, 39 Cal. 3d at 48-49, 702 P.2d at 549-50, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 391-92. See Plant
Food Co-op v. Wolfkill Feed & Fertilizer Corp., 633 F.2d 155, 159-60 (9th Cir. 1980).
21. Asahi, 39 Cal. 3d at 49 n.5, 702 P.2d at 550 n.5, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 392 n.5.
22. Id. at 50-51, 702 P.2d at 551, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 393 (emphasis in original) (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 298). See also Volkswagenwerk, A. G. v.
Klippan, GMBH, 611 P.2d 498 (Ala. 1980) (the stream of commerce theory was applied
to manufacturers of components parts, seat belts).
23. Asahi, 39 Cal. 3d at 51, 702 P.2d at 551, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 393 (quoting Nelson,
717 F.2d at 1126). See also Plant Food Co-op, 633 F.2d at 159-60.
24. Asahi, 39 Cal. 3d at 53-54, 702 P.2d at 553, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 395.
25. Id. at 52, 702 P.2d at 552, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 394. See World-Wide Volkswagen,
444 U.S. at 292.

and the interrelated interest of the state in assuming jurisdiction.26
The court argued that California has a strong interest in protecting
its consumers by ensuring that foreign manufacturers comply with
the state's safety standards. The court held that the inconvenience to
Asahi in having to defend an action in California was outweighed by
Cheng Shin's interest in litigating all its claims in California and by
27
California's interest in protecting its citizens.
V.

THE DISSENT

In the dissent, Justice Lucas emphasized the fact that in order to
subject a defendant to in personam jurisdiction, the defendant must
purposefully avail itself of the privilege of conducting business in the
forum state.28 He stated that nowhere in the record was it claimed
that Asahi had any direct contact with California or any intent to
serve that market directly. Also, because Asahi only received approximately .25% of its total revenue from California, it was inconceivable to Lucas that Asahi should have anticipated being haled into
a California court.29 Finally, Lucas argues that Asahi and Cheng
Shin entered into their contract outside of California. Because
Zurcher settled his claim with Cheng Shin before the jurisdiction issue came before this court, Justice Lucas argues that the
overburdened courts should be deciding cases involving California
citizens rather than disputes for indemnity between two alien
30
corporations.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The court widened the minimum contacts doctrine to include manufacturers that have a reasonable expectation that their product will
end up in the California forum via distribution channels. Therefore,
California in personam jurisdiction continues to expand with modern
technology.
JOHN THOMAS McDOWELL
26. See Buckeye Boiler Co. v. Superior Court, 71 Cal. 2d 893, 899, 458 P.2d 57, 62,
80 Cal. Rptr. 113, 118 (1969). The plaintiff was injured in California by a product manufactured in Ohio. The assertion of jurisdiction by a California court was upheld because the manufacturer sold its products to an Ohio distributor which had plants in
San Francisco. Jurisdiction was deemed fair and reasonable because the plaintiff, the

defective product and all the witnesses were located in California. Id. at 905-07, 458
P.2d at 65-67, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 121-123.
27. Asahi, 39 Cal. 3d at 53-54, 702 P.2d at 553, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 395.
28. Id at 54, 702 P.2d at 554, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 396 (Lucas, J., dissenting). See
Worldwide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 295-97.
29. Asahi, 39 Cal. 3d at 54-55, 702 P.2d at 554, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 396 (Lucas, J.,
dissenting).
30. Id. at 56, 702 P.2d at 555, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 397.
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C.

When a complaint is amended to charge a doe
defendant with a new cause of action arisingfrom
different operativefacts, the new action commences, for
purposes of the three year service and return
requirement,on the date the amended complaint is
filed. Barrington v. A. H. Robins Co.

In Barrington v. A. H. Robins Co., 39 Cal. 3d 146, 702 P.2d 563, 216
Cal. Rptr. 405 (1985), the court determined that the relation-back
doctrine may apply to the statute which requires a defendant to be
served with a summons and complaint within three years from the
filing of the complaint.
The petitioner, Cheryl Barrington, alleged that she was injured in
December 1977. On July 3, 1979, she filed suit alleging causes of action against her doctor, the manufacturer of the drug Darvon, and
does 1 through 40 for medical malpractice and the negligent failure to
warn of the dangers involved in taking Darvon. In October 1979, the
petitioner substituted A. H. Robins Company for doe 40. On February 29, 1980, she filed a first amended complaint which added an entirely new cause of action only against Robins. This new cause of
action alleged that the cause of petitioner's injuries was a defective
"Dalkon Shield" intrauterine device manufactured by Robins.
The service and return of the summons and amended complaint on
Robins was not made until July 19, 1982. This was two years and six
months after the filing of the amended complaint, but three years
and seven weeks after the filing of the original complaint. The trial
court sustained Robins' motion to dismiss the action under former
section 581a of the California Code of Civil Procedure, which required that the summons and complaint be served and returned
within three years from the filing of the complaint. CAL. CIV. PROC.
CODE § 583.210 (West 1985) (current section). The trial court held
that a doe defendant must be served with process within three years
from the original commencement of the suit.
Although the court agreed with many of the rules relied upon by
the trial court, it reversed the order dismissing the petitioner's
amended complaint due to the lower court's failure to apply the relation-back doctrine to this case. The court agreed that an action commences for purposes of section 581a on the date of the filing of the
complaint. It also conceded that this rule applies when the defendant
was named in the original complaint under a fictitious name. However, the court held that even though defendant Robins was named

in the original complaint as a fictitious defendant and was later added
as a named defendant, the amended complaint relied on different operative facts than the original complaint. Therefore, the court determined that the relation-back doctrine must be considered in deciding
whether an amended complaint relates back to the original complaint, thus requiring the defendant to be served with the amended
complaint within three years from the filing of the original
complaint.
The relation-back doctrine is stated in the following rule:
An amended complaint relates back to the original complaint and thus avoids
the statute of limitations as a bar against named parties substituted for fictitious defendants, if it
(1) rests on the same general set of facts as the original complaint; and (2) refers to the same accident and same injuries as the original complaint.

Barrington, 39 Cal. 3d at 151, 702 P.2d at 565, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 407
(citing Smeltzley v. Nicholson Manufacturing Co., 18 Cal. 3d 932, 936-

37, 559 P.2d 624, 626-27, 136 Cal. Rptr. 269, 271-72 (1977)). See also 3 B.
Witkin, California Procedure, Pleading §§ 1035, 1066, 1073, 1080
(1971). Although the relation-back doctrine traditionally only applied to the statute of limitations for the filing of the complaint, the
supreme court extended the doctrine to apply to the service and return requirements of section 581a (now section 583.210).
The court agreed with the petitioner's argument that the amended
complaint was based on different operative facts than the original
complaint, and therefore did not relate back to the original complaint. Since the amended complaint did not relate back to the original complaint the action in the amended complaint did not
commence for purposes of the statute of limitations until the
amended complaint was filed.
The court pointed out that because the petitioner could have filed
the amended complaint as a completely separate action, she should
not be penalized for merely taking advantage of the liberal joinder
rules. Furthermore, the court based its decision on the strong public
policy that seeks to dispose of litigation on the merits rather than on
procedural grounds.
JOHN THOMAS MCDOWELL
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D. A defective order granting a new trial must be
corrected within the sixty-day time period in which it
has to be granted, and such order must expressly state
that it was granted upon the ground of insufficiency of
the evidence; otherwise, an appellate court will vacate
the order: Sanchez-Corea v. Bank of America.
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Sanchez-Corea v. Bank of America,1 the supreme court reversed
an order granting a new trial to the defendant, Bank of America.
The court reasoned that the first order did not state the grounds
upon which a new trial was granted, and the second order was filed
after the sixty-day period provided by the California Rules of Civil
Procedure.
II.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The plaintiffs sued Bank of America for breach of contract, fraud,
intentional infliction of emotional distress and several other theories.
The trial court awarded the plaintiffs a judgment of over two million
dollars. Thereafter, the defendant timely moved the court for a new
trial on six grounds: "(1) irregularity in the proceedings of the jury
which prevented the defendant from having a fair trial, (2) misconduct of the jury, (3) excessive damages, (4) insufficiency of the evidence, (5) a verdict against the law, and (6) error in the law to which
'
defendant excepted during trial. '2

Thereafter and exactly sixty days after the notice of entry of judgment, the trial court granted the defendant's motion for a new trial.
However, this first order granting a new trial, dated November 27,
1979, stated no grounds upon which the new trial was granted. Later
on December 4, 1979, sixty-seven days after the notice of entry of
judgment, the trial court filed a second order stating that the ground
1. 38 Cal. 3d 892, 701 P.2d 826, 215 Cal. Rptr. 679 (1985). The opinion was authored by Justice Reynoso with Chief Justice Bird and Justices Mosk, Broussard,
Grodin, and Anderson concurring. There was a separate dissenting opinion by Justice
Kaus. Justice Anderson was assigned by the Chairperson of the Judicial Council.
2. Id. at 898, 701 P.2d at 830, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 683. California statutory law provides that a verdict may be vacated and a new trial granted for the reasons stated
herein: (1) Improper proceedings orders, or abuses of discretion of the court wherein
the right to a fair trial is impaired; (2) jury misconduct; (3) unavoidable accident or
surprise; (4) newly discovered evidence that was not reasonably available at trial; (5)
damages are excessive or inadequate; (6) evidence was insufficient to justify the
decison; (7) error in the law occurring at the trial. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 657 (West
1976).

for the new trial was based upon insufficiency of the evidence, which
was only one of the defendant's six assertions for a new trial. The
plaintiffs appealed the order granting a new trial asserting first, that
the original order dated November 27, 1979, was defective for failure
to state the grounds upon which a new trial was granted,3 and second, that the subsequent order dated December 4, 1979, was invalid
because the court filed it after sixty days from notice of entry of
4
judgment.
III.

THE COURT'S ANALYSIS

The first issue addressed by the court was whether the first order
the trial court granted was void or defective for failure to state the
grounds upon which a new trial was granted. In Mercer v. Perez,5 the
supreme court outlined circumstances in which an order granting a
new trial is void: (1) when a new trial is not available in the proceeding; (2) when a new trial is granted on a ground not prescribed by
statute; (3) when a notice of intention is filed too early, too late, or it
is not served upon an adverse party, or (4) when a new trial is
granted after the sixty-day period prescribed by law. The court in
Mercer held that the order was not void because it was not granted
under any of the listed circumstances in which an order is declared
void; the order merely did not state the grounds upon which it was
granted as required by statute. 6 The supreme court has stated, "It
follows that a failure of the trial judge to specify any ground. . . cannot be held to render the order void from its inception." 7 However,
the Mercer court reversed the order, not because it was void, but because "the record does not support the order."8 Following its holding
in Mercer, the court concluded that the trial court's first order granting Bank of America a new trial was not void, rather it was merely
defective for failure to state the ground upon which it was granted. 9
The court next addressed the second issue of whether the first order's defect was cured by the second order, which stated both the
grounds and reasons for granting a new trial. The court concluded
3. California Rules of Civil Procedure require that "[w]hen a new trial is granted,

on all or part of the issues, the court shall specify the ground or grounds upon which it
is granted and the court's reason or reasons for granting the new trial upon each

ground stated." CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 657 (West 1976).
4. Section 660 of the California Civil Procedure Code provides that "the power of
the court to rule on a motion for a new trial shall expire 60 days from and after the
mailing of notice of entry of judgment by the clerk of the court." Id. § 660.

5. Mercer v. Perez, 68 Cal. 2d 104, 118, 436 P.2d 315, 324, 65 Cal. Rptr. 315, 324
(1968).
6. Id. at 118, 436 P.2d at 324, 65 Cal. Rptr. at 324.
7. Treber v. Superior Court, 68 Cal. 2d 128, 134, 436 P.2d 330, 334, 65 Cal. Rptr.
330, 334 (1968).
8. Mercer, 68 Cal. 2d at 119, 436 P.2d at 325, 65 Cal. Rptr. at 325.
9. Sanchez-Corea, 38 Cal. 3d at 901, 701 P.2d at 832, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 685.
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that the second order did not cure the defect of the first because section 657 of the Code of Civil Procedure allows only the specification
of reasons to be filed ten days after the order is granted and not the
grounds.1o The grounds must be stated at the time the trial court
grants the order. In the case at hand, the grounds for granting a new
trial were stated along with the reasons in the second order, which
was filed after the sixty-day time period prescribed by section 660.11
Thus, the defect in the first order was not cured before the sixty-day
period expired.
Lastly, the court addressed the issue of whether the defective order
should have been affirmed upon appellate review. Section 657 of the
California Code of Civil Procedure outlines when an appellate court
is required to affirm an order:
[I]f it should have been granted upon any ground stated in the motion,
whether or not specified in the order or specification of reasons, except that
(a) the order shall not be affirmed upon the ground of the insufficiency of the
evidence to justify the verdict or other decision, or upon the ground of excessive or inadequate damages, unless such ground is stated in the order granting
the motion ....
12

The second order of the trial court stated that the grounds upon
which a new trial was granted was insufficiency of the evidence.
Pursuant to section 657, insufficiency of the evidence is an exception
to the general rule that an order should be affirmed. Thus, the court
could not affirm the trial court's order based upon the ground of insufficiency of the evidence.
Thereafter, the court examined the other grounds for granting a
new trial and concluded that none of them warranted affirming the
trial court's order. Therefore, the court reversed the order granting
Bank of America a new trial and reinstated the two million dollar
judgment against it.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The holding of the supreme court in Sanchez-Corea reaffirms the
rule that an order granting a new trial is not void because it fails to
10. Section 657 states that
if the motion is granted it must state the ground or grounds relied upon by
the court, and may contain the specification of reasons. If an order granting
such motion does not contain such specification of reasons, the court must,
within 10 days after filing such order, prepare, sign and file such specifications
of reasons in writing with the clerk.
CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 657 (West 1976) (emphasis added).
11. See supra note 4.
12. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 657 (West 1976).

state the grounds upon which it was granted. However, it should be
noted that the order is considered defective. For the defect to be
cured, it must be done within a sixty-day time period after notice of
entry of judgment. In Sanchez-Corea, the ground for the order was
stated after sixty days, thus, the defect was not cured. Furthermore,
the appellate court could not affirm the order because the ground
upon which it was granted, insufficiency of evidence, fell within one
of the exceptions to the statutory rule that an order should be affirmed whether or not the grounds were stated in the order. Therefore, following the Code of Civil Procedure, the court reversed the
order granting a new trial and reinstated the judgment of the trial
court.
MIssY KELLY BANKHEAD

E.

The legislature constitutionally granted concurrent
jurisdictionover the claims of state civil service
employees to the State Personnel Board and the agencies
operating under the FairEmployment and Housing
Act: State Personnel Board v. Fair Employment & Housing
Commission.
I.

INTRODUCTION

State Personnel Board v. Fair Employment & Housing Commission' considered jurisdictional conflict between state agencies. The
question posed was whether the agencies charged with administering
the California Fair Employment and Housing Act2 (hereinafter
FEHA or the Act) could exercise jurisdiction over state civil service
employees. The court utilized a two-fold analysis in finding that the
Department of Fair Employment and Housing (hereinafter DFEH or
Department) and the Fair Employment and Housing Commission
(hereinafter FEHC or Commission) could exercise concurrent juris1. 39 Cal. 3d 422, 703 P.2d 354, 217 Cal. Rptr. 16 (1985). Justice Broussard authored the majority opinion with Justice Kaus and Chief Justice Bird concurring. Justice Grodin wrote a separate concurring opinion with Justice Gilbert, assigned by the
Chairperson of the Judicial Council, concurring. Justices Lucas and Mosk each wrote
separate dissenting opinions.
2. CAL. GoV'T CODE §§ 12900-96 (West 1980). The court explained the history of
FEHA as follows:
In 1981, the Fair Employment Practice Act and the Rumford Fair Housing
Act were combined to form the Fair Employment and Housing Act (§ 12900 et
seq.), pursuant to the Governor's Reorganization Plan No. 1 (Stats. 1980, ch.
992, p. 3138). This change abolished the Division of Fair Employment Practices and the Fair Employment Practices Commission, both within the Department of Industrial Relations, and recreated them as the Department of
Fair Employment and Housing and the Fair Employment and Housing Commission, respectively.
State PersonnelBd., 39 Cal. 3d at 426 n.1, 703 P.2d at 355 n.1, 217 Cal. Rtpr. at 17 n.1.
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diction with the State Personnel Board (hereinafter the Board).
First, the court held that the legislature did intend to include civil
service employees within the coverage of the Act.3 Second, the court
found that it was constitutional for the legislature to so include the
employees.4
II.

FACTS

The three real parties in interest applied for positions as traffic officers with the California Highway Patrol after the Board had announced openings for cadets. Although they passed all examinations,
the three were all subsequently disqualified on the basis of the medical standards, which the Board had established for the position. 5 The
rejected applicants sent protest letters to the Board. These letters
were treated as "medical appeals," as opposed to complaints of discrimination on the basis of physical handicap. Each of the parties
also filed timely complaints with the DFEH.
The Department believed that the Board and the California Highway Patrol had committed an unfair employment practice and issued
accusations 6 charging discrimination on the basis of physical handicap. Before a hearing was held, the Board's motion was granted
which permanently enjoined the DFEH and FEHC from exercising
jurisdiction over such civil service claims. The superior court based
its decision on article VII of the California Constitution, 7 interpreting
it as a grant of exclusive jurisdiction to the Board for all matters involving state civil service employees. However, subsequent to the
trial court's judgment, the California Supreme Court issued a deci3. Id. at 428-35, 703 P.2d at 357-62, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 19-24.
4. Id. at 435-44, 703 P.2d at 362-68, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 24-30.
5. The applicants' reasons for disqualification were mild colorblindness, early
changes in thoracic spine which is characteristic of hypertrophic osteoarthritis, and
previous intestinal bypass surgery to alleviate a weight problem. Id. at 427, 703 P.2d at
356, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 18.
6. The DFEH may issue an "accusation" if it determines that the complaint is
valid and cannot be resolved through conciliation. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12965(a) (West
1980). The DFEH acts as prosecutor on the accusation, the equivalent of a civil complaint, and argues the complainant's case before the FEHC. Alternatively, the DFEH
can issue a "right to sue" letter allowing the complainant to pursue a private court action under the FEHA. Id. § 12965(b).
7. Article VII provides in relevant part: "In the civil service permanent appointment and promotion shall be made under a general system based on merit ascertained
by competitive examination." CAL. CONST. art. VII, § 1(b). Also, "[t]he board shall enforce the civil service statutes and ... shall prescribe probationary periods and classifications, adopt other rules authorized by statute, and review disciplinary actions."
CAL. CONST. art. VII, § 3(a).

sion in Pacific Legal Foundation v. Brown,8 in which it rejected the
"exclusive jurisdiction" interpretation of article VII relied on by the
trial court.
III.

A.

MAJORITY'S ANALYSIS

ConcurrentJurisdictionEstablished

The court began its inquiry by providing an overview of the Fair
Employment and Housing Act. 9 Initially, the court described the
Act's basic premise:
The FEHA is a comprehensive scheme for the realization of the state's public policy 'to protect and safeguard the right and opportunity of all persons to
seek, obtain, and hold employment without discrimination or abridgment on
account of race, religious creed, color, national origin, ancestry,
physical hand12
11
10
icap,[ ] medical condition,[ ] marital status, sex or age.'

In order to carry out this policy, the Act created two administrative
bodies. The first agency, the DFEH, performs investigatory, conciliatory and prosecutorial functions in discrimination complaints.13 The

second agency, the FEHC, performs adjudicatory and rulemaking
functions.14 The FEHC has several remedial powers including order-

ing reinstatement, hiring, promotion, and back pay. 15 Finally, any
8. Pacific Legal Found. v. Brown, 29 Cal. 3d 168, 624 P.2d 1215, 172 Cal. Rptr. 487
(1981). See generally California Supreme Court Survey, 9 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 233
(1981).
9. For an overview of the FEHA, presented in a comparative setting, see Gelb &
Frankfurt, California's Fair Employment and Housing Act: A Viable State Remedy
ForEmployment Discrimination,34 HASTINGS L.J. 1055 (1983) (a comparison of Federal Title VII with FEHA), and Saperstein & Siniscalco, CEB Forum: Employment discrimination claims, CALIFORNIA LAWYER, Nov. 1982, at 30 (survey article regarding
Federal and California discrimination practices, including FEHA claims).
10. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12926(h) (West 1980) states the following: "'Physical
handicap' includes impairment of sight, hearing, or speech, or impairment of physical
ability because of amputation or loss of function or coordination, or any other health
impairment which requires special educational or related services." Id.
The following materials further define the scope of the term "handicap" as it relates
to employment: American Nat'l. Ins. Co. v. Fair Employment & Housing Comm'n, 32
Cal. 3d 603, 610, 651 P.2d 1151, 1155, 186 Cal. Rptr. 345, 349 (1982) ("handicap" includes
physical conditions which may have a disabling effect in the future); Sterling Transit
Co. v. Fair Employment Practice Comm'n, 121 Cal. App. 3d 791, 797, 175 Cal. Rptr. 548,
551 (1981); CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 2, R. 7293.8(d) (1985) (employer may not reject individual on a risk of future injury, provided the individual can perform the job over a
reasonable length of time); and CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 2, R. 7286.7(a) (1985) (employer
may exclude handicapped persons on the basis of class only if all, or substantially all,
of the persons in that class are unable to perform the job duties safely and efficiently).
11. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12926(f) (West 1980), states the following: "'Medical condition' means any health impairment related to or associated with a diagnosis of cancer,
for which a person has been rehabilitated or cured, based on competent medical evidence." Id. (emphasis added).
12. State Personnel Bd., 39 Cal. 3d at 428, 703 P.2d at 357, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 19
(quoting CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12920 (West 1980)).
13. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12930 (West 1980).
14. Id. § 12935.
15. Id. § 12970(a). For an explanation regarding a relevant Civil Service Act
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6
FEHC order is reviewable by a competent superior court.'
The court addressed four areas in order to ascertain whether the
legislature intended to include civil service employees within the
framework of the Act. First, the court held that the language of the
FEHA's section 12926(c) "clearly manifests an intent to include both
public and private employers within its scope."'17 In so holding, the
court rejected the Board's argument that it alone had jurisdiction
over civil service employees while the DFEH and FEHC only had jurisdiction over "exempt" noncivil service employees.' 8 Second, the
court held that the Act's record keeping and reporting requirements
evidenced a legislative intent to include the state civil service. 19
Third, the court found that the Board had, for twenty years,2 0 acknowledged the power of the DFEH and FEHC to enforce the Act
within the state civil service. 21 As an example, the Board acknowledged concurrent jurisdiction, in its own 1976 investigator handbook,
by emphasizing the continuing policy of not precluding an employee
or applicant from filing a complaint with the California Fair Employ22
ment Practices Commission.
Under a fourth area of analysis, the court held that it is not "frivolous" to make two forums available to discrimination complainants
since the FEHA and the Civil Service Act, under which the Board
operates, are different and separate pieces of legislation. The court

amendment, which grants the Board similar authority, see infra note 29 and accompanying text.
16. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1094.5 (West 1980).
17. State Personnel Bd., 39 Cal. 3d at 429, 703 P.2d at 358, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 20.
CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12926(c) (West 1980), provides in pertinent part: "'Employer' .
includes ... the state or any political or civil subdivision thereof ...." Id
18. State PersonnelBd, 39 Cal. 3d at 429 n.6, 703 P.2d at 358 n.6, 217 Cal. Rptr. at
20 n.6. The court noted that since there are 130,000 classified civil service employees,
and 89,000 exempt employees in the state, "[i]t is inconceivable that the Legislature
could have silently excluded 130,000 servants from its contemplation when it provided
that 'state' employees would be covered by the Act." d.
19. Id. at 430, 703 P.2d at 358, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 20. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12946 (West
1980), requires the Board to retain employment records for one year. The court
deemed this requirement meaningful only if the Board's employment decisions were
reviewable by DFEH and FEHC. Furthermore, CAL. GOV'T CODE § 19702.5(a)(b)
(West 1980), requires the Board to submit affirmative action plans and statistical
surveys of employees to the Commission. The court held that these requirements
would be "superfluous" unless the FEHC had authority to enforce the Act over the
state civil service.
20. The twenty year span started with the passage of the Fair Employment Practices Act in 1959 (see supra note 2 regarding the FEHA's history), and ended with the
initiation of the case at bar in 1979.
21. State PersonnelBd., 39 Cal. 3d at 430, 703 P.2d at 359, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 21.
22. Id. See supra note 2 for an explanation of the FEHA's history.

found that the two laws differ in purpose, enforcement services, type
of forum, and procedural rights.
The court began this phase of its analysis by outlining the differing
purposes:
The purpose of the Civil Service Act is to ensure that appointments to state
office are made not on the basis of patronage, but on the basis of merit, in order to preserve the economy and efficiency of state service .... The purpose
of the FEHA is to provide effective remedies for the vindication of constitutionally recognized civil rights, and to eliminate discriminatory practices on
ancestry, physical
the basis of race, religious creed, color, national origin,
23
handicap, medical condition, marital status, sex and age.

The court next detailed the different enforcement services available under the two acts. One key feature among many 24 stems from
the divergent character of the investigating bodies themselves. When
the Board investigates an appeal, the process is handled by the same
agency charged with discrimination. However, when there is a
DFEH investigation, the Department acts as a neutral, outside investigatory agency. 25 This basic split serves to create two essentially different forums; the FEHC is a disinterested body, whereas "the Board
'' 26
occupies the roles of both defendant and judge.
Finally, the court summarized the different procedural rights afforded under the acts. First, complainants under the FEHA have a
private right of action in superior court. 27 This right is not granted
under the Civil Service Act. Second, the court noted that at a Board
hearing there is no right to cross-examination or direct examination
of witnesses and the normal rules of evidence do not apply. 28 Lastly,
at the time of the real parties' claims before the Board, the Civil Service Act did not provide for an award of back pay and compensatory
23. State Personnel Bd., 39 Cal. 3d at 432, 703 P.2d at 360, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 22. The
purpose of the Civil Service Act is found in CAL. GOV'T CODE § 18500 (West 1980). The
purpose of the FEHA is found in CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 12920-12921 (West 1980), and in
the California Constitution. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 8.
24. Two specific services available under the FEHA, which have no counterpart
under the Civil Service Act, are (1) that the Department bears the expense of investigating, conciliating, and where necessary, prosecuting the action on behalf of the
claimant (CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 12961-12963, 12963.1-12963.7 (West 1980)), and (2) that if
the Commission decides in the claimant's favor, the Department must conduct a compliance review to ensure the employer is fully obeying the Commission's order. Id.
§ 12973.
25. State PersonnelBd., 39 Cal. 3d at 432, 703 P.2d at 360, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 22.
26. Id. at 434, 703 P.2d at 361, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 23.
27. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
28. State Personnel Bd., 39 Cal. 3d at 433, 703 P.2d at 361, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 23.
CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 2, R. 547.32(f) (1985), governs the procedures at the appropriate
Board hearing. Regarding the court's statement that the rules of evidence do not apply at Board hearings, see Sommer, Rules of Evidence in Administrative Hearings,
JUDGES JOURNAL, Summer 1983, at 34 (refutes a literal interpretation of the phrase
"the rules of evidence do not apply in administrative hearings," stating that even
though the exclusionary rules are inapplicable, judges do not have a "carte blanche" to
ignore such rules).
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damages.
B.

29

The Legislature'sInclusion of State Civil Service Employees
Within the FEHA Found Constitutional

The court relied upon its previous decision in Pacific Legal Foundation3Oto dismiss the Board's argument that article VII of the California Constitution3 l grants it exclusive jurisdiction over civil service
employees. The Board argued that an exercise of jurisdiction by
DFEH and FEHC over state employees threatened to "fragment and
fractionalize" the merit principle which had been constitutionally
delegated to the Board to implement.
In Pacific Legal Foundation,the court held that collective bargaining under the State Employer-Employee Relations Act (SEERA) did
not conflict with the general merit principle embodied in article
VII.32 After holding that the sole aim of article VII was to enshrine
the merit principle in the constitution beyond the reach of political
incumbents, the court further stated that "the constitutional provision left the legislature with a 'free hand' to fashion 'laws relating to
personnel administration for the best interests of the state.' "33 Moreover, the court held that the legislature was not precluded from establishing other agencies, besides the Board, "whose specialized
watchdog functions might also, in some cases, involve the consideration of ...

34
disciplinary action."

Following the Pacific Legal Foundation logic, the court held that
"[j]ust as the 'merit principle' is not infringed upon by the institution
of collective bargaining, so it is unharmed by the watchdog functions
of the fair employment agencies. Indeed the principle of nondiscrim29. Subsequent to the real parties' claims, the Civil Service Act was amended to
give the Board authority to issue cease and desist orders and to order hiring, reinstatement, promotion, back pay and compensatory damages. See 1984 Cal. Stat. ch. 1754,
§ 6; CAL. GOV'T CODE § 19702(e) (West Supp. 1985). However, as the court pointed out,
"The fact that the Legislature has granted statutory powers to the Board that are already possessed by the Commission (§ 12970) without removing them from the Commission is further evidence of the Legislature's intent to provide parallel, not exclusive
forums." State PersonnelBd., 39 Cal. 3d at 434 n.13, 703 P.2d at 361 n.13, 217 Cal. Rptr.
at 23 n.13.
30. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
31. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
32. Pacific Legal Found., 29 Cal. 3d at 184-85, 624 P.2d at 1224, 172 Cal. Rptr. at
496.
33. Id. at 183, 624 P.2d at 1223, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 495.
34. Id. at 198-99, 624 P.2d at 1233, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 505. The first of these "watch
dog" agencies discussed was the FEHC. Id.

ination reinforces the merit principle." 35 The court concluded that
the legislature is not restrained by article VII from establishing other
agencies, such as those established under the FEHA, whose jurisdiction may overlap that of the Board.36 Hence, the Board's jurisdiction
37
is not exclusive and accommodation with other agencies is required.
The court refused to distinguish Pacific Legal Foundation from the
case at bar on the issue of actual conflict. The court rejected the
Board's claim that the two cases were different because there was an
actual conflict in this case while none existed in the previous one.
The court held that since the FEHC was injunctively stopped from
adjudicating the real parties' claims, the two cases were parallel in
the fact that there was no actual conflict, that is, no conflicting adjudications. 38 Thus, the mere potentiality of conflict was not sufficient
to prohibit the exercise of concurrent jurisdiction.
Finally, the court noted that the case presented no election of remedies problem. The court viewed the operations of the two agencies,
and the public policies behind the respective acts, as creating two independently viable forums.39
IV.

CONCURRING OPINION

Justice Grodin, with Justice Gilbert concurring, wrote a separate
opinion which addressed two issues. First, Justice Grodin declared it
unnecessary to resolve the issue of election of remedies 40 since the
Board's treatment of the real parties' claims 41 effectively avoided any
problem of duplicate adjudications. 42 Second, while echoing the majority's view that a mere potential conflict in adjudications is insufficient to preclude the FEHC from exercising jurisdiction, 43 Justice
Grodin viewed cases in which hiring criteria are attacked with regard
35. State Personnel Bd., 39 Cal. 3d at 438-39, 703 P.2d at 364, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 26.
36. Id. at 439, 703 P.2d at 365, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 27. One insightful collateral comment, which evidences the fact that the court's result naturally flowed from the Pacific Legal Found. holding, appears in a 1983 law review article: Gelb & Frankfurt,
California's FairEmployment and Housing Act: A Viable State Remedy for Employment Discrimination,34 HASTINGS L.J. 1055, 1059 n.32 (1983).
37. State PersonnelBd., 39 Cal. 3d at 440, 703 P.2d at 366, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 28.
38. Id. at 441-43, 703 P.2d at 366-67, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 28-29.
39. Id. at 443-44, 703 P.2d at 368, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 30.
40. Justice Grodin viewed the court as being in conflict over whether a claimant
may utilize the FEHA procedures after being unsuccessful under the Board's process
since "[t]he majority imply [sic] that he may do so ... while Justice Lucas in his dissent assails such a procedure .
Id. at 444-45, 703 P.2d at 369, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 31
(Grodin, J., concurring).
41. The Board treated the protests as "medical appeals" rather than as complaints
of discrimination on the basis of physical handicap. If they had done the latter, it
would have paralleled the FEHC classification. Id. at 426-27, 703 P.2d at 356, 217 Cal.
Rptr. at 31.
42. Id. at 444-45, 703 P.2d at 369, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 31.
43. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
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to a whole class, such as the case at bar, as posing a greater potential
conflict than in cases where the issue is individual discrimination.44
V.
A.

DISSENTING OPINIONS

Justice Lucas' Dissent

The basic thrust of Justice Lucas' dissent is summarized by the following passage: "To allow rejected civil service applicants the opportunity to pursue [the Board's] elaborate review procedure plus, if
unsuccessful, the luxury of initiating an entirely new administrative
proceeding before the [FEHC], based on identical claims of employment discrimination, gives these applicants an undeserved second
bite at the administrative apple." 45 The Justice found, contrary to
the majority, that the administrative procedures under both acts
were essentially equal4 6 and that the Board's past actions did not evidence an acknowledgement of concurrent jurisdiction. 47 Moreover,
Justice Lucas viewed the Board's jurisdiction as exclusive since its
power to set hiring criteria is "inextricably intertwined" with its con8
stitutional authority to administer the merit principal.4
B. Justice Mosk's Dissent
In a brief dissent, Justice Mosk stated that since the real parties in
interest are not suffering discrimination on the basis of physical
handicap, as defined by California Government Code section 12940,49
the majority's lengthy analysis is unwarranted.5 0 Finally, Justice
Mosk "editorialized" that this case should have been settled by interagency agreement and not through the protracted litigation of juris44. Where the hiring criteria are at issue, the Board's approval of those criteria is,
at least by implication, a determination that they are job related. Thus, there is a
heightened potential for conflict if the FEHC exercises its jurisdiction in determining
whether the criteria are discriminatory. State PersonnelBd., 39 Cal. 3d at 445, 703 P.2d
at 369, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 31 (Grodin, J., concurring).
45. Id. at 446, 703 P.2d at 370, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 32 (Lucas, J., dissenting) (emphasis
in original).
46. Id. at 449, 703 P.2d at 371-72, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 33-34.
47. Id. at 449-50, 703 P.2d at 372, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 34.
48. Id. at 450-51, 703 P.2d at 373, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 35.
49. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
50. State Personnel Bd, 39 Cal. 3d at 452, 703 P.2d at 374, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 36
(Mosk, J., dissenting). For an elaboration on Justice Mosk's analysis, see his dissent in
American National Ins. Co. v. Fair Employment & Housing Comm'n, 32 Cal. 3d 603,
611-20, 651 P.2d 1151, 1156-62, 186 Cal. Rptr. 345, 350-56 (1982) (Mosk, J., dissenting).
For a summary of American National Ins. Co., see CaliforniaSupreme Court Survey,
10 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 835 (1983).

dictional "arm-wrestlings." 51
VI.

IMPACT

The court's basic decision, regarding concurrent jurisdiction, gains
importance in light of the increasing size and scope of California's administrative agencies. On a practical level, the holding may help
clarify the role of the civil service employee's attorney under California law.52 Yet, there is a more pressing concern. By granting jurisdiction to the two agencies seeking it, albeit for the noble protection
of those discriminated against, the court may have "sweetened the
pot" for any agency willing to pursue litigation in order to gain power
5 3
via a favorable statutory interpretation.
JOHN EDWARD VAN VLEAR

F. Appointment of counsel for an incarcerated,indigent
defendant to a civil suit may be required if it is the
only way to protect his personal interests and right of
access to the courts: Yarbrough v. Superior Court.
The plaintiff in Yarbrough v. Superior Court, 39 Cal. 3d 197, 702
P.2d 583, 216 Cal. Rptr. 425 (1985), sought a writ of mandate to force
the appointment of legal counsel to defend him in a civil suit that
was brought by the family of the individual he was convicted of murdering. Claiming he was an indigent, Yarbrough asserted that without counsel he would be subject to a two million dollar default
judgment and would also be denied his right of access to the courts.
In issuing the writ to order the trial court to make a factual finding,
the court held that appointment of counsel may be appropriate as a
last resort if an adverse judgment would affect the indigent's personal interests, and there are no possible alternatives.
The court relied on an earlier decision, Payne v. Superior Court, 17
Cal. 3d 908, 553 P.2d 565, 132 Cal. Rptr. 405 (1976), that described the
possible remedies for an indigent prisoner who is a defendant in a
bona fide legal action that threatens his interests. Due process and
equal protection provisions require that prisoners not be denied access to the courts. Appointment of counsel may at times be required
51. State PersonnelBd., 39 Cal. 3d at 452-53, 703 P.2d at 374, 217 Cal. Rtpr. at 36
(Mosk, J., dissenting).
52. For a comparative analysis which may prove instructive for the California attorney, see Broida, RepresentingFederal Civilian Employees in DiscriminationCases

THE PRACTICAL LAWYER, Jan. 15, 1983 at 57 (step-by-step analysis of areas such as
counseling, complaints, investigation, hearings, and class complaints).
53. For an innovative view of the dynamics involved in such a scenario, see Mallamud, Courts, Statutes and Administrative Agency Jurisdiction:A Considerationof
Limits on JudicialCreativity, 35 S.C.L. REV. 191 (1984) (analysis of how judicial inter-

pretation of statutes results in granting administrative agencies increased power).
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to protect this right, but the key element of the right is access, not
appointment of counsel. See Annot., 23 A.L.R. FED. 6 (1975) (state
prisoners' access to courts under federal law).
The court noted a key factor necessary to justify appointment is
that an adverse judgment will affect property rights of the civil defendant. If the indigent has no property, as will usually be the case,
it will be difficult to show that he has an interest actually at stake.
In evaluating the potential for future loss to the prisoner, a very realistic assessment must be made of relevant economic factors. The
prisoner's age, term of incarceration, employment history, education,
skills, family background and likelihood of inheriting money are relevant factors of the inquiry. Also to be considered are the prisoner's
prospects for earnings while in prison.
Additionally, the trial court must determine that counsel will be
helpful in the circumstances of the case. In this case, because of the
admissibility of the prior conviction and its collateral estoppel effect,
Yarbrough had no chance of escaping liability in the civil suit. Yarbrough had an interest in mitigating the amount of damages assessed
him, but the existence of other defendants may have worked to protect his interest.
In short, to determine the necessity for appointing counsel to a
prisoner a court must consider the following: (1) the defendant's indigency, (2) whether defendant's interests are actually at stake, and (3)
whether counsel would be helpful under the circumstances. Additionally, the court should consider the feasibility of continuing the
civil action until the defendant is released and better able to handle
his own affairs. After weighing these factors, the court must then decide if there is an alternative besides appointment of counsel that will
protect the prisoner's right of access to the courts. See also Annot.,
23 A.L.R.4TH 590 (1983) (prisoners' access to legal research).
JAMES B. BRISTOL

IV.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Fortune-tellingis a form of noncommercial speech and
not an exclusively commercial activity; thus, it is
afforded free speech protections under the Constitution,
and any ordinance banning it is unconstitutional:
Spiritual Psychic Science Church of Truth, Inc. v. City of
Azusa.

In Spiritual Psychic Science Church of Truth, Inc. v. City of Azusa,
39 Cal. 3d 501, 703 P.2d 1119, 217 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1985), the City of
Azusa (hereinafter the City) enacted an ordinance prohibiting the
practice of fortune-telling for a fee or other consideration. The Spiritual Psychic Science Church of Truth, Inc. (hereinafter the Church)
lost its business license under the law after the minister had placed
an advertisement in a newspaper regarding her fortune-telling business. The Church and its minister then sued the City to enjoin enforcement of the ordinance asserting that it violated the freedom of
speech provisions of the California Constitution. The trial court
ruled for the City and upheld the ordinance. The Church appealed.
The City's first argument was that the court of appeal in In re
Bartha, 63 Cal. App. 3d 584, 134 Cal. Rptr. 39 (1976), had held that
fortune-telling for consideration was an exclusively commercial activity, and not speech. Thus, the Azusa ordinance as a regulation of
commerce was valid under the constitution. The supreme court rejected the argument and the Bartha holding. It concluded that fortune-telling is not an exclusively commercial activity subject to
regulation, but it involves speech. Thus, it should be afforded the protections of article 1, section 2 of the California Constitution. CAL.
CONST. art. I, § 2.
After deciding that fortune-telling was not exclusively a commercial activity, the court turned to the question of whether the speech
involved in fortune-telling was commercial or noncommercial. It reviewed decisions of the United States Supreme Court that distinguished commercial and noncommercial speech. The court concluded
that commercial speech involves the advancing of an economic transaction, and noncommercial speech involves activities above and beyond the mere advancing of an economic transaction. See Virginia
State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
Inc., 425 U.S. 376, 385 (1973). Using these guidelines, the court concluded that fortune-telling was noncommercial speech because it goes
beyond the advancing or proposing of an economic transaction; it concerns the passing of ideas and information. Thus, the court held that
fortune-telling constituted noncommercial speech protected by the
California Constitution.
The City contended that fortune-telling does not come within con-
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stitutional free speech protections because it does not concern the
political process. The court, however, rejected the argument stating
that the constitution protects more than just political speech. Fortune-telling undoubtedly falls within the scope and protection of the
constitution.
In the final analysis as to the constitutionality of the City's ordinance, the court conceded that some speech can be entitled to constitutional protection, and not be completely immune to regulation.
However, such a regulation may not go beyond what the constitution
allows. The court found that the City ordinance prohibiting fortunetelling for consideration went beyond what was allowed and unconstitutionally impinged the Church's speech rights.
MIssY KELLY BANKHEAD

V.

CONTRACT LAW
Parties to a contractconcerning illegal business
operations in Mexico cannot seek relief under the
contract in the courts of California because they come
with "unclean hands": Wong v. Tenneco, Inc.

In Wong v. Tenneco, Inc., 39 Cal. 3d 126, 702 P.2d 570, 216 Cal.
Rptr. 412 (1985), the supreme court refused to grant relief to either
of the parties under a breach of contract action since the contract was
based upon operations which were illegal under Mexican law. The
plaintiff, Wong, was an American citizen and de facto owner of farmlands located in Mexico, despite a Mexican constitutional provision
prohibiting foreign ownership of farmlands. Wong continued his
farming operations in Mexico despite their illegality by transferring
all of the assets to Mexican citizens working as "front men." To market the produce grown on his Mexican farmlands Wong, in 1971, entered into a marketing contract with H-M-T, a subsidiary of Tenneco,
Inc. At the time the marketing agreement was entered into, both
parties knew of the illicit nature of Wong's business in Mexico. Nevertheless, the parties contracted and continued to do business with
one another.
In 1974, Wong's financial status weakened, and he was forced to execute a $300,000 promissory note to H-M-T. The note was secured by
a deed of trust on residential property in California. Wong's financial

status continued to deteriorate, and the Mexican Government was
pressuring and threatening the Mexican "front men" with foreclo-

sure due to outstanding taxes owed on the farmlands. As a result of
Wong's severe financial crisis, H-M-T began submitting its sales proceeds directly to the Mexican "front men" instead of to Wong.
Thereafter, Wong brought suit in a California state court for over
$10 million in compensatory damages asserting among other things
that H-M-T had breached its marketing agreement. After a jury rendered a decision for H-M-T on its cross-complaint for approximately
$600,000 and a $1.6 million verdict for Wong, the trial court barred
the recovery based upon the "unclean hands" doctrine. The court
recognized that the entire business transaction was illegal under
Mexican law and left the parties where it found them.
In applying the doctrine of comity the court stated that "the forum
state will generally apply the substantive law of a foreign sovereign
to causes of action which arise there." Wong, 39 Cal. 3d at 134, 702
P.2d at 575, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 417 (following Loranger v. Nadeau, 215
Cal. 362, 10 P.2d 63 (1932)). Thus, the court held that under Mexican
law, the agreement between the parties was entirely illegal. It is a
long standing principle of law that parties to an illegal contract cannot rely upon a court of law to enforce the terms of their illegal contract. Lee On v. Long, 37 Cal. 2d 499, 502, 234 P.2d 9, 11 (1951).
Therefore, the court refused to grant either party relief under the illegal contract. The court did allow Tenneco to retain approximately
$100,000 from the sales proceeds of the residence which was the subject of the trust deed under the promissory note. The court allowed
this only because Tenneco had expended such an amount to protect
the property during the litigation. Thus, both parties benefited from
the preservation of the asset.
The court concluded that the Mexican law prohibiting foreign ownership of farmlands did not violate California public policy. In fact,
the court emphasized that the actions of people like Wong, who intentionally seek to violate the laws of one jurisdiction by using another jurisdiction's courts, violate public policy.
MIssY
VI.

KELLY BANKHEAD

CORPORATE OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS

Corporatedirector suing for finder'sfee in real estate
transaction allowed to invoke estoppel to plead the
statute of frauds and an actionfor fraud is available
even if subject agreement is made unenforceable under
the statute of frauds: Tenzer v. Superscope, Inc.
In Tenzer v. Superscope, Inc., 39 Cal. 3d 18, 702 P.2d 212, 216 Cal.
Rptr. 130 (1985), a corporate director brought an action against the
corporation based upon its refusal to pay a finder's fee for his part in
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the successful sale of the corporate headquarters. The director, who
was not a licensed real estate broker, personally communicated to the
corporation's president that a buyer might be available. He disclosed
the prospective buyer's name only after the president had orally
agreed to a finder's fee. The director sued the corporation under theories of breach of contract, estoppel and fraud. The corporation
raised the defense of the statute of frauds. After a hearing on the
merits, the corporation's motion for summary judgment was granted.
As to the corporation's defense, the court held that while there is
no finder's fee exception to the statute of frauds, unlicensed finders
such as the director may invoke the doctrine of estoppel to plead the
statute of frauds. In reaching its conclusion, the court refused to extend the scope of Keely v. Price, 27 Cal. App. 3d 209, 103 Cal. Rptr.
531 (1972), which stated that estoppel may not be invoked to plead
the statute of frauds where there is a refusal to comply with an oral
promise to pay a real estate commission. The court declined to pass
on the validity of barring licensed real estate brokers from using the
estoppel doctrine in such situations. However, it held the Keely rationale inapplicable to "finders;" further, "finders" need not be licensed brokers nor even involved in the real estate business
professionally.
The court also held that the director's action for fraud could be
maintained even though the agreement in question was oral and
made unenforceable by the statute of frauds. In so holding, the court
disapproved the rule set out in Kroger v. Baur, 46 Cal. App. 2d 801,
117 P.2d 50 (1941), which prohibited an action for fraud under such
circumstances. The court reasoned that the Kroger rule wrongly assumed the inability of a jury to distinguish between an unkept, but
honest, promise and one which the promisor never intended to perform. Furthermore, it deemed the Kroger approach inconsistent with
the idea that the statute of frauds, which was enacted to prevent
fraud, should not be used to shield fraud. The court did not see the
Kroger rule as necessary to prevent a nullification of the statute of
frauds since something more than nonperformance is required to
prove a party's intent not to perform his promise.
Finally, the court required the director to establish upon remand,
as a condition precedent to invoking the doctrine of estoppel, that his
behavior was reasonably consistent with his fiduciary role. Since a
corporate director may not drive a harsh and unfair bargain with the
corporation he is supposed to represent, the director must show that
the contested agreement was inherently fair from the viewpoint of

the corporation. This showing was required to prove that the director's reliance on the president's oral promise was justifiable. Since
estoppel is an equitable remedy, the court would not allow the director to enforce the president's promise against the corporation unless
the director had fulfilled his fiduciary responsibilities, thereby showing no unclean hands on his part.
JOHN EDWARD VAN VLEAR

VII.

CRIMINAL LAW
A.

Section 593e of the California Penal Code no longer
prohibits the sale of equipment to intercept intelligible,
unscrambled microwave transmissions: People v.
Babylon.

In People v. Babylon, 39 Cal. 3d 719, 702 P.2d 205, 216 Cal. Rptr. 123
(1985), the supreme court was concerned with interception of overthe-air subscription television transmissions. The United States
licenses two types of entities to transmit television programs: commercial television broadcast stations (these use only VHF and UHF
frequencies) and Multipoint Distribution Services (subscription television transmitting on frequencies from 2150 to 2162 MHz). With a
microwave antenna and other equipment, a subscriber to a Multipoint Distribution Service, such as Home Box Office (HBO), may receive subscription television programs.
To protect the subscription television industry from piracy of its
transmissions, California Penal Code section 593e was enacted in
1980. The section prohibits the manufacture, distribution, or sale of
any device for the purpose of intercepting or decoding any over-theair transmission by a subscription television service pursuant to authority granted by the Federal Communications Commission. CAL.
PENAL CODE § 593e (West Supp. 1985). The defendants were convicted of selling such equipment to a police investigator to intercept
subscription television transmissions. The defendants admittedly
knew that the equipment could and would be used to intercept HBO
transmissions, and had no consent from HBO to sell the equipment.
While the defendants', appeal was pending, section 593e was
amended to prohibit only the sale of devices "designed in whole or in
part to decode, descramble, intercept, or otherwise make intelligible
any encoded, scrambled or other nonstandard signal carried by that
subscription television system." Id. § 593e(b). Since the HBO signal
was neither encoded nor scrambled, the amended section 593e did not
proscribe the defendants' conduct. Thus, the judgment was reversed,
because absent a saving clause a defendant is entitled to benefit from
a more recent statute that reduces punishment for an offense or
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decriminalizes his conduct. See People v. Rossi, 18 Cal. 3d 295, 555
P.2d 1313, 134 Cal. Rptr. 64 (1976). It was unnecessary to consider
whether the superseded section 593e was preempted by the Federal
Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-610 (1982), as the court
concluded that the amended section did not prohibit the defendant's
conduct.
Neither broadcast on a microwave frequency nor the inability of an
ordinary television set to receive the HBO transmission was held to
make the transmission nonstandard. Section 593e, subdivision(g), defines a nonstandard signal as a distorted signal not intended to produce an intelligible program without special equipment provided by
the sender. CAL. PENAL CODE § 593e(g) (West Supp. 1985). The
court reasoned that distortion involves changing a wave's shape while
"microwave" merely denotes a wave length; thus it concluded that
microwaves are standard. To find otherwise would mean that a signal is nonstandard if it cannot be viewed in intelligible form by an
ordinary television set. All signals except those on VHF and UHF
frequencies would therefore be nonstandard, but such is not the case.
Thus, the court held that section 593e does not preclude selling
equipment designed to receive intelligible microwave transmissions.
See 53 CAL. JUR. 3D Radio and Television § 11 (1979 & Supp. 1985);
and 19 CAL. JUR. 3D CriminalLaw § 2057 (1984 & Supp. 1985).
MARK

S.

BURTON

B. A "copurchaser"who is deemed to be an equal partner
in a drug transactionfor personal use may not be
convicted of furnishing a controlled substance to his
fellow purchaser: People v. Edwards.
I.

INTRODUCTION

In People v. Edwards,' the court had to determine whether the felony of furnishing heroin to another included the furnishing of heroin
by a purchaser to one who appeared to be an equal participant in the
drug transaction. The court held that this determination turned on
whether the one to whom the heroin was furnished could truly be
called a "copurchaser." If so, a purchaser could not be guilty of the
felony of furnishing heroin to another, since the other person was
1. 39 Cal. 3d 107, 702 P.2d 555, 216 Cal. Rptr. 397 (1985). Justice Grodin authored
the opinion with Justices Mosk, Kaus, Broussard, Reynoso, and Lucas concurring.
Chief Justice Bird wrote a separate concurring and dissenting opinion.

also a purchaser. Applying these principles to this case, the court
found reversible error in the trial court's failure to give instructions
concerning copurchasers.
II.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Burt Royce driving with Isotta Mullican picked up the defendant,
Edwards, and his girlfriend, Victoria Rogers, while they were
hitchhiking. Later that evening, Royce, a former heroin user, offered
some heroin to the defendant and Rogers. The defendant, who had
possession of the couple's combined funds, gave fifty dollars to Isotta
Mullican for the drug. The foursome returned to Mullican's house
where Mullican prepared the heroin, and injected herself, the defendant, and Rogers. Shortly thereafter, Rogers lost consciousness.
2
She died one week later from a heroin overdose.
After a jury trial, the defendant was convicted under California
Health and Safety Code section 11352 for furnishing and/or administering heroin.3 He was also convicted under California Penal Code
section 187 for second degree murder based on the felony-murder
rule.4 The trial court denied the defendant's requested jury instruction on the offense of involuntary manslaughter. The defendant argued that his actions constituted a mere misdemeanor under
California Health & Safety Code section 115505 since he only aided
and abetted Rogers in her use of the heroin and could not be considered to have furnished her drugs. He contended that the trial court
committed reversible error since the jury was not given the option of
convicting him on the basis of the misdemeanor-manslaughter rule
pursuant to California Penal Code section 192.6
III.

THE COURT'S ANALYSIS

The court found reversible error in the failure to instruct that the
defendant could not be convicted for furnishing heroin if he was
2. After an unsuccessful attempt to find a pulse, the defendant and Royce took
Rogers to a local market and unconvincingly told the clerk, and later the police, that
they had found Rogers in the dumpster behind the market. Id. at 111-12, 702 P.2d at
557-58, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 399-400.
3. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11352 (West Supp. 1985), provides in relevant
part: "[E]very person who ... furnishes, administers, or gives away ... any controlled
substance ...
shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison .
.M
4. See infra note 36.
5. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11550 (West Supp. 1985), provides in relevant
part: "No person shall use ... [a] controlled substance except when administered by
...a person licensed by the state ... Any person convicted of violating any provision
of this subdivision is guilty of a misdemeanor ....
" Id.
6. CAL. PENAL CODE § 192 (West Supp. 1985), provides in relevant part that involuntary "[m]anslaughter is the unlawful killing of a human being without malice
...in the commission of an unlawful act, not amounting to felony ..
" Id.

[Vol. 13: 427, 1986]

California Supreme Court Survey
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

merely a copurchaser of the drug. The court further held there was
substantial evidence for the jury to have found the defendant was an
"equal partner" in the transaction and thus guilty only of involuntary
manslaughter for aiding and abetting. Finally, although the defendant's convictions were reversed, the state received the option of conducting a new trial or accepting a remittitur reflecting a conviction of
involuntary manslaughter.
A.

Furnishinga Controlled Substance and the Concept of
"Copurchasers"

Since the defendant did not administer any drug to Rogers, 7 it had
to be shown that he furnished her with the heroin to obtain a conviction under California Health and Safety Code section 11352.8 The felony is a general intent crime, 9 and requires evidence that Edwards in
some way supplied Rogers with the drug.O
The Edwards court found the concepts of "furnishing" and
"copurchasing" to be mutually exclusive: "the trial court erred in
failing to instruct the jury that defendant could not be convicted of
furnishing heroin to Rogers if he and Rogers were merely copurchasers of the heroin."1 1 Thus, in reversing the defendant's convictions,
the court's analysis necessarily revolved around defining
"copurchasers."
The court's use of "copurchasers" was based on the re-affirmation
of People v. Mayfieldl2 which implicitly held that one is not guilty of
furnishing if he participates in a group purchase of narcotics, even
7. The homeowner Mullican actually injected Rogers with the lethal dose of heroin. Edwards, 39 Cal. 3d at 111, 702 P.2d at 557, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 399.
8. See supra note 3. See also People v. Taylor, 112 Cal. App. 3d 348, 358, 169 Cal.
Rptr. 290, 296 (1980) (the court elaborated, "[Wie do not agree that the prosecution
must establish that [defendant] furnished and administered the heroin. The mere furnishing is sufficient." Id. (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
9. See People v. Daniels, 14 Cal. 3d 857, 862, 537 P.2d 1232, 1236, 122 Cal. Rptr.
872, 875 (1975) (disapproving People v. Holquin, 229 Cal. App. 2d 398, 402-03, 40 Cal.
Rptr. 364, 366-67 (1964), which held that furnishing under Health and Safety Code
§ 11501 was a specific intent crime).
10. "Furnish," as used in the Health & Safety Code means "to supply by any
means, by sale or otherwise." CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11016 (West Supp.
1975); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 4048.5 (West 1974).
11. Edwards, 39 Cal. 3d at 110, 702 P.2d at 556, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 398.
12. People v. Mayfield, 225 Cal. App. 2d 263, 37 Cal. Rptr. 340 (1964). In Mayfield,
the three defendants pooled their funds to purchase heroin. Prior to the purchase, the
defendants met the deceased who also offered to contribute his pro rata share.
Although it was unclear who made the actual purchase, the deceased injected himself
with a lethal dose of heroin.

where the purchase is for individual use.1 3 However, the court qualified its finding by stating that the rule only applies when the parties
involved are truly "equal partners." 14 In a footnote, which has already become a source of controversy,' 5 the court apparently limited
a defendant's ability to be deemed a "copurchaser." The limitation
increased the possibility that Edwards would receive a felony-murder
rule conviction, by severely reducing the class of acceptable "equal
partners:"
We expect there will be few cases involving a copurchase by truly equal
partners. Where one of the copurchasers takes a more active role in instigating, financing, arranging, or carrying-out the drug transaction, the "partnership" is not an equal one and the
more active "partner" may be guilty of
16
furnishing to the less active one.

Despite the limitation on who can be a copurchaser, the court held
that the jury might reasonably have concluded that the defendant
was an "equal partner" such that he did not furnish Rogers any heroin.17 The court analyzed the case at bar by applying the requirements for finding "equal partners" as it had expressed them in
footnote five quoted above. First, since the couple's funds were
pooled, the jury could have found an equally financed drug
purchase.' 8 Second, since Royce first suggested the heroin sale, and
since both the defendant and Rogers appeared equally inexperienced, 19 the decision to buy might have been mutual. Finally, apart
from the fact that the defendant actually handed Mullican the
purchase money, and in light of the pooled nature of the funds, the
jury might have found an equally consummated drug buy.
B.

Problem Area: Origin and Meaning Key Terms Used in the
Opinion

The ultimate fact which will preclude a conviction for furnishing
drugs is the determination that a defendant is a "copurchaser."20
Strikingly, the Edwards court heavily relied on a term that California
13. Edwards, 39 Cal. 3d at 114 n.4, 702 P.2d at 559 n.4, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 401 n.4.
The Edwards court found that while the Mayfield decision expressly held that the defendants had not sold or administered heroin, it implicitly held that they had not furnished the drug either. Id.
14. Id. at 114, 702 P.2d at 559, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 401.
15. See inkfra note 41.
16. Edwards, 39 Cal. 3d at 114 n.5, 702 P.2d at 559 n.5, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 401 n.5.
17. Id. at 114, 702 P.2d at 559, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 401.
18. The defendant stated that the couple's funds came from the sale of Rogers'
car, that he carried all the money, and that the couple intended to use the cash to buy
a new car and rent an apartment. Id.
19. The forensic pathologist who performed the autopsy on Rogers, and the police
detective who examined the defendant's arm both testified that there was no evidence
of chronic intravenous drug use. Id. at 115, 702 P.2d at 560, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 402.
20. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
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21
However, through its interpretacourts have not previously used.
22
the court established that a
tion of the Mayfield holding,
"copurchaser" is at a minimum the equivalent of a "group pur-

Beyond establishing this threshold issue, the court makes
the "equal partnership" limitation the key to defining the meaning of
'23
the term "copurchaser.
chaser."

Even though the court outlines the factors to be examined in deter24
the basis for
mining whether the purchasers are "equal partners,"

the use of this particular phrase is not given. The word "partner"
might be used by the court in its everyday sense, 25 but the fact that it
26
shows an intent to
is enclosed in quotation marks more than once
27
Also, the normal legal meaning of
use the term in a special sense.
"partner," participation in a partnership, 2 8 is not applicable in the

case at bar since the heroin purchase was for the individuals' per-

sonal use. 29 Similarly, the relationship involved cannot be classified
21. A search of California Supreme Court and appellate level cases revealed that,
apart from its usage in Edwards, the term "copurchaser" has been mentioned only in a
few other cases in the state's legal history. See, e.g., Morris v. Zuckerman, 69 Cal. 2d
686, 692 n.9, 446 P.2d 1000, 1005 n.9, 72 Cal. Rptr. 880, 885 n.9 (1968) (corporate); Munson v. Fishburn, 183 Cal. 206, 209, 190 P. 808, 809 (1920) (real estate); People v. Cline,
270 Cal. App. 2d 328, 332, 75 Cal. Rptr. 459, 462 (1969) (heroin); Burt v. Irvine Company, 237 Cal. App. 2d 828, 855, 47 Cal. Rptr. 392, 409 (1965) (real estate).
22. The court first concluded: "[t]he distinction drawn by the Mayfield court between one who sells or furnishes heroin and one who simply participates in a group
purchase seems to us a valid one .... Edwards, 39 Cal. 3d at 113-14, 702 P.2d at 559,
216 Cal. Rptr. at 401. From this "group purchase" language, the Edwards court found
the holding in Mayfield to be "that mere copurchasers are not guilty of furnishing
.... 1Id. at 117, 702 P.2d at 561, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 403. However, the court in Mayfield
never used the term "copurchaser(s)."
23. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. As a further note, while the full
term "copurchaser" is rarely mentioned in other literature, the Oxford English Dictionary 544 (Vol. II C, 1970), does list it under the definition of "co-," a prefix: "Esp.
common in the phraseology of Law, with the sense of 'joint' or 'fellow-' as [in] . . .copurchaser .... Id.
24. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
25. The WEBSTER'S UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 1307 (2nd ed. 1983), defines "partner" as: "one who has a share or part in anything with another or others; a sharer; a
participator; a partaker; an associate."
26. Edwards, 39 Cal. 3d at 114, 114 n.5, 115, 702 P.2d at 559, 559 n.5, 560, 216 Cal.
Rptr. at 401, 401 n.5, 402.
27. The PRENTICE-HALL HANDBOOK FOR WRITERS 128 (7th ed. 1978), states,
"Words used in a special sense may be set off by quotation marks."
28. The CAL. CORP. CODE § 15006 (West 1977) states in relevant part that "[a] partnership is an association of two or more persons to carry on as co-owners a business for
profit." This concept may have been adopted from the common law in Wheeler v.
Farmer, 38 Cal. 203, 213 (1869): "to constitute a partnership ... [t]here must be a joint
undertaking to share in the profit and loss." Id.
29. Edwards, 39 Cal. 3d at 114 n.6, 702 P.2d at 559 n.6, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 401 n.6.

as a "joint venture" since that term encompasses virtually the same
qualities that exist in partnerships. 3O The relationship cannot be
termed an "association" considering how that term has been interpreted by the California courts and legislature. 3 1 Finally, the com-

mon law criminal terms of "principal" and "accessory" prove equally
unhelpful in determining the origin or traditional meaning which
should be attached to the phrase "equal partners." 32 Nonetheless,
one might be able to tie the criminal concept of "principal" with the
court's new concept by analyzing causation and instigation. 33 This semantic inquiry leads to the conclusion that the court in Edwards has
introduced and applied two terms, "copurchasers" and "equal part-

ners," which lack a discernible origin or present legal usage which
might aid in their application.

IV.

THE CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION

Chief Justice Bird concurred in the reversal of the defendant's convictions. 34 However, she would have reversed the decision on the basis of her concurring opinion in People v. Burroughs.35 In her
Burroughs opinion, the Chief Justice advocated the elimination of
the judicially created 36 second degree felony-murder rule.37 After a
lengthy historical analysis of the doctrine, she concluded that the
30. The court in Bank of California v. Connolly, 36 Cal. App. 3d 350, 364, 111 Cal.
Rptr. 468, 477 (1973), summarized the point: "[a]lthough a partnership ordinarily involves a continuing business, whereas a joint venture is usually formed for a specific
transaction or a single series of transactions, the incidents of both relationships are the
same in all essential respects." Id. (citations omitted).
31. The court in Estate of Irwin, 196 Cal. 366, 372, 237 P. 1074, 1076 (1925), stated
that "[t]he usual meaning of the term 'association' is an 'unincorporated organization
composed of a body of men partaking in general form and mode of procedure of the
characteristics of a corporation.'"

Id. CAL. CORP. CODE § 21000 (West 1977), states in

relevant part: "[a] nonprofit association is an unincorporated association of natural persons for religious, scientific, social, literary, educational, recreational, benevolent, or
other purpose not that of pecuniary profit." Id.
32. The Court in Standerfer v. United States, 447 U.S. 10, 15 (1980), appraised the
problem as follows: "[a]t common law, the subject of principals and accessories was riddled with 'intricate' distinctions." Id. Parties to a crime were either principals in the
first or second degree or they were accessories before or after the fact. Id. Beginning
in 1872, California made all parties to a crime either principal or accessory. CAL. PENAL CODE § 30 (West 1970).

33. Lanham, MurderBy InstigatingSuicide, 1980 Crim. L. Rev. 215; Developments
in the Law, Homicide - Principalsand Causation,43 La. L. Rev. 371 (1982).
34. Edwards, 39 Cal. 3d at 119, 702 P.2d at 562, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 404 (Bird, C.J.,
concurring and dissenting).
35. People v. Burroughs, 35 Cal. 3d 824, 837-54, 678 P.2d 894, 902-15, 201 Cal. Rptr.
319, 327-40 (1984) (Bird, C.J., concurring).
36. "The second degree felony-murder rule is, 'as it has been since 1872, a judgemade doctrine without any express basis in the Penal Code ....
" Id. at 837, 678 P.2d
at 903, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 328 (quoting People v. Dillon, 34 Cal. 3d 441, 472 n.19, 668 P.2d
697, 715 n.19, 194 Cal. Rptr. 390, 408 n.19 (1983)).
37. Burroughs, 35 Cal. 3d at 837, 678 P.2d at 903, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 328 (Bird, C.J.,
concurring).
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doctrine is a "strict liability concept"3 8 which "erodes the important
relationship between criminal liability and an accused's mental
39
state."
V.

IMPACT

The importance of a legal principle is often tied to current events
and institutions. It is possible that this case is a response to the
highly publicized John Belushi drug overdose case. 40 Nonetheless,
the concept of "copurchasers" for finding a conviction under section
11352 of the Health and Safety Code is novel. Its introduction and
application may even exceed drug cases, go beyond the criminal law,
and reach other other general areas of the law.
JOHN EDWARD VAN VLEAR

VIII.

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
A.

Objective proof is required to rebut the presumption of
prosecutorialvindictiveness when a charge is increased
after jeopardy has attached: In re Bower.

In In re Bower, 38 Cal. 3d 865, 700 P.2d 1269, 215 Cal. Rptr. 267
(1985), the court held that to rebut the presumption of vindictiveness
in prosecuting an accused, the prosecution must demonstrate that the
increase in charge was justified by some objective change in circumstances or in the state of the evidence which legitimately influenced
the charging process. Furthermore, the new evidence on change in
circumstances cannot have been reasonably discoverable at the time
the prosecution exercised its discretion to bring the original charge.
The defendant was originally tried for second degree murder. The
defendant moved for and was granted a mistrial based on
prosecutorial error. On retrial the prosecution did not renew the
previously granted stipulation which limited defendant's possible lia38. Id. at 850, 678 P.2d at 912, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 337.
39. Id.
40. People v. Smith, No. A388784 (Los Angeles Municipal Court filed Feb. 12,
1985). Cathy Evelyn Smith is charged with the felony of furnishing Belushi heroin
and with second degree murder based on the second degree felony-murder rule. See
also, Stewart, Court Ruling Weighed for Its Affect in Belushi Case, L.A. Times, Sept.

23, 1985, Part II (Metro), at 1. This article uses quotations to show how both the prosecution and the defense are seeking to use Edwards in their arguments. The Los Angeles Times piece also reproduces the same portion of footnote 5 which is quoted from
Edwards in this California Supreme Court Survey article. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.

bility to second degree murder. The prosecution testified that this
decision was based on a review of the evidence and further conversations with potential witnesses. The same evidence was offered at retrial and the defendant was found guilty of first degree murder.
The supreme court received the petitioner's writ of habeas corpus
in lieu of an appeal because reference to matters outside the record
were required to establish that the defendant's constitutional rights
had been violated. People v. Pope, 23 Cal. 3d 412, 426, 590 P.2d 859,
867, 152 Cal. Rptr. 732, 740 (1979).
Where a moving party claims that the increased or additional
charges violate due process, he need only demonstrate facts giving
rise to a presumption of vindictiveness. At that time the burden
shifts to the prosecution to rebut the presumption. In re Lewallen, 23
Cal. 3d 274, 278, 590 P.2d 383, 385-86, 152 Cal. Rptr. 528, 530-31 (1979)
(prosecution failed to rebut clear meaning of court's statement that
increased punishment was a penalty for exercising right to trial).
In a related case, the United States Supreme Court stated that a
greater sentence will be upheld on retrial if affirmative reasons based
on objective information appear in the record. The rationale is that a
person should be able to pursue his statutory rights without apprehension of state retaliation in the form of substituting a more serious
charge for the one originally filed. North Carolinav. Pearce, 395 U.S.
711, 726 (1969); Twiggs v. Superior Court, 34 Cal. 3d 360, 369-70, 667
P.2d 1165, 1170-71, 194 Cal. Rptr. 152, 157-58 (1983). Such an apprehension would have a chilling effect on the assertion of those statutory rights and could undermine the integrity of the entire
proceeding.
The court recognized that an exception to this rule exists for
nonjeopardy plea negotiations. In such cases the defendant does not
have to decide whether to exercise his legal rights, and as long as the
defendant is able to accept or reject the offer, no element of retaliation or punishment exists. See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357,
362-63 (1978); People v. Rivera, 127 Cal. App. 3d 136, 144, 179 Cal.
Rptr. 384, 389 (1981). The important factors to be considered are the
attachment of jeopardy, the potential for deterring the exercise of a
legal right and the danger of state retaliation. Thus, the court denied
the writ of habeas corpus, but reduced the conviction to second degree murder.
DAYTON

B.

PARCELLS III
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B. Introduction of irrelevant evidence in penalty phase
requires reversal of death penalty: People v. Boyd.
I.

INTRODUCTION

People v. Boyd,' focuses on the changes made in the 1978 death
penalty initiative which became codified under California Penal Code
sections 190-190.5.2 Under this section proof of intent to kill or to aid
a killing is required for a finding of first degree murder under the
felony murder special circumstances theory. Prosecutorial evidence
at the penalty phase is also limited to evidence that tends to prove
the specifically listed statutory factors relevant to aggravation, mitigation, and sentencing.
II.

FACTS

On November 10, 1979, defendant and three friends were approached by David Edsill, the victim, who asked for directions to a
nearby residence. They replied they did not know where the residence was and continued to walk by Edsill. The defendant, however,
stopped, grabbed Edsill's shirt and demanded money from him.
When Edsill said he had no money, defendant pulled a gun and shot
him in the chest. As Edsill bent over and ran across the street, defendant fired five more shots killing Edsill. Defendant had previously been drinking and at the time of the incident was on his way to
get some "sherms" - cigarettes laced with PCP.
At the guilt phase of the trial, defense counsel attempted to establish a diminished capacity defense as a result of PCP usage. Counsel
argued that the killing was not premeditated and was not an attempt
to perpetuate a robbery; it was an impulsive act induced by PCP.3
At the penalty phase of the trial the prosecution called many witnesses to describe the defendant's past. Many of the witnesses described numerous unarmed assaults perpetrated by defendant. These
assaults constituted criminal activity involving the use of force or violence and their admissibility was not raised on appeal. However,
1. 38 Cal. 3d 762, 700 P.2d 782, 215 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1985). The opinion was authored
by Justice Broussard with Chief Justice Bird and Justices Mosk, Kaus, Reynoso, and
Grodin concurring.
2. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 190-190.5 (West Supp. 1985).
3. Expert testimony established that persons who use PCP may engage in bizarre
and violent behavior, sometimes long after they have taken the drug. Boyd, 38 Cal. 3d
at 767, 700 P.2d at 785-86, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 4. Defendant's family testified that defendant was a regular user of PCP and when under the influence of this drug he became
irrational and violent. Id.

other evidence offered by the prosecution was challenged on appeal
on the grounds that it was not relevant to any of the specific aggravating and mitigating factors set forth in the 1978 initiative. 4
The prosecution recalled Pamela Plummer to the stand at the penalty phase.5 She testified that defendant did not show any signs of
PCP use on the night of the murder. Defense counsel abandoned the
planned presentation of evidence supporting diminished capacity at
the penalty phase and only argued that defendant acted impulsively.6
The jury returned a verdict of death. Defendant appealed as to the
jury instructions at the guilt phase and the prejudicial admission of
irrelevant evidence at the penalty phase.
III.
A.

ANALYSIS

Guilt Phase

Defendant first attacked the felony-murder rule as a judge-made
law which should be repudiated. However, the court followed an ear7
lier decision which rejected this contention.
Second, the defendant argued that the evidence presented was not
sufficient to justify an instruction on premeditated murder.8 The
court rejected this argument as well.9 Nonetheless, any error in the
instruction on premeditation could not have prejudiced the defendant
because the jury found all the elements for first degree murder present based on felony murder special circumstances. 10
The court reversed the decision in the guilt phase because of the
prejudicial effect of the jury instruction on the finding of special cir4. One of the defendant's counselors testified that defendant threatened to kill
him and to force the vehicle transporting them to juvenile hall to crash. Further testimony told of how defendant threatened to kill a juvenile hall counselor for refusing to
give him a peanut butter and jelly sandwich. The incident lead to a small riot in the
cafeteria. Deputy Sheriff Silliman testified that circumstantial evidence showed defendant had attempted to escape while being held for this crime by removing an air
vent from his cell. Finally, defendant's probation and parole officers testified that defendant failed to benefit from the rehabilitative program and had a community reputation for violence. Id. at 767-69, 700 P.2d at 786-87, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 5-6.
5. Id. at 769, 700 P.2d at 787, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 6. Plummer was one of the people
with the defendant at the time of the incident.
6. Consequently, the penalty jury did not hear any testimony on defendant's PCP
use and the irrational and violent behavior this drug can cause.
7. See People v. Dillon, 34 Cal. 3d 441, 668 P.2d 697, 194 Cal. Rptr. 390 (1983).
8. Defendant relied on People v. Velasquez, 26 Cal. 3d 425, 606 P.2d 341, 162 Cal.
Rptr. 306 (1980), where proof of a sudden killing in the course of an argument and
struggle was not sufficient to establish deliberate and premeditated murder.
9. The only evidence of argument and struggle resulted from the victim pushing
defendant's gun away from his head. Defendant's deliberate acts, especially firing five
additional shots, were held to be sufficient to warrant an instruction on premeditation.
Boyd, 38 Cal. 3d at 770, 700 P.2d at 787-88, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 6-7.
10. The victim was killed by the defendant during the commission of a felony
(robbery).
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cumstances. Proof of intent to kill or to aid a killing is essential to a
finding of felony murder special circumstances.1
Thus, a trial
12
court's failure to instruct on intent to kill is reversible error per se.
Defense counsel argued that the defendant did not intend to kill
the victim. Rather, the killing was an unintentional, impulsive, and
drug-induced act. Without the instruction on intent to kill, defendant
could have been found guilty of first degree murder simply because
the murder occurred during the commission of a robbery. The argument was worthy of consideration and the trial court's failure to instruct on intent to kill was held to be reversable error.
B. Penalty Phase
The court discussed the penalty phase issues to give guidance to
the lower court since reversal at the guilt phase necessarily reversed
the penalty phase. The one issue raised by the defense which had not
been resolved by prior precedent was whether the prosecution, under
the 1978 initiative, could present evidence at the penalty phase which
was not relevant to any specific aggravating or mitigating factors
listed in the 1978 law.13
The language of section 190.3 of the 1978 initiative permits the introduction of evidence relevant to aggravation, mitigation, and sentencing with the exception of criminal activity not involving violence,
except felony convictions and criminal activity of which defendant
11. See Carlos v. Superior Court, 35 Cal. 3d 131, 672 P.2d 862, 197 Cal. Rptr. 79
(1983). This holding applied retroactively to all cases not yet final. People v. Garcia,
36 Cal. 3d 539, 544, 684 P.2d 826, 827, 205 Cal. Rptr. 265, 266 (1984).
12. Garcia recognizes four exceptions, two of which have arguable relevance to
the case at hand: (1) that the factual question was necessarily resolved adversely to
the defendant under other, properly given instructions, Garcia, 36 Cal. 3d at 554-55,
684 P.2d at 835, 205 Cal. Rptr. at 274, and (2) that "the parties recognized that intent to
kill was in issue, presented all evidence at their command on that issue, and . . . the
record not only establishes the necessary intent as a matter of law but shows the contrary evidence not worthy of consideration." Id. at 556, 684 P.2d at 835-36, 205 Cal.
Rptr. at 275.
The court found neither of those exceptions justified affirmance. Boyd, 38 Cal. 3d at
771, 700 P.2d at 788, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 7.
13. The 1978 initiative enacted a crucial change in jury determination as to the imposition of the death penalty. Prior to this initiative the jury could, after considering
the listed aggravating and mitigating factors, consider any other matter it thought relevant. The 1978 initiative requires the jury to determine the appropriateness of the
death penalty by weighing the specific factors listed in the statute. To impose the
death penalty the aggravating circumstances must outweigh the mitigating circumstances. Thus, any matters not within the statute's list are not entitled to any weight
in the penalty phase.

was acquitted. 14 Relevant evidence is defined as having "any tendency in reason to prove or disprove any disputed fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action."' 5 Since the jury must
decide the penalty on the basis of the specific factors listed in the
statute, any prosecutorial evidence of the defendant's history not probative of a specifically listed factor would be irrelevant.16
Four pieces of prosecutorial evidence were considered by the trial
court. The appellate court held that evidence of a nonviolent escape
17
attempt was barred under the act and properly excluded at trial.
Evidence of threat of violence, it held, was also barred and should
have been excluded because the act resulted in no charges and the
prosecution failed to offer substantial evidence to prove the elements
of the crime.' 8 The evidence of defendant's failure in rehabilitative
programs was not relevant to any of the listed aggravating and mitigating factors and should not have been admitted. Finally, evidence
of defendant's reputation in the community was also irrelevant to
any of the listed factors and should not have been admitted.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The Boyd court held that under the 1978 death penalty initiative,
the trial court must instruct the jury that intent to kill is an essential
element of a finding of first degree murder under felony-murder special circumstances. Additionally, the 1978 initiative prohibits the
14. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3 (West Supp. 1985) states in part:
[E]vidence may be presented... as to any matter relevant to aggravation, mit-

igation and sentence ... [excluding] criminal activity by the defendant which
did not involve the use or attempted use of force or violence or which did not
involve the express or implied threat to use force or violence ... [but] innocent evidence of prior criminal activity shall be admitted for an offense for

which the defendant was prosecuted and acquitted.
15. CAL. EVID. CODE § 210 (West 1966). See People v. Ortiz, 95 Cal. App. 3d 926,
933, 157 Cal. Rptr. 448, 454 (1979).
16. The constitutional requirement set down in Locket v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604
(1978) and Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 110 (1982), required the court to interpret section 190.3(K) as allowing the defense to offer any mitigating evidence "which
extenuates the gravity of the crime." Id. (emphasis added). However, the prosecution
is limited to evidence relevant to the listed factors exclusive of section 190.3(K) unless
the defense opens the door to prosecutorial rebuttals through the presentation of mitigating evidence under section 190.3(K). Boyd, 38 Cal. 3d at 775, 700 P.2d at 792, 215
Cal. Rptr. at 11.
17. There was no evidence that defendant used or threatened to use force. Violent
injury or threat of injury to property is not sufficient to justify admissibility. Boyd, 38
Cal. 3d at 776, 700 P.2d at 792, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 11-12.
18. Instructions of reasonable doubt or proof of uncharged crimes are required at
the penalty phase. People v. Robertson, 33 Cal. 3d 21, 53-55, 655 P.2d 279, 311-312, 188
Cal. Rptr. 77, 109-110 (1982). This implies the trial court will not permit the jury in
the penalty phase to consider an uncharged crime as an aggravating factor unless "a
rational trier of fact could have found the essential element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." People v. Johnson, 26 Cal. 3d 557, 576, 606 P.2d 738, 750, 162 Cal. Rptr.
431, 443 (1980) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-319 (1979)).
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prosecution from introducing evidence in the penalty phase which is
not probative of any of the statutorily listed factors for aggravation or
mitigation. Nonetheless, the defense could introduce such evidence
by extenuating the gravity of the crime through Penal Code section
190.3(K).
DAYTON B. PARCELLS III

C. Search warrant which was not supported by facts
contained within an affidavit was considered overbroad
and justified reversal of death sentence: People v. Frank,
I.

INTRODUCTION

In People v. Frank,1 the court was faced with determining the legitimacy of a search warrant. The search warrant, used to obtain the
defendant's personal papers and diaries, ultimately led to a lower
2
court judgment of death under the California death penalty act.
The supreme court, holding that the section of the warrant which referred to the seizure of the defendant's papers, documents and writings was overbroad, only reversed the lower court's judgment as to
3
the death penalty.

II.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On March 14, 1978, at approximately 10:15 a.m., the defendant, a
known child molester,4 abducted a two and one-half year old girl
1. 38 Cal. 3d 711, 700 P.2d 415, 214 Cal. Rptr. 801 (1985). The majority opinion
was written by Justice Mosk, with Justices Broussard and Reynoso concurring. Separate concurring and dissenting opinions were filed by Chief Justice Bird and Justice
Kaus.
2. Id. See former CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 190-190.6 (West 1970) (current version at
CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 190-190.5 (West Supp. 1985)).
3. Frank, 38 Cal. 3d at 719, 700 P.2d at 416, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 802.
4. The trial court admitted evidence of the defendant's prior involvement with
two other acts of child molesting. The first incident, which took place on May 15, 1973,
involved the abduction of a four year old girl. The defendant drove the girl to a secluded area, forced her to drink beer, took off her clothes and tied her hands. The
defendant subsequently scraped her stomach with a knife, inserted a knife into her vagina and attached locking pliers to her vaginal area. The victim was then immersed in
water, but eventually escaped to a nearby house.
The second incident, which occurred on July 5, 1978, involved an eight year old girl
whom the defendant abducted. The defendant forced the girl to drink four beers. He
then pinched her breasts, inserted a pen into her vagina, and inserted a tire gauge into
her anus. After forcing her to orally copulate with him, the defendant immersed her
in a nearby stream, and left her alone long enough for her to summon help. The vic-

from her baby sitter's home.5 Two days later the body of a little girl
was discovered near a gully in Woodland Hills.6 Later investigation
revealed that this was the girl who had been abducted by the defendant. An autopsy revealed that the child's cause of death was strangulation; however, she had suffered numerous injuries 7 prior to death
which evidenced rape.8
On October 18, 1978, approximately seven months after the abduction, a superior court judge issued a warrant listing various items to
be seized from the defendant's apartment.9 Two police officers
served the warrant on the defendant's wife while four criminalists
searched every room in an attempt to find any evidence which would
possibly link the defendant to the crime, "whether or not it was described in the warrant." 10 This search led to the discovery of three
notebooks which the defendant used while he was a patient at the
Atascadero State Hospital to write down his thoughts of his emotional and sexual life. At trial the prosecutor moved to admit these
notebooks into evidence.11
III.

MAJORITY OPINION

The court initially stated that it subscribed to the rule which states
that courts should not invalidate warrants by interpreting the affidavit in a "hyper-technical, rather than a common sense, manner."12 In
viewing the warrant at hand, the court stated that while it listed
items, the existence of which could be "properly inferred from the
condition of the body and the circumstances of the crime," 13 other
items listed came from "apparently boilerplate lists routinely incortim later positively identified the defendant as her assailant. Id. at 720, 700 P.2d at 417,
214 Cal. Rptr. at 803.
5. The babysitter lived in a community which is approximately three miles from
the Camarillo State Hospital, where the defendant's wife worked. The defendant regularly took his wife to work. The court stated that if the defendant took the most di-

rect route to his wife's place of employment, he would have gone through an area
which was very close to the neighborhood from which this victim was abducted. Id. at

719-20, 700 P.2d at 416-17, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 802-03.
6. The court noted that the defendant lived in Woodland Hills. Id. at 719, 700
P.2d at 417, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 803.

7. The entrance to her vagina was torn, hymen broken and sperm was discovered
in her vaginal area. Id.
8. The court found that the victim's blood had a .03 percent alcohol content. Id.
9. Frank, 38 Cal. 3d at 722, 700 P.2d at 419, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 805.
10. Id. at 723, 700 P.2d at 419, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 806.
11. Id. at 723-24, 700 P.2d at 420, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 806.
12. Id. at 722, 700 P.2d at 419, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 805. The court further stated that
doubtful or marginal cases, in the area of determining whether an affidavit demon-

strates probable cause, should be "determined by the preference to be accorded to warrants." Id. (quoting People v. Mesa, 14 Cal. 3d 466, 469, 535 P.2d 337, 339, 121 Cal. Rptr.
473, 475 (1975)).
13. Frank, 38 Cal. 3d at 722, 700 P.2d at 419, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 805.
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porated into the warrant without regard to the evidence."14
The court cited clauses one, two, and eight of the search warrant as
prime examples of boilerplate clauses authorizing the police to search
for and seize the evidence in question.15
In viewing the activity of the police criminalists who indiscriminately seized items from the defendant's apartment, the court concluded that the notebooks in question were seized only because an
officer suspected, after looking at them, that they might be incriminating and they were not seized because they were listed in the warrant.16
As a result, the court stated that the warrant was
"impermissibly overbroad" on two grounds: first, it failed to particularly describe the place to be searched and the things to be seized;
second, its issuance was not supported by probable cause to believe
7
the items were at that place.'

The court's discussion of the requirement of particularity relied
heavily upon Burrows v.

Superior Court18

and Aday v. Superior

Court.19 These cases established that the policy behind the require-

ment is to "prevent general exploratory searches which unreasonably
14. Id.
15. These clauses provided in relevant part:
1. Evidence tending to establish the identities of the occupants, users or
owners of the residence, including, but not limited to utility bills or receipts,
envelopes, traffic tickets, insurance papers or vehicle registration;
2. Documentary evidence tending to show the whereabouts of Theodore
Frank during March 14 and 15, 1978, including, but not limited to credit card
receipts, receipts from businesses, records of telephone toll calls made during
that period of time; cancelled checks made out or cashed on those dates, ledgers or personal diary notations which would indicate the whereabouts of Theodore Frank on those dates;
3. Scrapbooks, newspaper clippings, photographs (developed or undeveloped), tape recordings or writings which could relate to the death of Amy
[(S.)] and would indicate either participation and/or an interest in that death
by Theodore Frank ....
Frank, 38 Cal. 3d at 722-23, 700 P.2d at 419, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 805.
16. Id. at 724, 700 P.2d at 420, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 806.
17. Id. In stating this, the court based its decision upon CAL. CONST. art. I, § 13.
18. Burrows v. Superior Court, 13 Cal. 3d 238, 529 P.2d 590, 118 Cal. Rptr. 166
(1974). In Burrows, the court unanimously held that a search of a lawyer's office,
which was not limited to the documents specified in the warrant, was unreasonable. In
reaching this conclusion, the Burrows court stated that the unreasonableness of the
search was a direct result of the warrant's broad description of the things to be seized.
I&
19. Aday v. Superior Court, 55 Cal. 2d 789, 362 P.2d 47, 13 Cal. Rptr. 415 (1961). In
Aday, the warrant authorized the police to search for general categories of documentary evidence. The court stated, in holding that the warrant description was fatally
overbroad, that the various categories were so broad that they failed to place any sort
of meaningful restriction on the items which were to be seized. Id. at 796, 362 P.2d at
51, 13 Cal. Rptr. at 419.

interfere with a person's right to privacy." 20 Clauses two and eight of
the warrant in the case at bar failed to satisfy the particularity requirement. The overbreadth of the warrant was demonstrated by the
fact that so many innocent items were taken from the defendant's
home. 21 Further, the court stated that "[t]he vice of an overbroad
warrant is that it invites the police to treat it merely as an excuse to
22
conduct an unconstitutional general search."
In viewing the requirement that the warrant must be supported by
probable cause, the court reiterated the following six point standard
for probable cause: "whether the affidavit [1] states facts [2] that
make it substantially probable [3] that there is specific property [4]
lawfully subject to seizure [5] presently located [6] in the particular
23
place for which the warrant is sought."
The affidavit supporting issuance of the warrant contained twentyfour pages of factual allegations which focused on the acts allegedly
committed by the defendant. The court emphasized that there was
not a "single fact" contained within the affidavit which would give
probable cause to support the boilerplate allegations contained within
clauses one, two and eight of the warrant. 24 The court further emphasized that the affidavit completely lacked any facts which would
support a belief that the defendant possessed the diaries or writings
which were listed in clauses two and eight of the warrant. 25 In concluding that the lower court's finding of probable cause to support
the search for the notebooks was based upon "mere speculation" or
on boilerplate allegations, the court stated that the warrant impermissibly authorized a search for the notebooks in question; the war26
rant was in fact broader than the facts upon which it was issued.
As to the effect of the use of the notebooks by the prosecution at
20. Frank, 38 Cal. 3d at 724, 700 P.2d at 420, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 806.
21. Id. at 727, 700 P.2d at 422, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 808.
22. Id. at 726, 700 P.2d at 422, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 808.
23. Id. at 727, 700 P.2d at 422-23, 214 Cal Rptr. at 808-09 (quoting People v. Cook,
22 Cal. 3d 67, 84 n.6, 583 P.2d 130, 134 n.6, 148 Cal. Rptr. 605, 614 n.6 (1978)). The court
stated that the first requirement (that the affidavit state facts) is a precondition of the
other requirements. Further, the court emphasized that a warrant may not authorize
any type of search which is broader than the particular facts which support the issuing
of the warrant. Frank, 38 Cal. 3d at 728, 700 P.2d at 423, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 809 (citation
omitted).
24. Id. at 728, 700 P.2d at 428, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 809 (emphasis omitted). See also
supra note 14 and accompanying text.
25. Frank, 38 Cal. 3d at 728, 700 P.2d at 423, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 809. See also supra
note 14 and accompanying text. The court stated that there was nothing in the affidavit to give the magistrate any factual basis to find that it was substantially probable
that the defendant's apartment contained any type of documentary evidence of his location at the time of the crime or any special interests in the crime. Id. at 728, 700 P.2d
at 423, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 809.
26. Id. at 729, 700 P.2d at 424, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 810. The court based this conclusion on Burrows v. Superior Court, 13 Cal. 3d 238, 250-51, 529 P.2d 590, 598, 118 Cal.

Rptr. 166, 174 (1974). See supra note 17.
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trial, the court stated that in the guilt phase, only two percent of the
notebook entries were introduced as evidence. 27 This combined with
strong evidence establishing the defendant's modus operandi and that
he in fact had committed the murder of the two and one-half year
old girl, lead the court to conclude that it was not reasonably probable that a more favorable result to the defendant would have been
reached if the notebooks had not been introduced.28 Thus, no prejudice resulted at the guilt phase from the lower court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress the notebooks.
However, the court stated that the introduction had a "very different effect" on the penalty phase of the trial. Prejudice resulted from
the prosecution's repeated use and reference to the notebooks
throughout the entire penalty phase.29 Thus, the court reversed the
lower court's judgment with respect to the penalty of death but affirmed it in all other aspects. 30
IV.

SEPARATE OPINIONS

Chief Justice Bird, in her concurring and dissenting opinion, 31 emphasizes four main points: first, it has been a long recognized principle that an individual's papers must be free from governmental
intrusion;32 second, the affidavit completely failed to state facts sufficient for probable cause to search for the diaries in question;33 third,
the warrant failed to meet the constitutional requirement of particularly describing the places to be searched and the persons or things to
be seized, and therefore did not place any sort of meaningful restriction on the scope of the search through the defendant's personal papers;34 and fourth, the jury instructions given during the penalty
stage were constitutionally deficient. As to the last point, the Chief
Justice stated that there is no way to state with certainty that the
sentencing jury considered all of the mitigating evidence since the
lower court presented them with a list of enumerated mitigating factors which would appear to the average reasonable juror to be
27. Frank, 38 Cal. 3d at 729, 700 P.2d at 424, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 810.
28. Id. at 730-31, 700 P.2d at 425, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 811.
29. Id. at 734, 700 P.2d at 427, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 813.
30. Id. at 735, 700 P.2d at 428, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 814.
31. Id. at 735-55, 700 P.2d at 428-442, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 814-828 (Bird, C.J., concurring and dissenting).
32. Id. at 742, 700 P.2d at 433, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 819.
33. Id. at 744-45, 700 P.2d at 435, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 821.
34. Id. at 745-47, 700 P.2d at 435-37, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 821-23.

3

exclusive. 5
In his separate concurring and dissenting opinion,36 Justice Kaus
stated that he only dissented as to the "more mundane matters" involved in the majority opinion. The main focus of his opinion dealt
with the defendant's objection, raised at the trial court level, to the
overbreadth of the warrant. Justice Kaus concluded that the defendant did not properly raise the issue and thus did not preserve the ob37
jection for appeal.
V.

CONCLUSION

While the effect of the court's decision may only be limited to its
facts, the court appeared to be issuing a two-pronged warning to magistrates and law enforcement officials regarding the issuance and execution of search warrants in the future. First, trial courts should
avoid boilerplate clauses which compel a search broader than the
facts contained within the affidavit will support. Second, law enforcement officials must refer to the warrant for guidance when conducting a search; otherwise the evidence will be excluded.
JESSICA L. LEMOINE

D.

Reversible error exists when the court fails to instruct
jury on need to find intent to kill as a prerequisiteto
finding special circumstances: People v. Hayes.

In People v. Hayes, 38 Cal. 3d 780, 699 P.2d 1259, 214 Cal. Rptr. 652
(1985), the supreme court reviewed the defendant's conviction and
death sentence as required by the death penalty law of 1978. The defendant had been charged with three counts of murder in connection
with shooting deaths that occurred in an armed robbery of a
hamburger stand and market. Upon arrest the defendant made a
confession which was tape recorded and played at the time of trial to
the jury. The jury found the defendant guilty as to each murder
count. At the conclusion of the penalty phase of the trial, the jury
returned a verdict of death on two of the three counts, but they were
unable to agree on a penalty for the third count. The defendant was
later sentenced to life imprisonment without possibility of parole.
Defendant claimed error as to both the guilt phase and penalty
phase of the trial. The claim of error as to the guilt phase was that
the tape recording should have been suppressed on Mirandagrounds.
The defendant argued that his statement, "Do I still gotta tell you af35. Id. at 750, 700 P.2d at 439, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 825.
36. Id. at 755-62, 700 P.2d at 442-46, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 828-32 (Kaus, J., concurring
and dissenting).
37. Id.
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ter I admit it?", constituted an attempt to invoke his Miranda right
to cut-off further questioning. The court rejected this contention. It
stated that the trial court reasonably could have found the inference
of the defendant's statement to be that he was willing to talk about
the crimes but unwilling to go into the details. The court therefore
affirmed the verdict of guilt.
The defendant's claim of error as to the penalty phase was that the
trial court did not instruct the jury that a finding of "special circumstances" required a prior finding that the defendant intended to kill
the robbery victims. The court held that the absence of such an instruction constituted error under Carlos v. Superior Court, 35 Cal. 3d
131, 672 P.2d 62, 197 Cal. Rptr. 79 (1983). The Carlos court held that
the absence of proof of intent to kill made the death penalty cruel
and unusual punishment under the United States Constitution. The
Hayes court stated that failing to instruct the jury of that requirement was reversible error except in four situations, none of them
were found to apply. Further, since the specific intent to kill is a
question of fact, the court stated it was not a proper one for them to
decide. The court thus set aside the special circumstances finding
and reversed the trial court as to the penalty phase.
KEITH F. MILLHOUSE

E.

The authority in Penal Code section 3041.5(b)(2)(A) to
review parole applications biennially instead of
annually is a procedural change that is not limited by
prohibitionsagainst ex post facto applicationsof
penalites: In re Jackson.

Because of ex post facto prohibitions, the constitutionality of a law
that changed the frequency that a prisoner could petition for parole
hearings was considered by the court in In re Jackson, 39 Cal. 3d 464,
703 P.2d 100, 216 Cal. Rptr. 760 (1985). The legislature amended section 3041.5 of the Penal Code in 1982 to permit the Board of Prison
Terms [hereinafter "Board"] to conduct parole hearings semi-annually, instead of yearly, in cases that the Board finds it reasonable to
expect parole will be denied. CAL. PENAL CODE § 3041.5(b)(2)(A)
(West Supp. 1985). The court determined that the change was
merely procedural since it affected the right to have a parole hearing,
and thus it was not within the purview of ex post facto prohibitions.
However, the court also held that the Board must consider the ques-

tion of a two year postponement from the issue of applicant's parole
request.
Lawrence Jackson, convicted of first degree murder for a killing
that took place in 1961, sought habeas corpus relief to compel the
Board to conduct his parole hearings on an annual basis. In 1977, the
determinate sentencing law went into effect to require an annual parole suitability hearing for prisoners that did not have a set parole
date. CAL. PENAL CODE § 3041.5(b)(2) (West Supp. 1985). For an
analysis of the administrative procedures of the law, see Comment,
Senate Bill 42 - The End of the Indeterminate Sentence, 17 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 133 (1977). This law was amended in 1982 by section
3141.5(b)(2)(A) to allow administrative discretion in handling parole
requests in which the Board finds it is not reasonable to expect a
grant of parole. Jackson was determined unsuitable for parole; additionally, he was found to have no reasonable chance of becoming suitable by the next year's hearing.
The reasons for the grant of discretion in postponing a prisoner's
next parole hearing was to relieve the Board from the heavy and
costly burden of conducting annual parole hearings when the result
is very predictable. Statistics were offered to show that nearly all parole hearings resulted in a denial of release or the setting of a parole
date three to nineteen years in the future.
Jackson argued that changing the 1977 law to apply to prisoners
convicted before the 1982 amendment would impose a penalty ex post
facto, and was invalid under federal and state constitutions. His reasoning was that the provision permitting the Board to refuse to hear
a petition for parole for two years instead of one amounted to the
possibility of a prisoner being denied release that otherwise would
have been forthcoming. The Attorney General, arguing for the state,
contended that the change was to relieve an administrative burden
and was only a procedural change.
To determine whether the challenged statute was only a procedural change, the court examined the actual effect of the amendment. First, it noted that the criteria for a finding of parole
suitability was the same as before the amendment. Most importantly, though, the new rule does not deprive an inmate of the right
to a suitability hearing. Further, no practical change would occur in
the release date because even when suitability for parole is found, experience shows that release does not take place for several years.
Thus, the change of parole review frequency could not have a realistic possibility of denying a prisoner's chances for early release or
any other opportunity for parole. The court further buttressed its
reasoning by the fact that postponement may occur only on those occasions that the Board is able to articulate reasons for denial of pa-
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role at the next hearing. Also, several procedural guarantees operate
to insure that the parole hearing itself is conducted fairly. Since the
amendment was deemed to have no substantive effect on the right to
parole and found to serve a valid state interest, the court held that it
was procedural and not an ex post facto imposition of a penalty.
However, the court found that the Board had acted deficiently in
one area. When Jackson applied for parole and was denied, the
Board based its reasoning for postponing the hearing for two years by
the same statement it used to deny parole at the present hearing.
Looking at the language in section 3041.5 of the California Penal
Code, the court decided that the legislature intended for the questions of parole suitability and postponement of the next hearing to be
decided upon independent grounds. In this case, the Board's written
decision merely cited the reasons for denying parole without showing
that the postponement question was even considered. Since this procedure did not satisfy the requirements of section 3041.5 of the California Penal Code, the court instructed the Board to clearly state the
factors that lead to the decision to postpone the next hearing. For a
discussion of factors that are valid for a finding of parole unsuitability, see Allen v. United States Parole Commission, 671 F.2d 322 (9th
Cir. 1982).
JAMES

B.

BRISTOL

F. Death sentence reversed because trial court abused its
discretionin not grantingdiscovery of police records:
People v. Memro.
I.

INTRODUCTION

In People v. Memrol the supreme court reviewed an automatic appeal from a judgment imposing a sentence of death under the 1977
death penalty legislation.2 The court reversed the conviction because
the trial court abused its discretion in summarily denying the defendant's discovery motion. 3 The court also used the case as an opportu1. 38 Cal. 3d 658, 700 P.2d 446, 214 Cal. Rptr. 832 (1985). Chief Justice Bird authored the majority opinion with Justices Mosk, Broussard, and Reynoso concurring.
Justice Grodin wrote a separate concurring and dissenting opinion with Justices Kaus
and Lucas concurring.
2. See 1977 Cal. Stat. ch. 316, § 14 (former CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.6; current version at CAL. PENAL CODE § 1239(b) (West Supp. 1985)).
3. See infra notes 20.40 and accompanying text.

nity to examine the breadth of police record discovery in general, 4 to
further define "attempt" in the context of lewd or lascivious conduct,5 and to pronounce a rule requiring a special waiver of jury trial
6
on the special circumstances issue.
II.

FACTS

Shortly after the disappearance of seven year old Carl Jr. in October of 1978, Detective Sims of the South Gate Police Department
used a psychic to prepare a sketch of the person whom she visualized
as having been with Carl Jr. at the time of his disappearance. Carl
Jr.'s parents said the sketch resembled the defendant who had
dropped off a car for Carl Sr. to repair, an occasional business practice between the two men, on the night of the boy's disappearance.
Upon visiting the residence of the defendant, the officers contend
they saw "literally hundreds" of photographs, on the walls and
shelves, of clothed and partially clothed young boys. 7 After the officers returned to Carl Jr.'s home, the defendant arrived to drop off
another vehicle for repair. The defendant reportedly said that he
had last seen Carl Jr. on the night of his disappearance when he took
the youth to get a soft drink at a local restaurant. The officers contend that they immediately arrested the defendant and took him to
the station in handcuffs. The defendant denied telling the officers
that he took the boy to a restaurant. Furthermore, the defendant asserted that he was taken to the station, without handcuffs, after
8
agreeing to submit to a polygraph test.
The discrepancies between the story of the police and that of the
defendant continued regarding the subsequent events at the city jail.
The officers contended that several hours after voluntarily waiving
his constitutional rights, and reiterating what he had previously told
the officers, the defendant confessed to killing Carl Jr. and two other
youths in Bell Gardens in 1976. 9 The officers denied making threats
or any form of promises during the interrogation. 10 Later that evening, the defendant led the police to Carl Jr.'s body.
The defendant claimed there were four separate interrogation ses4. See infra notes 41-49 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 50-63 and accompanying text.

6. See infra notes 64-69 and accompanying text.
7. While the defendant admitted that photographs of nude boys were in his
apartment, he asserted that the officers found them only after a warrantless general
search of the premises. The officers denied any search of the apartment on that occasion. Memro, 38 Cal. 3d at 667 n.4, 700 P.2d at 452 n.4, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 838 n.4.
8. Id. at 668 n.6, 700 P.2d at 453 n.6, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 839 n.6.
9. Id. at 669-70, 700 P.2d at 453-54, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 839-40.
10. For a synopsis of the confession, including details of the earlier killings, see
infra notes 54-56 and accompanying text.
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sions, none of which were proceeded by Mirandawarnings. 1 During
the third session, stated the defendant, Detective Carter made threatening references to the ability of Detective Greene, a large officer in
the room who was fond of weightlifting, to fight and get answers. Fi12
nally, after pointing out a hole in the wall of the interrogation room
3
and making other intimidating maneuvers,' Detective Carter "'reminded' [defendant] that Greene was nearby and . . . '[m]aybe [defendant] would like [his] head to make a matching hole in the wall
. ' 14 The defendant subsequently confessed.
III.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

After the defendant waived his right to a jury trial, the court, at a
hearing on a motion in limine, denied the defendant's renewed attempt to suppress the confession on the ground of involuntariness.15
At the trial the court found the defendant guilty of three murders:
(1) first degree murder as to the Carl Jr. and Ralph C. killings, and
(2) second degree murder as to the Scott F. homicide. Additionally,
the trial court held that the multiple murder special circumstance allegation was true;16 however, it found that the felony-murder special
circumstance allegation was not true. 17 Finally, after the defendant
waived his right to a jury trial on the question of penalty, the trial
court imposed a judgment of death for the Carl Jr. murder.
The defendant's appeal stemmed from the trial court's denial of his
discovery motion.' 8 In his motion, the defendant sought information
11. Id. at 670-72, 700 P.2d at 454-56, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 840-42.
12. This four or five inch hole in the plaster was located to the defendant's right,
about shoulder level as he sat at the table. Id. at 671, 700 P.2d at 454, 214 Cal. Rptr. at
840. Defense counsel investigated the interrogation room several weeks later and instead of finding a hole, he found a fresh plaster patch covering the area where the hole
was reported to be. A photograph of the patched wall was later admitted into evidence. Id at 673 n.11, 700 P.2d at 456 n.11, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 842 n.11.
13. For instance: "The officers then directed [defendant] to stand up, pull up his
shirt, and drop his pants to his knees. One of the officers stated that they had found
some pictures, and 'were just comparing what they could see against the pictures.' [Defendant] complied." Id. at 671, 700 P.2d at 455, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 841.
14. Id. at 672, 700 P.2d at 455, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 841.
15. Id. at 666, 700 P.2d at 451, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 837. For the statutory treatment of
in limine motions, see CAL. EVID. CODE § 405 (West 1966).
16. Regarding the felony-murder special circumstance of lewd or lascivious conduct, see 1977 Cal. Stat. ch. 316, § 9 (former CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3(c)(3)(iv); current
version at CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(a)(17)(v) (West Supp. 1985)).
17. Regarding the multiple murder special circumstance, see 1977 Cal. Stat. ch.
316, § 9 (former CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3(c)(5); current version at CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 190.2(a)(2) (West Supp. 1985)).
18. Memro, 38 Cal. 3d at 675, 700 P.2d at 457, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 843.

regarding complaints against the South Gate Police Department for
use of excessive force or violence and information contained in the
officers' personnel files, including psychiatric reports, relating to such
incidents. In ruling on the motion, the trial court limited the number
of testifying witnesses, who claimed previous mistreatment at the
hands of the South Gate Police Department, to two. The court excluded fifteen other possible witnesses because their statements
failed to implicate any of the interrogating officers. 19

IV.
A.

MAJORITY'S ANALYSIS

Abuse of Trial Court's Discretion

The supreme court quickly dismissed two arguments offered in
support of the trial court's ruling. First, the court declined to condition appellate review of discovery on the satisfaction of a pretrial
writ requirement. Mentioning lack of supporting authority, additional delay and expense, and the importance of discovery rights, the
court held that failure to seek pretrial review of a discovery ruling
will not preclude appellate review on the merits. 20 Second, the prosecution argued that the discovery motion was properly denied since
the declaration accompanying the motion wrongfully omitted a personal averment by the defendant regarding the involuntariness of his
confession. However, the court rejected this argument because California Evidence Code section 1043, subdivision (b)(3)21 contained no
22
such requirement for a "personal" affidavit by the defendant.
In finding that the trial court erred in denying the discovery motion, the court focused on refuting the prosecution's argument that
the defendant had failed to demonstrate a "plausible justification" for
the information sought. 23 After emphasizing the importance of dis19. Id. at 673, 700 P.2d at 456, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 842. The two witnesses testified to
being beaten by Detective Greene. Moreover, they both stated that Greene threatened
to put their heads through the wall with the hole in it. Id. at 674, 700 P.2d at 456-57,
214 Cal. Rptr. at 842-43.
20. Id. at 675-76, 700 P.2d at 457-58, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 843-44.
21. The motion required by section 1043(b) of the California Evidence Code was to
contain the following:
(1) Identification of the proceeding in which discovery or disclosure is sought,
the party seeking discovery or disclosure, the peace officer whose records are
sought, the governmental agency which has custody and control of such
records, and the time and place at which the motion for discovery or disclosure shall be heard;
(2) A description of the type of records or information sought; and
(3) Affidavits showing good cause for the discovery or disclosure sought, setting forth the materiality thereof to the subject matter involved in the pending litigation and stating upon reasonable belief that such governmental
agency identified has such records or information from such records.
CAL. EVID. CODE § 1043(b) (West Supp. 1985).
22. Memro, 38 Cal. 3d at 676, 700 P.2d at 458, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 844.
23. Id. at 676-84, 700 P.2d at 458-64, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 844-50.
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covery in criminal trials,24 the court cited Pitchess v. Superior
Court2 5 as judicial precedent for allowing the discovery of police per-

sonnel records. 26 In addition to the Pitchess standards, the court
stated that the complimentary provisions of California Evidence Code
sections 104327 and 104528 provided the backdrop for evaluating the

trial court's ruling.

29

The court proceeded to validate the defendant's theory of discovery
and summarized it by concluding: "Plainly, evidence that the interrogating officers had a custom or habit30 of obtaining confessions by violence, force, threat or unlawful aggressive behavior3 l would have
24. For example, the court adopted the following statement by former chief Justice Traynor: "'[I]n the absence of a countervailing showing by the prosecution that
the information may be used for an improper purpose, discovery is available not
merely in the discretion of the trial court, but as a matter of right.'" Id. at 677, 700
P.2d at 459, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 845 (quoting Traynor, Ground Lost and Found in Criminal Discovery, 39 N.Y.U. L. REv. 228, 244 (1964)).
25. Pitchess v. Superior Court, 11 Cal. 3d 531, 522 P.2d 305, 113 Cal. Rptr. 897
(1974). In Pitchess,the accused sought discovery of statements by complainants against
the arresting officers and disciplinary records in the police department's possession
concerning the officers' tendency towards violent acts. The court held both types of
information discoverable. See generally Comment, Discovery of Complaints Alleging
Police Brutality,63 CALIF. L. REV. 181 (1975) (comprehensive summary, including discussion of Pitchess, somewhat outdated due to lack of discussion regarding subsequently passed California Evidence Code section 1043 in 1978).
26. Memro, 38 Cal. 3d at 677-78, 700 P.2d at 459-60, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 845-46.
27. See supra note 21.
28. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1045 (West Supp. 1985). The court summarized the effect of
this provision as follows: "[Tihe trial court conducts an in camera examination of the
material to determine its relevance to the case at hand. Certain information is immune from disclosure, while other information may be released according to the guidelines provided .... Memro, 38 Cal. 3d at 679, 700 P.2d at 460, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 84647. See generally Review of Selected 1978 CaliforniaLegislation, 10 PAC. L.J. 247, 431
(1979) (reviews newly enacted California Evidence Code sections 1043, 1044, and 1045).
29. Memro, 38 Cal. 3d at 680, 700 P.2d at 461, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 847. The correlation
between Pitchess and the statutes is evidenced in the court's holding that the interpretation of "good cause," i.e., "plausible justification," applied by Pitchess and its progeny
was adopted by the legislature in enacting California Evidence Code section 1043. Id.
at 678-79 n.19, 700 P.2d at 460 n.19, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 846 n.19.
30. The court stated, "'Habit' means a person's regular or consistent response to a
repeated situation. 'Custom' means the routine practice or behavior on the part of a
group or organization that is equivalent to the habit of an individual." Id. at 681 n.22,
700 P.2d at 462 n.22, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 848 n.22 (quoting 2 JEFFERSON, CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE BENCHBOOK § 33.8 (2d ed. 1982)). See generally Uviller, Evidence of Character
to Prove Conduct: Illusion, Illogic, and Injustice in the Courtroom, 130 U. PA. L. REV.
845 (1982) (evidentiary focus on rules governing methods for proving character; details
rationales for continued use of such techniques).
31. Regarding the effectiveness of predicting violent behavior, see generally Harding & Adserballe, Assessments of Dangerousness: Observations in Six Countries, 6
INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 391 (1983) (summarizes results from collaborative study by
teams in Brazil, Denmark, Egypt, Swaziland, Switzerland, and Thailand); Middleton,

been admissible on the issue of whether the confession had been coerced." 32 The court also held that People v. Navarro33 "is not authority for the proposition that a claim of coercion can never be grounds
for discovery of police personnel records." 34 The court further found
that since evidence concerning complaints of prior violence by the interrogating officers was of an admissible type, 35 the counsel's declaration, which asserted that the confession had been coerced by
promises of leniency and threats of violence, sufficiently "set forth
the materiality" of the information sought.36 Additionally, the court
held that the defendant was not required to furnish additional "foundational facts" about the information sought in his motion, as was required in Tyler v. Superior Court,37 since to require such specificity

would "place the accused in the Catch-22 position of having to allege
with particularity the very information he is seeking."3 8 Finally, the
court summarized its holding by stating:
Counsel's allegations were sufficient to put the court on notice that the voluntariness of the confession would be in issue. The declaration articulated a theory as to how the information would be used in litigating that question. While
undoubtedly the factual allegations could have been more specific, they went
far beyond expressing "a mere desire for the benefit of all the information"
which was in the prosecution's hands. . . . Since counsel demonstrated good
cause for the information regarding the 3interrogating
officers, the trial court
9
erred in summarily denying the motion.

The court held that discovery may have produced evidence which
Predicting Violence: Can PsychiatristsBe Seers?, 66 A.B.A. J. 829 (1980) (reviews New
York case where psychiatrists wrongly believed patient was no longer a threat to exwife); Wilkins, Problems with Existing PredictionStudies and FutureResearch Needs,
71 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 98 (1980) (surveys use of predictive statement and details steps needed for improvements in prediction).
32. Memro, 38 Cal. 3d at 681, 700 P.2d at 462, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 848.
33. People v. Navarro, 84 Cal. App. 3d 355, 146 Cal. Rptr. 672 (1978).
34. Memro, 38 Cal. 3d at 682, 700 P.2d at 462, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 848.
35. The court stated, "Evidence of coercion is relevant both to the admissibility of
a confession and the weight it is to be given by the trier of fact." Id. (citing Jackson v.
Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 386 n.13 (1964); People v. Jimenez, 21 Cal. 3d 595, 607, 580 P.2d
672, 678, 147 Cal. Rptr. 172, 179 (1978); CAL. EVID. CODE § 607 (West 1966)).
With respect to admissibility of confessions under coercive circumstances, see generally Note, The Compelled Confession: A Case Against Admissibility, 60 NOTRE DAME
LAW. 800 (1985) (overviewing standards for voluntariness of confessions in connection
with Miranda warnings); Note, Admissibility of Confessions: The Voluntariness Requirement and Police Trickery in North Carolina,20 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 251 (1984)
(while focusing on a North Carolina case, this article presents well composed summary
of voluntariness requirements for confessions in relation to coercive police behavior);
CaliforniaSupreme Court Survey, A Review of Decisions, 10 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 835
(1983) (reviews People v. Hogan, 31 Cal. 3d 815, 647 P.2d 93, 183 Cal. Rptr. 817 (1982),
where implied promises of leniency and psychological coercion rendered incriminating
statements involuntary and thus inadmissible).
36. Memro, 38 Cal. 3d at 682, 700 P.2d at 463, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 849. Regarding the
necessity of setting forth the materiality of the requested information in order to show
good cause, as required by California Evidence Code section 1043, see supra note 21.
37. Tyler v. Superior Court, 102 Cal. App. 3d 82, 162 Cal. Rptr. 82 (1980).
38. Memro, 38 Cal. 3d 684, 700 P.2d at 464, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 850.
39. Id.at 682-83, 700 P.2d at 463, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 849.
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would have disproved the voluntariness of the defendant's confession;
0
therefore, the judgment was reversed.4
B. Police Record Discovery
The court made a four part holding regarding the scope of the defendant's discovery request. First, the court found that the defendant's request for all complaints of excessive force was overly broad.
The court stated that since the defendant "sought the information to
bolster his claim of involuntariness in the interrogation setting, only
complaints by persons who alleged coercive techniques in questioning
were relevant."41 Second, the court held that absent a showing
which linked any of the twelve non-interrogating officers of the
South Gate Police Department to the interrogating officers, the defendant was not entitled to discover information regarding those officers.42 Additionally, the court concluded that the defendant needed
to establish the above-mentioned link as a prerequisite to the introduction of testimony regarding the conduct of the twelve non-interrogating officers. 43 Third, the court found that although conclusions
resulting from internal police investigations were discoverable under
Pitchess principles, California Evidence Code section 1045, subdivision (b)(2) now precludes such discovery.44
The fourth part of the court's effort to define the scope of police
record discovery dealt with statements of psychiatrists or psychologists contained in personnel files. The court noted that at first blush
the information appeared to be protected by the psychotherapist-patient privilege contained in California Evidence Code section 1014.45
40. Id. at 685, 700 P.2d at 464, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 850. With respect to the admissibility of evidence showing coercion, including the citations which the court repeats at this
point in its analysis, see supra note 35 and accompanying text. Note 35 also contains a
summary of Justice Grodin's concurring and dissenting opinion regarding the majority's "reversal" holding.
41. Id. at 685, 700 P.2d at 465, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 851.
42. Id at 686, 700 P.2d at 465-66, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 851-52. The court further stated
that the trial court should determine, as a preliminary matter, whether the information sought may be obtained from other department records kept in the course of normal business. This would effectively bypass the disclosure of personnel records. Id at
687 n.30, 700 P.2d at 466 n.30, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 852 n.30 (citing CAL. EVID. CODE
§ 1045(c) (West Supp. 1985)). See also supra note 28.
43. Memro, 38 Cal. 3d at 689-90, 700 P.2d at 468, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 854.
44. Id at 687, 700 P.2d at 466, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 852. See CAL. EVID. CODE
§ 1045(b)(2) (West Supp. 1985). The court found a similar statutory prohibition against
discovery of complaints occurring more than five years before the defendant's interrogation. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1045(b)(1) (West Supp. 1985). See also supra note 28.
45. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1014 (West Supp. 1985).

However, the court held that in camera review of the material by the
trial court 46 was proper to determine if the statutory exception to the
privilege 47 required disclosure of the information.48 The court
adopted the following statement and held that it applied with equal
force to officers who allegedly obtained confessions by unlawful
methods: " '[T]he peril to which the public is exposed by a police officer who is suffering from a mental or emotional condition which
renders him violence prone ... is a danger of sufficient gravity to
justify the invocation of the exception provided by Evidence Code
section 1024.' 49
C. Attempted Lewd or Lacivious Conduct Found
The double jeopardy principles announced in Burks v. United
States,50 prohibiting retrial of a defendant after an appellate court
has reversed the conviction on the ground of insufficiency of the evidence, are followed in California.51 Thus, the court found it necessary to address the sufficiency of evidence supporting the murder
charges against the defendant.52 The parties focused on the sufficiency of the premeditation and deliberation evidence needed to support the first degree murder conviction for Carl Jr.'s killing.
However, the court deemed it unnecessary to reach that issue since it
found sufficient evidence to support the verdict under a felony-murder theory based upon the special circumstance of attempted lewd or
3
lascivious conduct.5
46. Id. § 1045(b)(3), (d). See supra note 28.
47. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1024 (West Supp. 1966). No privilege applies "if the psychotherapist has reasonable cause to believe that the patient is in such mental or emotional condition as to be dangerous to himself or the person or property of another and
that disclosure of the communication is necessary to prevent the threatened danger."
Id.
48. Memro, 38 Cal. 3d at 688-89, 700 P.2d at 467, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 853. Accord
Lemelle v. Superior Court, 77 Cal. App. 3d 148, 143 Cal. Rptr. 450 (1978) (while trial
court properly denied discovery of psychiatric or psychological opinions regarding officers' tendency towards violence, accused could properly move for in camera inspection of record). But cf Arcelona v. Municipal Court, 113 Cal. App. 3d 523, 169 Cal.
Rptr. 877 (1980) (discovery denied of psychological test results showing tendencies of
officers to use excessive force and bias against homosexuals due to lack of probative
value; privacy rights of officers outweighed value of information to accused).
49. Memro, 38 Cal. 3d at 688, 700 P.2d at 467, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 853 (quoting
Lemelle, 77 Cal. App. 3d at 168, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 462-63 (Tamura, J., dissenting)).
50. Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1 (1978). See generally CriminalLaw Survey,
15 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 688 (1982) (reviews post-conviction proceedings; uses Burks as
framework for analyzing double jeopardy issue with regards to insufficient evidence).
51. See, e.g., Stone v. Superior Court, 31 Cal. 3d 503, 515, 646 P.2d 809, 817, 183 Cal.
Rptr. 647, 655 (1982); People v. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d 18, 71, 641 P.2d 775, 807, 181 Cal.
Rptr. 243, 275 (1982).
52. Memro, 38 Cal. 3d at 690-700, 700 P.2d at 468-75, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 854-61.
53. The special circumstance of lewd or lascivious conduct is set out in 1977 Cal.
Stats. ch. 316, § 9 (current version at CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(a)(17)(v) (West Supp.
1985)). The relevant felony-murder provision states in part: "All murder... which is
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In order to assess whether there had been an "attempt," the court
detailed the defendant's confession. 54 In brief, the defendant stated
that he initially offered to take Carl Jr. to a local restaurant for a
Coke. Instead, the defendant drove directly to his apartment and
"had it in the back of his mind he was going to try to take some pictures of [Carl Jr.] in the nude because that is how he got his sexual
satisfaction, photographying [sic] young boys in the nude."5 5 After
the defendant had guided Carl Jr. into the bedroom, turning on
strobe lights as he did so, the boy said he wished to go home. The
defendant, angered by this request, grabbed a clothesline and strangled the youth to death. Finally, the defendant attempted to have
6
anal intercourse with the dead body.5
Since the case law regarding the types of acts necessary for an attempt under California Penal Code section 288 is limited,57 the court
resorted to traditional definitions for the crime of attempt.5 8 While
the court mentioned several tests for determining whether an act
committed in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate . . . any act punishable
under section 288, is murder of the first degree." CAL. PENAL CODE § 189 (West Supp.
1985). At the time of the Carl Jr. killing, section 288 provided in relevant part:
Any person who shall willfully and lewdly commit any lewd or lascivious act
...upon or with the body, or any part or member thereof, of a child under
the age of 14 years, with the intent of arousing, appealing to, or gratifying the
lust or passions of sexual desires of such person or of such child, shall be
guilty of a felony ....
1976 Cal. Stats. ch. 1139, § 177 (current version at CAL. PENAL CODE § 288(a) (West
Supp. 1985)).
54. Memro, 38 Cal. 3d at 690-93, 700 P.2d at 468-71, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 854-57.
55. Id. at 691, 700 P.2d at 469, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 855.
56. The defendant also confessed to killing Scott F., 12 years old, and Ralph C., 10
years old, in Bell Gardens two years earlier. Essentially, after meeting the boys in a
park, and after making an unsuccessful advance toward Scott, which produced the fatal response of "fucking faggot," the defendant murdered Scott by slitting his throat.
Realizing that Ralph would recognize him as being the last person seen with Scott, the
defendant tracked him down and similarly slit his throat. Id at 692-93, 700 P.2d at 470,
214 Cal. Rptr. at 856.
57. Id. at 697 n.48, 700 P.2d at 473 n.48, 214 Cal. Rtpr. at 859 n.48. The court cited
three cases involving attempts under California Penal Code section 288: People v
Granados, 49 Cal. 2d 490, 319 P.2d 346 (1957) (no attempt where dead girl's body found
with apron pulled below genitals, skirt considerably above genitals, and no physical evidence of sexual activity); People v. La Fontaine, 79 Cal. App. 3d 176, 144 Cal. Rptr. 729
(1978) (no attempt where no touching of boy hitchhiker); People v. Worthington, 38
Cal. App. 3d 359, 113 Cal. Rptr. 322 (1974) (attempt instructions allowed where victim's
mother had ordered accused to leave victim's bedroom combined with "extremely
weak" medical testimony indicating sexual misconduct).
58. For an intriguing view on the British approach to attempts, see generally Dennis, The Criminal Attempts Act 1981, 1982 CRIM. L. REV. 5 (overview of British statutory solution, including definition of attempt plus actus reus and mens rea elements);
Case and Comment: Attempt, 1984 CRIM. L. REV. 675 (summarizing 1984 British case,

constitutes an attempt, it appeared to find the necessary factors
under a two-part formula. First, since "to constitute an attempt the
acts of the defendant must go so far that they would result in the accomplishment of the crime unless frustrated by extraneous circumstances,"5 9 the court found that "[b]ut for Carl Jr.'s abrupt decision

to leave the apartment, it is likely that [the defendant's] steps would
have resulted in a completed violation of section 288."60 Second,
although the defendant's act of accompanying the youth to the apart-

ment probably only fell within the "zone of preparation," his ushering of the boy into the bedroom, while always staying close by, was
an attempt since it constituted "actual commencement of his plan."

61

The court thus concluded that there was sufficient evidence of attempted lewd or lascivious conduct, under a felony-murder theory, to
support the trial court's first degree murder verdict.6 2 Hence, the

court found no double jeopardy bar to a reprosecution

of the

3

defendant.6
D.

Waiver of Jury Trial on Special Circumstances

The court used the present case to pronounce the requirements of
a personal waiver of a jury on a special circumstances allegation since
the issue was important and because it was one which would likely
arise upon retrial as well as in other death penalty cases. 6 4 The court
used the following quote from People v. Granger6 5 to frame the problem of inherently conflicting statutory provisions:
[W]here ... a jury has ... been waived as to the guilt phase of the case, it is
... impossible to comply with the requirements of section 190.4, that the special circumstances be tried by a jury, and also comply with the requirement of
section 190.16 that the guilt and special circumstances be determined 'at the
6
same time.

The court held that since, for jury waiver purposes, special circumstance allegations should be given the same deference as charges of
analyzing the meaning of intent within the attempt context, and commentary regarding effects of Criminal Attempts Act 1981 on common law attempt).
59. Memro, 38 Cal. 3d at 698, 700 P.2d at 474, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 860 (citing People v.
Werner, 16 Cal. 2d 216, 221-222, 105 P.2d 927, 931 (1940)).
60. Memro, 38 Cal. 3d at 699, 700 P.2d at 475, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 861 (citing Werner,
16 Cal. 2d at 221-222, 105 P.2d at 931).
61. Memro, 38 Cal. 3d at 699, 700 P.2d at 475, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 861 (citing People v.
Staples, 6 Cal. App. 3d 61, 68, 85 Cal. Rptr. 589, 594 (1970)).
62. Memro, 38 Cal. 3d at 699, 700 P.2d at 475, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 861.
63. Id. at 700, 700 P.2d at 475, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 861. The court also rejected the
defendant's sufficiency claims regarding malice for the Bell Gardens killings. Id.
64. Id. at 700-05, 700 P.2d at 475-78, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 861-64.
65. People v. Granger, 105 Cal. App. 3d 422, 164 Cal. Rptr. 363 (1980).
66. Memro, 38 Cal. 3d at 701, 700 P.2d at 476, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 862 (quoting
Granger,105 Cal. App. 3d at 427-28, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 366). See also CAL. EVID. CODE
§§ 190.1(a), 190.4(a) (West Supp. 1985).
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substantive offenses, 67 the court in Granger was correct in deciding
that California Evidence Code section 190.4 should prevail and that
the trial court should have required a separate, personal waiver of
the right to jury trial on the special circumstances issue. 68 Thus,
although the court found that the trial court had erred in not requiring such a waiver, it did not reach the issue of prejudice since the de69
fendant's conviction was reversed on other grounds.
V.

SEPARATE CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION

Although he concurred in the majority's holding that the trial
court erred in denying defendant's discovery motion, Justice Grodin
parted with the majority on two distinct points.70 First, the justice
withheld his approval from that portion of the majority opinion holding which permitted the discovery of psychiatric or psychological
statements or reports in the officers' personnel file. Justice Grodin
would impose a heightened "good cause" requirement for obtaining
the records in order to avoid impermissible invasions of privacy.
Among other things he suggested having routine scrutiny of officers'
therapy sessions, whether the reports were in police files, for possible
indications of violent tendencies. 7 1 Second, the justice dissented from
the majority's apparent holding that the defendant received an unqualified reversal and new trial regardless of what any new discovery
72
would reveal.
VI.

IMPACT

While the court used this case as a vehicle to clarify several important aspects of California's death penalty laws, the acts of the defendant in this case, like those in so many sexual deviation/murder
scenarios, surely tempt the average citizen to bury reason with rage.
However, the court has again proclaimed that our system of justice
must prevail over our sense of justice. Yet at some point, in spite of
correct legal reasoning, the continual reversal of death sentences for
67. Memro, 38 Cal. 3d at 703, 700 P.2d at 477, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 863 (citing People v.
Garcia, 36 Cal. 3d 539, 684 P.2d 826, 205 Cal. Rptr. 265 (1984)).
68. Memro, 38 Cal. 3d at 701, 704, 700 P.2d at 476, 478, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 862, 864.
69. Id. at 704-05, 700 P.2d at 478, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 864. Regarding the reversal on
other grounds, i.e., the denial of discovery, see supra note 3 and accompanying text.
70. Id at 705-710, 700 P.2d at 479-82, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 865-68 (Grodin, J., concurring and dissenting).
71. Id. at 705-07, 700 P.2d at 479-80, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 865-66.
72. Id. at 710, 700 P.2d at 482, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 868.

those convicted of unconscionable acts may produce a backlash which
slides the laws of California closer toward the sense of justice end of
the scale.
JOHN EDWARD VAN VLEAR

G. Erroneously admitted evidence of prior incidents
similar to those upon which current criminalcharges
are based found prejudicial: People v. Ogunmola.
In People v. Ogunmola, 39 Cal. 3d 120, 701 P.2d 1173, 215 Cal. Rptr.
855 (1985), a certified gynecologist appealed from his conviction for
the rape of two patients. The patients were allegedly raped while
"unconscious of the nature of the act," a violation of section 261 of
the California Penal Code. CAL. PENAL CODE § 261 (West Supp.
1985). Each rape allegedly occurred during the performance of a bimanual vaginal examination. The defendant argued that the patients
mistook the normal insertion of two fingers for a sexual penetration.
At trial, the prosecution was permitted to introduce evidence of similar previous incidents involving two different patients. The defendant had been tried and acquitted of the charges stemming from the
prior incidents. The issue before the court was whether the trial
court had committed reversible error in admitting the evidence concerning the previous acts.
The court reversed the defendant's convictions since it found prejudice in the erroneously admitted evidence. The court found, and the
State conceded, that under People v. Tassell, 36 Cal. 3d 77, 679 P.2d 1,
201 Cal. Rptr. 567 (1984), the evidence was erroneously admitted for
corroboration since neither identity nor intent was at issue. The
court also held that the evidence was not independently admissible
for the purpose of establishing a necessary element of the crime
charged, that is the defendant's opportunity to achieve penetration.
Moreover, since the case pitted the credibility of the complaining witnesses against that of the defendant and his nurses, the court found
prejudicial error based on the great weight that the corroborating
testimony must have carried with the jury. The court's strongest evidence of prejudice came from the fact that the defendant was acquitted when charged with only two similar offenses, but convicted when
the jury learned of four similar incidents.
JOHN EDWARD VAN VLEAR
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H.

When there is evidence to justify a conviction of a
lesser offense than the one for which the defendant is
being tried, the trial court must give jury instructions
on that lesser included offense: People v. Ramkeesoon.

In People v. Ramkeesoon, 39 Cal. 3d 346, 702 P.2d 613, 216 Cal.
Rptr. 455 (1985), the supreme court reversed the defendant's conviction of murder and robbery because the trial court committed reversible error when it failed to instruct the jury on the lesser offense of
larceny and theft. The defendant testified that he did not have the
intent to steal any of the murder victim's property until after the assault had occurred. After presentation of the defendant's testimony,
the defense counsel requested that jury instructions on larceny and
grand theft be given as lesser offenses included in the robbery. Despite this request, the trial court did not give the instructions. Thereafter, the defendant was convicted of robbery and murder.
In reversing the trial court, the supreme court reiterated that,
[i]t is well settled that the trial court is obligated to instruct [the jury] on necessarily included offenses - even without a request - when the evidence
raises a question as to whether all of the elements of the charged offense are
present and there is evidence that would justify a conviction of such a lesser
offense.

Ramkeesoon, 39 Cal. 3d at 351, 702 P.2d at 616, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 458
(following People v. Wickersham, 32 Cal. 3d 307, 325, 650 P.2d 311,
320, 185 Cal. Rtpr. 436, 445 (1982)). The defendant's testimony that
he did not form the intent to steal until after the attack warranted an
instruction of an offense lesser than robbery. Since an instruction on
the lesser offense was not given to the jury, the trial court erred.
The supreme court further held that such error was not merely
"harmless error" but reversible error. Because the defendant admitted to taking the victim's property, and the only theft charge instruction given to the jury was robbery, the jury was certain to convict the
defendant on the robbery charge. The trial court gave the jury no
opportunity to consider whether the defendant had formed the necessary intent for robbery or whether he had simply committed a
lesser theft crime. The conviction was therefore reversed.
MIssY KELLY BANKHEAD

I.

The warrantlesssearch of the defendant's briefcase
found in the trunk of his vehicle after his arrest was
held to be a violation of article I, section 13 of the
California Constitution: People v. Ruggles.

In People v. Ruggles, 39 Cal. 3d 1, 702 P.2d 170, 216 Cal. Rptr. 88
(1985), the court considered the admissibility of evidence obtained in
the warrantless search of a briefcase and two tote bags found in the
locked trunk of the defendant's automobile. The court held that the
search of the interior of the defendant's automobile was permissible.
However, the search of the briefcase and the tote bags without a
search warrant violated article I, section 13 of the California Constitution. The court also held that because the crime for which the defendant was charged was committed before the passage of
Proposition 8 (CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28), the defendant's motion to
suppress should have been granted.
The defendant, David Wendell Ruggles, was a parolee who had
been imprisoned for armed robbery. The Los Angeles Police Department received information that the defendant and an accomplice
were going to commit an armed robbery on January 3, 1979. The informant also indicated that the defendant would use two handguns in
the robbery; one would be carried by the defendant on the small of
his back and the other would probably be carried in a briefcase or
sachel.
On the morning of January 3, 1979, the police surveillance team observed the defendant placing a brown briefcase in his trunk. When
the surveillance team decided that the defendant was about to leave
the county, they arrested him and conducted a search of his vehicle
after spotting drug paraphernalia in plain view on the back seat. The
police seized keys to the car and opened the trunk. In the trunk,
they found the brown briefcase and two tote bags. In the briefcase,
the police found two guns, ammunition, a holster, handcuffs, gloves, a
flashlight and a bandana. In the tote bags, the police found various
other robbery equipment. The trial court denied the defendant's motion to suppress all the evidence found in the vehicle because it held
that the officers had probable cause to arrest the defendant, to stop
his vehicle, and to search his vehicle, including the trunk.
The supreme court first considered the case in light of United
States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982). In Ross, the United States
Supreme Court expanded the "automobile exception" to the warrant
requirement of the fourth amendment. The Court adopted the rule
that police officers, who lawfully stop a vehicle, and have probable
cause to believe that contraband is located somewhere in the vehicle,
may conduct a warrantless search of the vehicle as thorough as that
which a magistrate could authorize by warrant. Id. at 824.
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The California court concluded that the trial court did not err in
finding that the police officers had probable cause to search Ruggles'
vehicle, including the trunk. However, the court accepted the defendant's argument that this case is distinguishable from Ross because here the officers knew which container was likely to contain at
least one of the weapons. In Ross, there was probable cause to believe that narcotics were somewhere in the vehicle, not in a specific
container in the trunk. The supreme court pointed out that a warrant is required for the search of a particular container, even in a car,
when it is known that this container holds the sought-after evidence.
Therefore, the court held that the fact the briefcase was found in a
trunk did not justify a warrantless search unless there was both
probable cause and exigent circumstances.
Rather than wait for the United States Supreme Court to direct
this court on how to apply Ross, the California Supreme Court looked
to article I, section 13 of the California Constitution because it establishes a higher standard for searches and seizures than the United
States Constitution. The court stated that this decision was in the interest of protecting the privacy of California citizens. It reasoned
that because the police can impound an item until a search warrant is
obtained, requiring a warrant in cases such as Ruggles, absent consent
or some exigency, will cause no excessive burden on the police.
Because the court did not rely on Proposition 8 in formulating its
opinion, this case will have little or no precedential effect. Proposition 8 establishes that all relevant evidence will now be admissible in
criminal proceedings. In re Lance W., 37 Cal. 3d 873, 694 P.2d 744,
210 Cal. Rptr. 631 (1985), interpreted Proposition 8 as abrogating the
defendant's right to object to and suppress evidence seized in violation of the California Constitution, but not the Federal Constitution.
Therefore, federal standards will probably now be controlling in all
California cases involving the warrantless search of containers found
in vehicles subsequent to the passage of Proposition 8.
JOHN THOMAS McDOWELL

J.

Defendant proceeding pro se held not to have been
denied due process: People v. Smith.

In People v. Smith, 38 Cal. 3d 945, 702 P.2d 180, 216 Cal. Rptr. 98
(1985), the court upheld a trial judge's decision to deny the defendant's motions for continuance. On appeal the defendant claimed he
was denied a fair trial because he was not given sufficient time to ex-

amine jury instruction materials and was denied eight hours sleep
the night before trial.
At trial the defendant had represented himself and was convicted
of burglary. The conviction rested upon an eyewitness identification,
the defendant's arrest in a getaway car with stolen goods, and an incriminating statement made at trial. During the trial the defendant
stated he did not have adequate access to legal materials and moved
for continuance, which the judge denied. On appeal the record indicated that the defendant had access to legal materials via books circulated in the jail library, a deputy's daily run to a law library, and the
photocopying of noncirculating materials by a "runner." The defendant used the libraries almost daily for three months. The supreme
court held that Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1974) only required that a defendant proceeding pro se be treated the same as an
attorney. The defendant's access to a law library was therefore adequate under the due process clause. See also Stewart v. Gates, 450 F.
Supp. 583, 589 (C.D. Cal. 1978).
At the end of the trial, the defendant had again moved for a continuance, claiming that he never had an opportunity to examine the
California Jury Instructions For Criminal Trials (CALJIC) or to prepare jury instructions. The court upheld the trial court's denial of
the motion because the defendant admitted six weeks before trial
that he had knowledge of CALJIC and wanted to use the volume.
The defendant also knew that his "runner" could photocopy CALJIC
for his use. The court further stated that the jury instructions given
at trial were not prejudicial. The charge was simple, and the evidence of guilt was overwhelming. Moreover, the trial judge modified
or refused many of the instructions proposed by the prosecution, and
the defendant could find no error in the instructions. See 21 CAL.
JUR. 3D Criminal Law §§ 2908-2923 (1985).
The defendant's second ground for a continuance was a lack of
sleep the night before trial. The defendant claimed that he had not
been allowed eight hours sleep and that he was too tired to present a
case. The defendant relied on Stewart v. Pitchess, 457 F. Supp. 104
(C.D. Cal. 1978), in which the defendants challenged jail conditions
and the court gave orders that prisoners be allowed eight hours sleep
before court appearances. The court held that the case did not require the trial judge to delay the trial. Stewart did not mandate eight
hours sleep but only that a defendant not be so tired that he lacked
alertness to present his best defense. The overwhelming evidence
against the defendant, and not a lack of sleep, accounted for the defendant's failure to cross-examine or to present a defense. Thus,
there was no due process violation in not granting a continuance for
lack of sleep.
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The court summarily dismissed the defendant's other contentions
as having no merit. The pretrial hearings for discharging the public
defender and allowing the defendant to represent himself were adequate. The defendant was not entitled to a legal research firm, and
the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in refusing to replace a
court-appointed investigator. Further, the trial judge had properly
refused to subpoena certain witnesses requested by the defendant,
the evidence was sufficient to support the verdict, a motion for a new
trial was properly denied, and the defendant had no right to crossexamine the probation officer who prepared the probation report.
The court viewed the case as an example of a street-wise defendant
employing every possible tactic to delay his conviction and induce error into the proceedings.
MARK

K.

S.

BURTON

The rule which operates to exclude probation revocation
hearing testimony from the subsequent trial on the
underlying criminal charge was not abrogated by the
adoption of article I, section 28 of the California
Constitution: People v. Weaver.

In People v. Weaver, 39 Cal. 3d 654, 703 P.2d 1139, 217 Cal. Rptr.
245 (1985), the court decided the issue of whether the adoption of article I, section 28 of the California Constitution (also known as the
Victim's Bill of Rights and Proposition 8) abrogated the rule which
excludes testimony given at a probation revocation hearing from the
subsequent criminal trial on the related criminal charges.
The defendant in this case was on probation for possessing a
sawed-off shotgun, a crime to which he pled guilty in 1981. One of
the conditions of his probation was that he could not possess any dangerous weapons during the probation period. In August, 1982, the defendant allegedly accused a man of looking at his girlfriend which
prompted the defendant to slash the tires and dent the roof of the
man's car with a sheath knife he was carrying. In February, 1983, the
district attorney initiated revocation proceedings against the petitioner for this conduct, which also served as the basis for independent criminal charges. The petitioner offered no evidence at the
hearing because his attorney felt that Proposition 8 would make that
evidence admissible at the subsequent criminal trial on the related
charges.
The trial court held that the defendant had violated his probation

and sentenced him to two years in state prison. On appeal the defendant claimed "that the trial court's refusal to continue the revocation hearing until after trial forced him to choose between testifying
at the hearing and jeopardizing his privilege against self-incrimination, or remaining silent and surrendering his due process right to
present evidence in his own behalf." Weaver, 39 Cal. 3d at 657, 703
P.2d at 1141, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 247.
In affirming the order revoking the petitioner's probation, the
supreme court first noted that Proposition 8 only applies to prosecutions for crimes committed after its passage in June, 1982. See People
v. Smith, 34 Cal. 3d 251, 667 P.2d 149, 193 Cal. Rptr. 692 (1983). The
court therefore held that although Proposition 8 came into effect after the gun possession crime had been committed, it still applied to
the revocation hearing and subsequent trial because the crime giving
rise to the parole violation was committed after the passage of Proposition 8.
The court next analyzed the following rule developed by the
supreme court in 1975:
[T]he testimony of a probationer at a probation revocation hearing held prior
to the disposition of criminal charges arising out of the alleged violation of the
conditions of his probation, and any evidence derived from such testimony, is
inadmissible against the probationer during subsequent proceedings on the related criminal charges, save for purposes of impeachment or rebuttal ....

People v. Coleman, 13 Cal. 3d 867, 889, 533 P.2d 1024, 1042, 120 Cal.
Rptr. 384, 402 (1975). See also 22 CAL. JUR. 3D CriminalLaw §§ 34783481 (3d ed. 1985). The purpose of this rule was to give the probationer the opportunity to be heard at his probation revocation hearing without fear of self-incrimination. The problem which faced the
court in the application of the Coleman rule lay in the interpretation
of the language of article I, section 28, subdivision (d) of the California Constitution. "[R]elevant evidence shall not be excluded in any
criminal proceeding, including pretrial and post conviction motions
and hearings.

. .

."

CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28(d). This section had re-

cently been interpreted so as to limit a court's power to exclude relevant evidence. In re Lance W., 37 Cal. 3d 873, 694 P.2d 744, 210 Cal.
Rptr. 631 (1985). See also Comment, Proposition 8: California Law
After In re Lance W. and People v. Castro, 12 PEPPERDINE L. REV.
1059 (1985).
Nonetheless, despite the constitution's language, the court held
that the rule expressed in Coleman still operated to exclude probation revocation hearing testimony from subsequent criminal trials.
The court used the language in article I, section 28 to justify its holding. The article states: "Nothing in this section shall affect any existing statutory rule of evidence relating to privilege . .

. ."

CAL.

CONST. art. I, § 28(d). The court held that the Coleman rule may be
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deemed a statutory rule because it is codified in section 940 of the
California Evidence Code. CAL. EVID. CODE § 940 (West 1966).
Therefore, the Coleman rule survived the adoption of Proposition 8,
and because the court found that the petitioner would be protected
by the Coleman rule in any subsequent criminal trial, he could not
attack the probation revocation hearing on that basis.
Although this decision has the effect of saving the Coleman rule
from being abolished by Proposition 8, the decision has a harsh effect
on the defendant. Because of his initial belief that Proposition 8
would allow his probation revocation hearing testimony to be used in
his subsequent criminal trial, the defendant was punished for his silence at that hearing.
JOHN THOMAS McDOWELL

L. Defendant's murder conviction cannot be reversed on
appeal even though admissible evidence regardingthe
victim's use of heroin was excluded at the trial because
the omission constituted harmless error: People v.
Wright.
In People v. Wright, 39 Cal. 3d 576, 703 P.2d 1106, 217 Cal. Rptr. 212
(1985), defendant Wright was convicted of first degree murder. The
defendant and victim lived in the same trailer park. On the night of
the murder, the two had a heated argument which caused the defendant to retrieve a gun from his trailer and shoot the victim four
times, killing him. At trial, the jury convicted the defendant of first
degree murder. Wright appealed the conviction on several grounds.
First, Wright contended that the trial court erred when it refused
to admit evidence regarding the victim's use of heroin in two situations: at the time of his death, and two years prior thereto when the
victim had resisted arrest while under the influence of heroin. Defendant's purpose in offering evidence of the victim's use of heroin
was to establish that the victim had an irrational behavior while
under the influence of heroin that justified defendant's self-defense.
The trial court refused to admit all evidence regarding the victim's
use of heroin because its prejudicial nature outweighed its probative
value. The supreme court held that the trial court did err when it
refused to admit evidence which would show that the victim had
used heroin within twenty four hours of his death, because at the
very least, such evidence would have impeached the victim's wife's
testimony. At trial she testified for the State and declared that her

husband had not used heroin within two years. Furthermore, such
evidence would not have been that prejudicial because the victim's
wife had already testified that the victim had used heroin in the past.
Therefore, even though the supreme court found that the trial court
had erred in not admitting particular evidence regarding the victim's
use of heroin the day of his murder, the error was harmless. The
judgment was not reversed on defendant's first contention.
Wright's second contention was that the trial court gave improper
instructions to the jury on deliberate and premeditated murder. The
trial court did err in one set of the instructions given to the jury on
deliberation and premeditation; however, other instructions given
correctly explained the meaning of deliberation and premeditation.
Thus, again the error was harmless.
Thirdly, the defendant asserted that he should have been granted a
mistrial and dismissal because the prosecution failed to disclose evidence that tended to exculpate the defendant to his defense counsel.
The undisclosed pieces of evidence were the police reports from the
night of the murder. The court refused to grant Wright a mistrial because the undisclosed evidence was discovered before a verdict had
been reached and before jury deliberations had begun. Once the nondisclosure was discovered, the trial court allowed defense counsel an
opportunity to introduce the evidence, remedying any prejudice
caused by the nondisclosure.
Finally, Wright claimed that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to justify the jury's finding that the murder was in fact premeditated and deliberate. On review, the supreme court noted that it
was "required to 'review the whole record in the light most favorable
to the judgment to determine whether it contains substantial evidence . . . from which a rational trier of fact could have found the

defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.'" Wright, 39 Cal. 3d at
592, 703 P.2d at 1116, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 222 (quoting People v. Green,
27 Cal. 3d 1, 55, 609 P.2d 468, 501, 164 Cal. Rptr. 1, 34 (1980)). Using
this standard of review, the court held that substantial evidence did
exist regarding Wright's planning to kill the victim. After a heated
verbal encounter with the victim, the defendant returned to his
trailer and procured the murder weapon. Instead of staying safe and
secure in his trailer, Wright returned to the scene of the argument
and without hesitation shot the victim as soon as he saw him. Based
upon these facts, the supreme court found substantial evidence to
support the jury's first degree murder conviction. Therefore, the
conviction was affirmed.
MISSY KELLY BANKHEAD
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IX.

EMPLOYEE BENEFITS
A.

Special pay given after retirement,pursuant to a
collective bargainingagreement, and not previously
accrued while working, may be deducted from
unemployment compensation benefits: Evans v.
Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board.
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Evans v. Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board,1 the court
had to determine whether a special payment of money to retired
workers was a pension payment that was to be deducted from unemployment compensation. The issue arose because federal and state
laws on unemployment insurance 2 require that certain categories of
retirement pay be deducted from the amount of unemployment compensation to which an individual would otherwise be entitled. The
court ruled that the special payments, which were automatically
given to every employee upon retirement, were pension payments.
The payments were deductible from unemployment benefits because
they were given for a specific period of time and did not represent
vacation time the employees had accrued while working. The court
stated, however, that any amounts that represented unused vacation
time accruing before retirement could not be deducted from unemployment compensation.
Charles Evans, one of three employees who sought relief in this action, retired from Kaiser Steel Corporation on August 9, 1980. His
regular pension payments were scheduled to begin in December,
1980. Evans applied for unemployment insurance benefits for the
meantime. However, before the unemployment benefits were given,
Evans received a special lump sum payment from Kaiser as provided
in the company's pension agreement. The amount of the special payment to be given any employee under the plan had some relation to
that employee's vacation time and pay. 3 Evans received an amount
1. 39 Cal. 3d 398, 703 P.2d 122, 216 Cal. Rptr. 782 (1985). Opinion by Justice
Grodin with Chief Justice Bird, Justices Mosk, Kaus, Broussard, Reynoso, and Lucas
concurring.
2. 26 U.S.C.A. § 3304(a)(15) (West Supp. 1985). This statute mandated the enactment of its provisions by state legislatures. See CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE § 1255.3 (West
Supp. 1985).
3. The calculation of special payments is confusing. In some cases the payment
to an employee is reduced by the amount of vacation time and pay he has accrued and
taken. In other cases where an employee has accrued vacation time but not used it or
an employee is ineligible for vacation he will receive an amount equal to thirteen

equal to thirteen weeks of vacation pay. When the Employment Development Department heard of the payment, it denied Evans unemployment benefits; it considered the special payments as retirement
pay. The California Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board
affirmed.
The Department and Board made similar rulings regarding the
other two Kaiser retirees. Stanton Weitzel retired after being placed
on a ninety day layoff and after completing an extended vacation.
His special payment was reduced by the amount of vacation pay received and so was his unemployment insurance. Robert Goist elected
to retire when given a choice between retirement and taking another
position. Goist had taken five weeks of vacation with pay in his final
year before retiring. Thus, instead of receiving thirteen weeks of salary upon retirement, he received only eight weeks of pay in the special payment plan. Nonetheless, the Department ruled, and the
Appeals Board affirmed, that Goist was ineligible for any benefits.
II.

A.

THE COURT'S ANALYSIS

Statutory History

In 1976, Congress enacted legislation to address an inequity then
existing in some states. Individuals who retired under certain conditions were able to draw unemployment benefits in addition to social
security and other pension payments. 4 The Senate Finance Committee decided that the law should be uniform in all states to prevent
retirees from collecting both types of benefits from the same employer.5 Congress therefore determined that pension payments
should be deducted from unemployment benefits.6
Before the new law was to take effect, the National Commission on
Unemployment Insurance [hereinafter Commission] was given an op-

portunity to review the proposed legislation. The Commission was
highly critical of the plan, stating that it is inappropriate to limit unemployment compensation in the present economy when many people are forced into early retirement by industry-wide layoffs. 7 In
spite of this condemnation by the Commission, the proposed legislaweeks of vacation pay. Evans, 39 Cal. 3d at 412-13, 703 P.2d at 128-29, 216 Cal. Rptr. at
789-90.
4. S. Rep. No. 1265, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 21-22, reprintedin 1976 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 6015-16.
5. Id.
6. Id. See also Annot., 56 A.L.R.3D 520 (1974) (right to unemployment compensation as affected by receipt of pension); Annot., 56 A.L.R.3D 552 (1974) (right to unemployment compensation as affected by receipt of social security benefits).
7. National Comm'n on Unemployment Compensation, Final Report (July, 1980).
For background on the right to receive unemployment compensation when laid off according to a mandatory retirement plan, see Annot., 50 A.L.R.3D 880 (1973).
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tion passed as an amendment to the Federal Unemployment Tax Act,
became effective March 31, 1980, and is codified in Title 26 of the
United States Code, section 3304(a)(15). 8
Section 3304(a)(15) requires retired employees who are eligible for
unemployment insurance benefits to deduct the amount of any pension received from weekly insurance benefits. 9 The Act defines pension payments as income that is paid from a plan maintained or
contributed to by an employer, and made periodically after retirement.10 As required by the federal law, the same offset provision
was then enacted by the states that did not have such a law or whose
law was inconsistent with the provision; California was among
them.11

The Evans court commented that the California Legislature shared
the Commission's view but under Congressional mandate reluctantly
approved section 1255.3 of the Unemployment Insurance Code in
1979.12 In order to minimize the effect of the law the legislature included a self-destruct clause that would void or limit the statute if
Congress ever limited or repealed section 3304(a)(15). 13 The history
of the California statute indicates that the legislature intended only
to comply with the minimum requirements of the federal law, and
14
nothing more.
Alongside the deduction statute is section 1265 of the Unemployment Insurance Code, which defines "vacation time earned but not
paid prior to termination" in such a manner that it precludes deduction of post termination vacation pay from unemployment benefits.15
Therefore, the court decided that the determination of whether to
treat the special payment given by Kaiser to its retired employees as
a retirement benefit must be made in light of this legislative policy
towards accrued vacation pay and legislative resistance in passing section 1255.3.16
8. 26 U.S.C.A. § 3304(a)(15).
9. Id.
10. 26 U.S.C.A. § 3304(a)(15) (West Supp. 1985); CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE
§ 1255.3(c)(1) (West Supp. 1985).
11. CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE § 1255.3 (West Supp. 1985).
12. Evans, 39 Cal. 3d at 409, 703 P.2d at 127, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 787.
13. CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE, § 1255.3(b), (c) (West Supp. 1985).
14. Evans, 39 Cal. 3d at 410, 703 P.2d at 127, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 787.
15. CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE § 1265.5 (West Supp. 1985).
16. Evans, 39 Cal. 3d at 410, 703 P.2d at 127, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 787. For background
on the right of an employee to receive unemployment compensation upon voluntary
retirement, see Annot., 88 A.L.R.3D 274 (1978). For general eligibility requirements,

B.

Characterizationof the Special Payment

The court noted that the special payment given to the employees
upon retirement is characterized in the pension agreement in specific
terms. It is made in a lump sum and equal to thirteen weeks of vacation pay. The sum is reduced by the amount of any vacation pay received in the retirement year, and any unused vacation pay is not
17
added to the amount of the special payment.
Nearly all retiring employees from Kaiser receive the special payment, regardless of their vacation eligibility status, and it is disbursed
from the pension trust fund. The payment is received only once and
only upon retirement, even if the person is later re-employed by Kaiser. Thus, the employees' argument that the special payment is not a
pension, but only compensation earned for previous work, is not persuasive in regards to retiring employees with no accrued vacation.18
However, for those employees who have accrued vacation time
upon retirement, the portion of the special payment that represents
accrued vacation pay cannot be a retirement benefit; the accrued
amount would have been paid even if the employee had not retired.' 9
The right to vacation pay becomes vested as the employee's services
are rendered and is not forfeitable. 20 Accordingly, the court determined that the portion of the special payment not equivalent to accrued vacation pay is properly characterized as a pension payment for
purposes of reducing unemployment benefits. The part of the special
payment that is equivalent to accrued vacation pay, however, must be
2
exempted from the statutory offset provision. '
C.

Allocation of the special payment

In the cases of all three employees, the special payment was allocated to the entire three month period immediately following retirement. This was done primarily on the basis of the pension agreement
that stated the payment was to cover a thirteen week period. The
employees urged that since the payment is a lump sum, it is not a pesee 1 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW §§ 65-72 (8th ed. 1973 & 1984 Supp.); 2
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE REPORTER (CCH) California

8507.5 (1983).

17. Evans, 39 Cal. 3d at 410-11, 703 P.2d at 127-28, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 788.
18. Id. at 414-15, 703 P.2d at 130, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 790.
19. Id.
20. Suastez v. Plastic Dress-Up Co., 31 Cal. 3d 774, 780-81, 647 P.2d 122, 125-26, 183
Cal. Rptr. 846, 849-50 (1982). For the related matter of the rights of non-unionized, pri-

vate employees to vacation pay, see Annot., 33 A.L.R.4TH 264 (1984).
21. Evans, 39 Cal. 3d at 416, 703 P.2d at 131, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 719. For a comparison of how other states treat this issue, see Annot., 14 A.L.R.4TH 1175 (1982) (right to
unemployment compensation as affected by vacation or payment in lieu thereof). See
also Annot., 3 A.L.R.4TH 557 (1981) (right to unemployment compensation as affected
by claimant's receipt of holiday pay); Annot., 93 A.L.R.2D 1319 (1964) (severance pay-

ments as affecting the right to unemployment compensation).
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riodic pension payment and is not subject to the offset provisions of
section 1255.3.22 The court ruled that this payment should be treated
as the first installment of the pension plan, covering the first quarter
of retirement. Such an allocation is reasonable in cases where the
employee is receiving thirteen weeks of pay for a thirteen week
23
period.
However, this formula is not proper for those individuals who do
not receive a full thirteen weeks of vacation pay upon retirement.
Persons like Goist, who used their accrued vacation during their re-

tirement year, had that amount of vacation pay deducted from the
special payment. The five weeks Goist took during his final year
caused him to receive only eight weeks of vacation pay in the special
payment. The proper allocation of his retirement bonus should have

been only over an eight week period. He should have received five
weeks of unemployment benefits with his eight weeks deducted.24

III.

CONCLUSION

The court's holding is narrowly drawn to the circumstances of Kaiser Company's special retirement payments. Under the Unemployment Insurance Code, the court concluded that to the extent special
retirement payments do not include earned but unused vacation pay,

they are pension payments. They must therefore be deducted from
unemployment benefits. The court also ruled that the deduction
from unemployment benefits must be fair. If a payment equal to
eight weeks of vacation pay is classified as a pension payment, only

eight weeks of unemployment benefits may be withheld.25
JAMES B. BRISTOL
22. CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE § 1255.3(c) (West Supp. 1985). This argument was part
of a larger contention that the lump sum should be allocated to a single week in offsetting the unemployment benefits. The court held that the allegation was largely rendered moot by the determination in Rivera v. Becerra, 714 F.2d 887 (9th Cir. 1983),
cert. denied sub. nom., International Union, United Auto., Aerospace and Agricultural
Implement Workers of Am. v. Donovan, 465 U.S. 1099 (1984).
23. Evans, 39 Cal. 3d at 419, 703 P.2d at 133-34, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 793-94.
24. Id. at 420, 703 P.2d at 134, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 794.
25. Id. at 420-21, 703 P.2d at 134, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 794. The court also considered
the emplyees' request for attorney fees from the Board under CAL. GOV'T CODE § 800
(West 1980). This was denied, as the recovery of fees must be based upon a finding
that the public entity engaged in "conduct not supported by fair or substantial reason."
Seghesio v. County of Napa, 135 Cal. App. 3d 371, 377, 185 Cal. Rptr. 224, 228 (1982).
The record did not reflect arbitrariness or capriciousness on the part of the Board.

B. By withdrawing retirement contributions, an employee
does not waive his right to apply for disability
retirement unless it is proved that he made an
informed decision: Hittle v. Santa Barbara County
Employees Retirement Association.
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Hittle v. Santa Barbara County Employees Retirement Association,' the court faced two major issues: whether the retirement association's sixty day time limit for judicial review was valid and
whether an employee had knowingly waived his right to apply for
disability retirement when he withdrew his contributions to an employee retirement plan. The court held that the time limit was invalid in light of Government Code section 31727.2 It also found no
substantial evidence to support the trial court's decision that the employee had waived his rights. The court based this decision on the
fact that the only notice the employee had of his options under the
plan was a brief handwritten notation on a form letter.3 This led to
the court's finding that the retirement association failed to fulfill its
fiduciary duty to inform the employee of his retirement options.4
II.

FACTS

William T. Hittle began working as a heavy truck operator for the
Santa Barbara County Public Works Department in July, 1977, and
joined the Santa Barbara County Employees Retirement Association
(SBCERA). Two months later, Hittle injured his lower back while
working.5 His chiropractor authorized him to return to work on
June 21, 1978. However, a second chiropractor recommended that
Hittle refrain from working until August, 1978, at which time his
level of disability would be reexamined. On August 14, 1978, an orthopedic surgeon reexamined Hittle and reported that the industrial
6
injury had totally disabled Hittle.
When Hittle did not report to work, SBCERA sent him two form
Furthermore, the Board's judgment was partially upheld. Evans, 39 Cal. 3d at 411, 703
P.2d at 128, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 788.
For further information on recovery of attorney fees, see Comment, Government

Code 800 Reimbursement of Counsel Fees, 1 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 287 (1974).
1. 39 Cal. 3d 374, 703 P.2d 73, 216 Cal. Rptr. 733 (1985). Opinion by Justice Rey-

noso with Chief Justice Bird and Justices Mosk, Broussard, and Grodin concurring. A
separate concurring opinion by Justice Grodin and a separate concurring and dissenting opinion by Justice Lucas were also filed.

2. Id. at 385, 703 P.2d at 79, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 739.
3. Id. at 389, 703 P.2d at 81, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 742.
4. Id. at 393, 703 P.2d at 84, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 745.
5. Id. at 380, 703 P.2d at 75-76, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 736. Hittle injured his back when

he slipped while dismounting from his truck. Id.
6. Id. at 380-81, 703 P.2d at 76, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 736.
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letters concerning his contributions to the retirement system. The
first letter dated August 22, 1978, gave Hittle two options: (1) to
withdraw from SBCERA and be refunded his contributions, or (2) to
take deferred retirement if he had at least five years service. 7 The
second letter dated September 24, 1978, bore a handwritten notation:
"[I]f you have filed or intend to file for disability retirement you
should not withdraw the above contribution. '8 However, the accompanying form, entitled "Disposition of Retirement Contribution,"
failed to list the disability retirement as an option available to Hittle. 9
In October, 1978, Hittle requested and was refunded his retirement
contribution. When Hittle discovered two and one-half years later
that he might have been eligible for disability benefits, he applied to
SBCERA for disability retirement and offered to repay his retirement contributions.' 0 Both the personnel director of SBCERA and
the retirement board denied Hittle's request. The board also refused
to reconsider its decision.'1 Within eighty-five days of this refusal to
12
consider, Hittle sought judicial relief.
The trial court exercised its independent judgment in ruling that
the evidence did not support Hittle's claim that, when he withdrew
his contributions, he was ignorant of his right to file for disability retirement. The trial court held that an employee cannot apply for disability retirement once he removes his retirement contributions and
thus ceases to be a member of SBCERA.13 The trial court upheld the
sixty day time limit for judicial review provided by article XI, section
R of the SBCERA bylaws and found Hittle's petition to be
7. Id. at 381, 703 P.2d at 76, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 736. Because Hittle had worked just
two months, the first letter provided him only one real choice.
8. Id. at 382, 703 P.2d at 76, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 737. Before sending this second letter, SBCERA had received a doctor's report indicating Hittle's total disability. Id.
9. Id. Hittle limited himself to the options on this form when he withdrew his
retirement contributions. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 382-83, 703 P.2d at 77, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 737. The personnel director
stated that the doctors' medical reports were neither timely nor satisfactory evidence
of good cause for Hittle's absence, and the board gave no reason for denying Hittle's
request. Id.
12. Id. at 383, 703 P.2d at 77, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 737.
13. Id. See Strumsky v. San Diego County Employees Retirement Ass'n, 11 Cal.
3d 28, 520 P.2d 29, 112 Cal. Rptr. 805 (1974) (if a local or state agency's decision substantially affects a fundamental vested right, the court must use its independent judgment to determine whether the agency's findings were supported by evidence). The
trial court relied on Dodosh v. County of Orange, 127 Cal. App. 3d 936, 179 Cal. Rptr.
804 (1981) (an employee who voluntarily resigned and withdrew his retirement contributions was ineligible to apply for a disability pension).

untimely.14

III.

THE MAJORITY OPINION

The first issue was whether an exhaustion of administrative remedies was necessary. 15 The SBCERA bylaws generally provided that if
the retirement board rejected an application for benefits, the applicant was entitled to an administrative hearing upon request. Hittle
was excused from exhausting his administrative remedies because he
repeatedly sought relief from appropriate administrative officials,
and because the board failed to advise him of other available administrative procedures after it formally rejected his application.16
The next question was whether SBCERA's sixty day limit for seeking judicial review was a private statute of limitations contrary to
law. 1 7 The Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.6 allows local agencies either to adopt a ninety day statute of limitations or to remain

subject to the longer statute of limitations for civil actions. It allows
a limitation period of less than ninety days "only if the shorter statute of limitations is a state or federal law."18 Thus, SBCERA had ex-

ceeded its authority since its sixty day limitation period did not come
within this exception. The court noted that the legislation creating
local retirement associations does not provide for local choice of limi14. Hittle, 39 Cal. 3d at 383, 703 P.2d at 77, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 738. Article IX, section R of the SBCERA bylaws provide:
[W]here the party or applicant is entitled to a judicial review of the proceedings before this Board, the petition to the court shall be filed within sixty (60)
days from the date the notice of this Board's decision is delivered to the party
or applicant, or served by mail upon him or his attorney.
Id. at 385, 703 P.2d at 79, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 739.
15. Id. at 384-85, 703 P.2d at 78, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 738. The general rule is that
courts have no jurisdiction over an agency's decision until the appellant has exhausted
his administrative remedies. However, there are exceptions. See 2 CAL. JUR. 3D Administrative Law §§ 262-266 (1973).
16. Hittle, 39 Cal. 3d at 384, 703 P.2d at 78, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 738. SBCERA did not
contend that Hittle had to exhaust his administrative remedies. Id. See also Westlake
Community Hosp. v. Superior Court, 17 Cal. 3d 465, 477-78, 551 P.2d 410, 417, 131 Cal.
Rptr. 90, 97 (1976) (a hospital's bylaws were ambiguous, and a doctor denied staff privileges was not notified of her right to appeal; thus, the doctor was not required to exhaust her administrative remedies).
17. Hittle, 39 Cal. 3d at 385, 703 P.2d at 80, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 739. See supra note 14
regarding SBCERA's bylaws.
18. Hittle, 39 Cal. 3d at 386-87, 703 P.2d at 80, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 740. See CAL. CIV.
PROC. Code § 1094.6(a), (b), (g) (West Supp. 1985). Section 1094.6 was enacted because
local and state agencies had substantially different limitation periods for judicial review. Before section 1094.6, local agencies followed the statutes of limitation for civil
actions which is three years for statutory liability and four years in most other cases.
Hittle, 39 Cal. 3d at 386, 703 P.2d at 79, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 739. See City of Sacramento v.
Superior Court, 113 Cal. App. 3d 715, 722 n.6, 170 Cal. Rptr. 75, 79 n.6 (1980) (Carr, J.,
concurring and dissenting); Note, Review of Selected 1976 California Legislation, 8
PAC. L.J. 165, 247 (1977).
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tation periods except those provided by section 1094.6.19 Moreover,
the local regulation affecting state courts' jurisdiction was held to in-

trude impermissibly on a legislative function.20 The court reasoned
that a ninety day statute of limitations barred stale claims and that a

shorter period offered no extra benefit; it might even preclude some
21
meritorious actions.
The main issue was whether Hittle knowingly waived his right to
apply for disability retirement. Any county employee who belongs to
the retirement system and retires for a service-connected disability
has a statutory right to a retirement allowance. 22 That employee
cannot waive his right unless he knowingly and intelligently relinquishes it.23 Since the law favors pension rights in order to make a
pensioner and his dependents economically secure, courts should be
24
especially careful to decide doubtful cases against waiver.
Applying those principles to the case, the court found no substantial evidence to support the trial court's finding that the handwritten
notation on the second letter made Hittle's waiver informed and
valid.25 The court relied upon Hittle's statement to the trial court
19. Hittle, 39 Cal. 3d at 387, 703 P.2d at 80, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 740. See generally
County Employees Retirement Law of 1937, CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 31450-898 (West
Supp. 1985). Sections 31526 and 31527 define the scope and content of local retirement
board regulations.
20. Hittle, 39 Cal. 3d at 387, 703 P.2d at 80, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 741. "It is well settled
... that laws passed by the Legislature under its general police power will prevail over
regulations made by [an agency] with regard to matters which are not exclusively [that
agency's] affairs." Id. (quoting Tolman v. Underhill, 39 Cal. 2d 708, 712, 249 P.2d 280,
282 (1952)).
21. Hittle, 39 Cal. 3d at 388, 703 P.2d at 80, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 741. Had SBCERA
adopted the ninety day limitation period of section 1094.6, Hittle's filing eighty-five
days after the board denied his application would have been timely. See supra note 12.
22. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 31727.4 (West 1973).
23. Hittle, 39 Cal. 3d at 389, 703 P.2d at 82, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 742. A county employee may apply for disability retirement "unless one member waives the right to retire for disability and elects to withdraw contributions ....
CAL. GOV'T CODE § 31721
(West Supp. 1985). For discussions about the requirement that a waiver be knowing
and intelligent, see 30 CAL. JUR. 3D Estoppel and Waiver § 22 (1976); Bauman v. Islay
Invs., 30 Cal. App. 3d 752, 758, 106 Cal. Rptr. 889, 893 (1973); and Jones v. Brown, 13
Cal. App. 3d 513, 519, 89 Cal. Rptr. 651 ,654 (1970).
24. Hittle, 39 Cal. 3d at 390, 703 P.2d at 82, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 742. The party claiming waiver must prove waiver by clear and convincing evidence. Public policy dictates
that pension legislation be construed liberally. Id. See also Eichelberger v. City of
Berkeley, 46 Cal. 2d 182, 188, 293 P.2d 1, 4 (1956); Heaton v. Marin County Employees
Retirement Bd., 63 Cal. App. 3d 421, 429, 133 Cal. Rptr. 809, 813 (1976).
25. Hittle, 39 Cal. 3d at 389, 703 P.2d at 81, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 741-42. While a trial
court uses an independent judgment test to review an administrative finding, an appellate court normally employs the substantial evidence test in reviewing the trial court.
A judgment is upheld if any substantial evidence supports each essential finding of the

that when he withdrew his retirement contributions, he did not
know that he might qualify for disability retirement. 26 This state27
ment was found to be the only rational explanation of his conduct.
The court also determined that SBCERA failed to meet its fiduciary duty to fully inform members of their retirement options. 28 A
pension plan creates a trust relationship between the pension beneficiary and the trustees of the pension funds. Trustees must therefore
exercise their fiduciary trust in good faith and "may not obtain any
advantage... over the beneficiary by the slightest misrepresentation,
concealment, threat, or adverse pressure of any kind."29 SBCERA
had not fulfilled its fiduciary duty because using only the "obscure"
handwritten notation to inform Hittle of his possibility for disability
retirement was "tantamount to . . . misrepresentation and concealment, however 'slight.' "30 It would have been little trouble to in-

clude the retirement option in the form letter or in the "Distribution
of Retirement Contribution" form.31
IV.

CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINIONS

Justice Kaus concurred in the finding that substantial evidence was
insufficient to uphold the trial court's finding of a knowing waiver.
However, he thought it unnecessary to hold that SBCERA had not
32
fulfilled its fiduciary duty.
trial court; all contrary evidence is ignored. 6 B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE APPEAL § 245 (2d ed. 1971). Since no substantial evidence supported the trial court's finding, it was necessary to decide whether the court might employ the independent
judgment test requested by Hittle. Hittle, 39 Cal. 3d at 389, 703 P.2d at 81, 216 Cal.
Rptr. at 741-42.
26. Id. at 390, 703 P.2d at 82, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 742-43. Hittle stated:
At the time I withdrew the contributions, I had absolutely no knowledge of
the fact that I might qualify for a service-connected disability retirement ....
At no time that I can recall had anyone ever told me that a County employee
with less than five years of service credit had any form of retirement benefits.
Had I been aware of the fact that a County employee who incurs a serviceconnected disability may apply for service-connected disability retirement regardless of the length of employment, I would not even have considered withdrawing the $187.49 that the County was offering me.
Id.
27. Id. at 390-91, 703 P.2d at 82-83, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 743.
28. Id. at 391, 703 P.2d at 83, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 743. Hittle first raised this issue on
appeal. A new issue ordinarily may not be raised on appeal because the opposing party
would be prejudiced in defending against the new theory; however, "this rule does not
apply when the facts are not disputed and the party merely raises a new question of
law." Id. at 392 n.10, 703 P.2d at 83 n.10, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 743 n.10 (quoting UFITEC,
S.A. v. Carter, 20 Cal. 3d 238, 249 n.2, 571 P.2d 990, 996 n.2, 142 Cal. Rptr. 279, 285 n.2
(1977)).
29. Hittle, 39 Cal. 3d at 392-93, 703 P.2d at 84, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 744 (quoting CAL.
CIV. CODE § 2228 (West 1985)). See generally CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 2216-2222 (West 1985).

30. Hittle, 39 Cal. 3d at 394, 703 P.2d at 84-85, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 745.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 395, 703 P.2d at 85-86, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 746 (Kaus, J., concurring).
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Justice Lucas concurred and dissented. He agreed that Hittle need
not exhaust his administrative remedies, that the sixty day statute of
limitations was contrary to law, and that the court's standard of review should be the substantial evidence test.3

3

But Lucas asserted

that the trial court's finding of a knowing waiver should have been
upheld under the substantial evidence test.3 4 The court should have
disregarded Hittle's statement 35 because a reviewing court should
look only to evidence supporting the successful party. 36 Moreover,
the trial judge could have disbelieved Hittle in light of the handwritten notation and Hittle's access to counsel when he withdrew his contributions. 37 Lucas also attacked the inference that Hittle's decision
38
was not informed because it was contrary to his economic interest.

Finally, the court should not have considered the breach of
SBCERA's fiduciary duty since this issue was not raised at the trial
court level.

39

V.

CONCLUSION

The Hittle case should make government associations more careful
in enumerating all retirement options available to employees. Associations can simply update their retirement forms and form letters.
Also, associations will be forced to choose a statute of limitations permitted by Government Code section 31727.
MARK
33.
34.
35.
36.

S.

BURTON

Id. (Lucas, J., concurring and dissenting).
Id.
See supra note 26.
Hittle, 39 Cal. 3d at 395, 703 P.2d at 85-86, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 746. See supra note

22.
37. Hittle, 39 Cal. 3d at 396, 703 P.2d at 86, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 746-47. The trier of
fact decides all issues of credibility. Nestle v. City of Santa Monica, 6 Cal. 3d 920, 925,
496 P.2d 480, 483, 101 Cal. Rptr. 568, 571 (1972).
38. Hittle, 39 Cal. 3d at 396-97, 703 P.2d at 87, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 747. Justice Lucas
argued that if Hittle had known all his options and their consequences and had still
withdrawn his contribution, the majority's logic would nevertheless have made the
waiver unknowing. Id.
39. Id. Justice Lucas noted that Hittle had provided no evidence on SBCERA's fiduciary duty or on whether this duty had been met. Id.

X. EVIDENCE
A. At probation and parole revocation hearings,
documentary hearsay evidence that does not fall within
an exception to the hearsay rule is admissible if it is
sufficiently reliable: People v. Maki.
In People v. Maki, 39 Cal. 3d 707, 704 P.2d 743, 217 Cal. Rptr. 676
(1985), Donald L. Mai was on probation and was required to obtain
written consent from his probation officer before leaving the County
of San Diego or the State of California. At probation revocation proceedings, a court found that Maki had violated his probation requirements by traveling to Chicago, Illinois, without obtaining his
probation officer's consent.
Over Maki's objections, the court admitted into evidence copies of a
car rental invoice and a hotel receipt, which had been seized during
Maki's arrest on unrelated charges. Maki's name appeared three
times on the invoice showing that he had rented a Hertz car at Chicago's O'Hare Airport for two days. The judge and Mai's probation
officer compared the signature on the invoice to Maki's signatures on
two probation reports and concluded that the same person made all
three signatures. The hotel receipt was unsigned, but it bore Maki's
name and showed payment for services at the Hyatt Regency O'Hare
in Chicago.
No attempt was made to admit the two documents as business
records under California Evidence Code section 1271; rather, the
prosecution argued that the documents were properly admitted as
"adoptive admissions." The "adoptive admission" doctrine creates an
exception to the hearsay rule where a party, who knows a statement's content, "has by words or other conduct manifested his adoption or his belief in its truth." CAL. EVID. CODE § 1221 (West 1966).
The court found that the documents were not admissible as adoptive admissions. Without testimony as to the invoice's preparation or
its purpose, Maki's signature alone could not authenticate the contents of the invoice. There could be no adoptive admission unless it
were proven that Maki had read the invoice (knowledge) and then
signed it (a manifest adoption).
The court criticized People v. Whittaker, 41 Cal. App. 3d 303, 115
Cal. Rptr. 845 (1974), which side-stepped the adoptive admission issue
by holding that a rental receipt was not hearsay because it was used
to prove that a defendant possessed a paper indicating that he had
rented an automobile. The court quoted with approval Justice Jefferson, who argued that possession alone should not be grounds to circumvent the hearsay problem. Invoices should be admissible only
when there is a hearsay exception and additional evidence. See 1 B.
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Jefferson, CaliforniaEvidence Benchbook § 1.3 (2d ed. 1982). Unlike
the receipts in People v. Goodall, 131 Cal. App. 3d 129, 182 Cal. Rptr.
243 (1982), Maki's car invoice was used to prove the truth of the matter stated therein (that Maki was in Chicago).
The court stated that procedures at a parole revocation hearing
should be flexible and accommodating; thus, a court may consider
documents that are reliable yet would be inadmissible at a criminal
trial. The substance of such hearsay must be considered before it
provides grounds for revocation. See 22 CAL. JUR. 3D CriminalLaw
§ 3480 (1985).
The court concluded that the invoice and the receipt were admissible and constituted sufficient grounds to revoke probation. Maki's
uncontroverted signature on the invoice was the significant factor.
From this signature, plus the fact that the parties relied on this type
of invoice for billing and payment, the court could infer that Maki
was in Chicago. While the hotel receipt had little probative value
alone, it served to corroborate the invoice. Moreover, no evidence
contradicted the inference that Maki went to Chicago.
MARK S. BURTON

B.

Hearing report made by a mental health counselor is
inadmissible hearsay in a contested trial to determine
if an individual is gravely disabled: Conservatorship of
Manton.

The court, in Conservatorship of Manton, 39 Cal. 3d 645, 703 P.2d
1147, 217 Cal. Rptr. 253 (1985), ruled on the admissibility of a report
prepared by a mental health counselor after conducting an investigation of the appellant, James Manton. The report contained information from Mr. Manton's hospital and medical records, statements of
doctors and hospital attendants, and interviews with Manton and his
father. The court ruled that statutory authority permitting use of the
report at a hearing to determine the necessity of conservatorship did
not authorize its use as evidence in a trial contesting the result of
that hearing. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 5008(h), 5350(d) (West
1984). Therefore, the report on Manton should have been excluded
as hearsay from the trial that followed the hearing.
Procedures for conservatorship and institutionalization are codified
in the Welfare and Institutions Code, as the Lanterman-Petris-Short
Act. Id. §§ 5000-5550 (West 1984). If a recommendation for conservatorship is made by an appropriate person, an inquiry is begun to de-

termine the mental capability of the proposed conservatee. Id.
§§ 5352, 5354. A report containing all relevant aspects of the person's
background and medical and social condition must be prepared for
the court. The investigator preparing the report must also comment
on any suitable alternatives to conservatorship. If there are none, a
conservator should be designated and the scope of his powers articulated. Id. §§ 5354.5-5356. See also Kelitz, Fitch & McGraw, A Study
of Involuntary Civil Commitment in Los Angeles County, 14 Sw.
U.L. REV. 241 (1984).

A hearing must be scheduled as part of this process to evaluate the
findings of the mental health professional who submits the report.
Section 5354 of the Act requires that the report be filed with the
court prior to the hearing. CAL. WELF. INST. CODE § 5354 (West
1984). In order to find that conservatorship is appropriate, a court
must determine that the person is gravely disabled because of a
mental disorder or alcoholism. Id. §§ 5008(h), 5350. The conservatee
may then request a jury trial to decide the issue of grave disability.
Id. § 5354. See Comment, Mental Health Professionals as Civil Commitment Hearing Officers: Procedural Due Process Problems, 17
U.C.D.L. REV. 653 (1984).
The Act only mentions the use of the investigator's report in the
hearing, not in a subsequent trial. Based upon this language and the
lack of any evidence showing legislative intent to create another exception to the hearsay rule, the court determined that the report
must be excluded from a trial contesting the finding of the hearing.
The court also ruled that the contents of the report in the current
case would not be admissible under any other exception to the hearsay rule. Furthermore, much of the report was found to be multiple
hearsay (e.g., the father's descriptions of the mother's feelings about
her son's condition). Because admission of the report was highly
prejudicial, the court ordered a new trial to determine whether Manton was gravely disabled under the Act. For general information on
conservatorship, see 7 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW,
Wills and Probate §§ 584-699A (8th ed. 1974 & Supp. 1984).
JAMES B. BRISTOL

C.

Failureto seize evidence does not preclude admission of
eyewitness testimony: In re Michael L.

In the case of In re Michael L., 39 Cal. 3d 81, 702 P.2d 222, 216 Cal.
Rptr. 140 (1985), the court refused to extend a police officer's duty to
preserve evidence beyond the duty to seize evidence which may favorably resolve the issue of a defendant's guilt or innocence. Thus,
the court affirmed the lower court's holding that the failure of police
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officers to seize evidence, which provided the basis for witnesses' incourt identifications of the defendant, did not make the identifications inadmissible at trial.
The defendant, a minor, appealed his robbery conviction on the
grounds that the in-court identifications made by witnesses after they
had viewed a videotape of the robbery were not admissible at trial because the police officers failed to seize the videotape. Thereafter, the
videotape was inadvertently erased; thus, it was not available at trial.
Furthermore, the defendant asserted that the police officers had a
duty to seize the videotape pursuant to People v. Hitch, 12 Cal. 3d 641,
527 P.2d 361, 117 Cal. Rptr. 9 (1974). Hitch imposes a duty upon police officers to preserve evidence when there is a "reasonable possibility that... [the evidence would constitute] favorable evidence on the
issue of guilt or innocence ....

."

Id. at 649, 527 P.2d at 367, 117 Cal.

Rptr. at 15.
On the facts of this case, the court refused to extend an officer's
duty of preserving evidence to include a duty to seize evidence. The
court's reasoning was two-fold. First, the police officer, by not seizing
the videotape which was the basis for the witnesses' in-court identifications, did not act in bad faith nor did he intentionally deprive the
defendant of the videotape as evidence. The owners of the videotape,
after the investigating police officer's request, agreed not to erase the
tape. Thereafter, it was inadvertently erased by the owner. The police officer made a good faith effort to preserve the tape by obtaining
the owner's consent not to erase the tape after the owner refused to
let the police have custody of the tape.
Second, the court asserted that the effects of excluding the in-court
identification would be wholly disproportionate to the alleged police
misconduct. The court was satisfied with the reliability of the incourt identifications because they were made by witnesses who knew
the defendant, and who had viewed the videotape several times immediately following the robbery. Other witnesses, who viewed the
tape but did not know the defendant, testified that the tape was in
fact clear. Thus, the court refused to exclude the in-court
identification.
In its opinion, the court did not hold that it would never exclude
evidence resulting from a police officer's failure to seize. However, it
refused to do so under the facts of this case. Thus, in the future the

court may hold the police officers to a duty to seize evidence, not
merely to preserve it.
MISSY KELLY BANKHEAD

XI.

GOVERNMENT LAW
The supreme court vacates an injunction prohibiting
the Departmentof FairEmployment and Housing and
the FairEmployment and Housing Commission from
handling civil service discriminationclaims: MacPhail
v. Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District.

In MacPhail v. Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District,39 Cal. 3d
454, 703 P.2d 374, 217 Cal. Rptr. 36 (1985), the supreme court, pursuant to California Constitution, article VI, section 10, invoked its original jurisdiction to review an injunction issued in the related case of
State Personnel Board v. FairEmployment & Housing Commission,
39 Cal. 3d 422, 703 P.2d 354, 217 Cal. Rptr. 16 (1985). This injunction
prevented the Department of Fair Employment and Housing
(DFEH).and the Fair Employment and Housing Commission (FEHC)
from processing any employment discrimination claims against the
state civil service.
Alec MacPhail had twice applied to become a traffic officer cadet
with the California Highway Patrol. After passing all written and
oral examinations, MacPhail was disqualified because an X-ray allegedly revealed spinal anomalies that the State Personnel Board (the
Board) believed created a higher than average risk of a future back
injury. Although MacPhail claimed that he had never had back
problems and four physicians reported that MacPhail was healthy
and fit for cadet duties, the Board rejected MacPhail's appeals. MacPhail next appealed to the DFEH. The Department, however, would
not hear his complaint because of the superior court's injunction in
State Personnel Board.
For the reasons given in State Personnel Board, the court dissolved
the injunction as applied to MacPhail and other state civil service
employees and applicants similarly situated. A peremptory writ of
mandamus was issued directing the lower courts to vacate their orders in State Personnel Board. See 43 CAL. JUR. 3D Mandamus and
Prohibition§ 28 (1978).
The court did not need to consider MacPhail's due process claims.
MacPhail had argued that the injunction denying him adjudicatory
procedures guaranteed him by the Fair Employment and Housing
Act, CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 12900-12996 (West 1980 & Supp. 1985), deprived him of property without due process. See Logan v. Zimmerman, 455 U.S. 422 (1985). MacPhail claimed due process had also
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been denied because the Board could not impartially judge the fairness of its own employment standards. See Mennig v. City Council,
86 Cal. App. 3d 341, 150 Cal. Rptr. 207 (1978).
Additionally, the court noted that "handicap" as defined in California Government Code, section 12926, subdivision (h) includes physical
conditions that may cause a future handicap but are presently causing no disability. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12926(h) (West Supp. 1986). See
American National Insurance Co. v. Fair Employment & Housing
Commisssion, 32 Cal. 3d 603, 651 P.2d 1151, 186 Cal. Rptr. 345 (1982).
MARK S. BURTON

XII.

FAMILY LAW
The statutory presumtion that a child born by a
married woman while living with her husband is the
child of the husband does not violate the due process or
equal protection clauses of the California or United
States Constitutions: Michelle W. v. Ronald W.

In Michelle W. v. Ronald W., 39 Cal. 3d 354, 703 P.2d 88, 216 Cal.
Rptr. 748 (1985), the court was asked to decide the constitutionality
of section 621 of the California Evidence Code. It states, "[T]he issue
of a wife cohabitating with her husband, who is not impotent or sterile, is conclusively presumed to be a child of the marriage." CAL.
EVID. CODE § 621(a) (West Supp. 1985). See also 6 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Parentand Child §§ 215-42 (8th ed. 1974).
Defendants Ronald and Judith W. were married and lived together
when Judith gave birth in 1974 to Michelle, the subject of this action.
Ronald W. treated Michelle as his daughter and provided the necessary support for her until Ronald and Judith W. were divorced about
five years later. Judith was given custody of Michelle. During
Judith's marriage to Ronald, she was having sexual relations with
Donald R., the second claimant to this paternity action. Donald R.
and Judith were married in 1980. After the marriage, Donald R. held
Michelle out as his natural child and brought this action to establish
paternity in 1981. The trial court applied the presumption that because Ronald and Judith W. were married when Michelle was born,
and Ronald W. was neither impotent nor sterile, Michelle was Ronald W.'s child. Plaintiffs then appealed.
The presumption of paternity established by section 621 is limited
by the following prerequisites: (1) The mother must be married; (2)

the mother must be cohabitating with her husband; (3) the husband
must be neither impotent nor sterile; (4) two years must have passed
since the birth of the child and during those two years, the husband
or the mother together with the supposed father must have failed to
rebut the presumption in court. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 621 (West
Supp. 1985). The plaintiffs, Michelle W. by her guardian ad litem and
Ronald W., contended that the fourth prerequisite was unconstitutional. First, they argued that since this claim was brought six years
after the birth of Michelle, the two year limitation prevented them
from establishing the biological parent-child relationship in a court of
law. They claimed that this deprived them of a liberty interest protected by the due process clause. Second, they contended that the
gender-based classification in the statute, which allows the mother
and child to rebut the presumption of paternity but not the natural
father, violated the equal protection guarantees of the California and
United States Constitutions.
The supreme court rejected both contentions after weighing the
competing public and private interests. The court rejected Donald
R.'s due process claim holding that the public interest in protecting
the family unit and promoting familial stability outweighed Donald
R.'s interest in establishing a biological relationship in a court of law.
The court also refused to adopt Michelle W.'s due process claim. The
rationale for denying her claim was that the state's interest in preserving and protecting developed parent-child and sibling relationships which give young children social and emotional strength and
stability, outweighed Michelle W.'s interest in establishing paternity.
The court noted that Michelle W.'s association with Donald R. was
not threatened and she was not prohibited from obtaining information as to who her biological father was. Therefore, the court saw no
violation of due process.
The court quickly dismissed the equal protection attack on section
621. It held that the wording of section 621 does not give the natural
mother greater rights to rebut the presumption of paternity than the
supposed father. The rights of the natural married mother and the
rights of the natural unwed father are conditioned upon each other
because the mother may raise the motion for blood tests only if the
biological father files an affidavit with the court acknowledging paternity. Neither party has any rights over the other. Therefore, the
court determined that section 621 of the California Evidence Code
did not violate the constitutional rights of the plaintiffs, and the judgment of the trial court was affirmed.
JOHN THOMAS MCDOWELL
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XIII.

FOOD AND DRUG LAW
The language of Health and Safety Code section 11055,
the general purpose behind the narcotic statutes, and
importantpublic policy concerns all dictate a finding
that D-cocaine is a "controlledsubstance" within the
meaning of the statute: People v. Aston.

In People v. Aston, 39 Cal. 3d 481, 703 P.2d 111, 216 Cal. Rptr. 771
(1985), the court was asked to interpret section 11055 (b)(4) of the
California Health and Safety Code. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§ 11055 (b)(4) (West 1975 & Supp. 1985). Besides interpreting the
statute's actual wording, the court focused on key state-wide policy
concerns in holding that the synthetically derived D-cocaine is a controlled substance under the act.
The two defendants were arrested and subsequently convicted of
possession of cocaine for sale after a warranted search of their residence yielded several grams of white powder. At trial, an expert for
the prosecution testified that while his tests on the seized substance
confirmed the presence of cocaine in salt form, his lack of access to a
"polarimeter" made it impossible to determine whether or not the
substance was D- or L-cocaine. An expert for the defense next testified that D-cocaine is an "isomer," a compound with the same molecular formula as cocaine but with a different molecular structure. The
expert also testified that D-cocaine does not affect the central nervous system as does the "pharmacologically active" L-cocaine. The
trial court, in refusing to admit the latter expert's testimony, found
that it was not relevant or credible as evidence since the chance of
finding D-cocaine on the street was extremely rare. The crux of the
defendants' argument was that the trial court committed reversible
error in failing to give the jury a defense-requested instruction regarding the prosecution's burden. The defendants asserted that the
state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the seized substance
was in fact L-cocaine, a specifically listed controlled substance, and
not merely D-cocaine.
The court immediately held that the "independently by means of
chemical synthesis" language of Health and Safety Code section
11055(b)(4) served to include D-cocaine within the category of "controlled substance." Moreover, by outlining the general purpose behind California's narcotics statutes, and by emphasizing key public
policy considerations, the court reaffirmed the state's commitment to
wage war on drug abuse. With regard to the war on cocaine usage,

the court detailed the "evils" to be remedied: distribution by organized crime, the negative impact of cocaine's untaxed sale trade on the
monetary and taxation systems of the state, and the burden cocaine
distribution places on the state's law enforcement officers. Finally,
the court rejected the defendants' arguments that subsequent amendments to the narcotic statutes, which expressly identified cocaine
"isomers" and "D-cocaine" as controlled substances, showed an original lack of legislative intent to include such items. However, the
court found that since these amendments were merely administrative
corrections, the defendants' hypertechnical reading of the earlier
statute could not stand. Hence, the court held that because the legislature intended to give "cocaine" its popular, common sense meaning,
both L- and D-cocaine were deemed controlled substances under the
act.
The court also rejected several additional issues raised on appeal by
the defendants. First, because the trial court made the state's paid
narcotics assistant available to the defense prior to a hearing on the
motion to suppress, the defendants claimed that the assistant should
have been made available at the preliminary hearing. However, the
court held that there was no reversible error in the magistrate's failure to make that person available at the preliminary hearing because
the defendants could not show that they were denied a fair trial or
otherwise suffered prejudice at the preliminary hearing. Second, the
court held that the trial court properly refused to suppress the seized
cocaine as evidence. The court rejected the defendants' arguments
that the affidavit, upon which the warrant was issued, did not meet
the requirements set forth in Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964),
since the affidavit adequately informed the magistrate of the underlying circumstances. The court also rejected the defendants' contentions that the affidavit contained misstatements and omitted material
facts.
JOHN EDWARD VAN VLEAR

XIV.

JURY SELECTION
A. By meeting the three Wheeler requirements, the
defendant made a primafacie showing that the
prosecution used peremptory challenges in order to
accomplish a discriminatoryexclusion of jurors:
People v. Motton.

In People v. Motton, 39 Cal. 3d 596, 704 P.2d 176, 217 Cal. Rptr. 416
(1985), the court found reversible error in the defendant's conviction
for second degree murder, since the trial court did not require the
prosecution to justify its peremptory challenges after the defendant
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made a prima facie showing of discriminatory exclusion. The defendant made the prima facie showing by meeting the three requirements
set forth in People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 583 P.2d 748, 148 Cal.
Rptr. 890 (1978).
The defendant initially objected to the prosecutor's exercise of his
peremptory challenges to exclude all black females from the jury.
The judge rejected this contention. On the following day, after the
prosecutor had dismissed a black male by a peremptory challenge,
the defendant objected that the prosecution was in fact excluding all
blacks from the jury. In addition to rejecting this revised contention,
the judge also refused to allow the record to reflect the previous
challenges, since she thought such a request should have been made
before the jury selection process began. Finally, the judge was not
going to allow either attorney to place something on the record
which she could not verify by "recollections."
Under Wheeler, "the use of peremptory challenges to remove prospective jurors on the sole ground of group bias [as distinguished
from a permissible specific bias] violates the right to trial by a jury
drawn from a representative cross-section of the 'community . .. .
Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d at 276-77, 583 P.2d at 761-62, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 903.
The court held that the defendant had clearly met the three Wheeler
requirements necessary to make a prima facie showing of discriminatory exclusion.
First, the defendant met the "adequacy of record" requirement by
making as complete a record as possible. The court held that it was
unnecessary to establish the true racial identity of the challenged jurors as a prima facie case may be established merely by showing that
the prosecution was systematically excusing persons who appeared to
be black. In response to the fact that the deficiencies in the record
could be attributed, at least in part, to the actions of the trial judge,
the court articulated a cooperation standard: "When a Wheeler motion is made, we believe it to be the duty of the court, and both counsel as officers of the court, to cooperate to construct as complete a
record as is feasible." Motton, 39 Cal. 3d at 605, 704 P.2d at 181, 217
Cal. Rptr. at 421.
Second, the defendant met the "exclusion of a cognizable group"
requirement since black women do represent a cognizable group
which has a definite composition and corresponding factors defining
and limiting the group. The court also noted the fact that if blacks
comprise a portion of the population, then they are an important seg-

ment of an "ideal cross-section of the community" which should be
on a jury panel.
Third, the defendant met the "likelihood that persons were challenged because of their membership in a cognizable group" requirement since the prosecutor used a disproportionate number of his
challenges to exclude black women and blacks in general. At the
time of the first Wheeler motion, the prosecutor had used four of
eight challenges to remove all black women. Moreover, by the close
of jury selection, he had used seven of his thirteen challenges to
eliminate all black jurors.
JOHN EDWARD VAN VLEAR

B.

Peremptory challenges cannot be used to exclude a
group of personsfrom a jury based upon a group,
ratherthan a specific, bias: People v. Trevino.

In People v. Trevino, 39 Cal. 3d 667, 704 P.2d 719, 217 Cal. Rptr. 652
(1985), the two defendants appealed their first degree murder convictions. Defendant Trevino contended that his constitutional right to
have a jury composed of a representative cross-section of the community was violated as a result of the prosecutor's misuse of peremptory
challenges. The prosecutor used six of his twenty-one peremptory
challenges to exclude potential jurors with Spanish surnames. As a
result, no Spanish surnamed jurors were on the panel; one of the alternates did have a Spanish surname.
The supreme court, in an opinion written by Justice Reynoso, reversed Trevino's murder conviction holding that his state constitutional right to a trial by a jury which represented a cross-section of
the community was violated. The court followed its ruling set out in
People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 276-77, 583 P.2d 748, 761-62, 148 Cal.
Rptr. 890, 903 (1978), where the court stated "that the use of peremptory challenges to remove prospective jurors on the sole ground of
group bias violates the right to trial by a jury drawn from a representative cross-section of the community under article I, section 16, of
the California Constitution." Id. It is necessary to distinguish between a specific bias and a group bias. Attorneys are allowed to use
peremptory challenges to exclude a potential juror on the basis of
specific bias but cannot exclude a potential juror based upon a group
bias.
The main issue in Trevino was whether the term "Spanish surname" adequately describes Hispanics as a cognizable class within the
community. The United States Supreme Court has noted that "just
as persons of a different race are distinguished by color, these Spanish names provide ready identification of the members of this class."
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Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 480 n.12 (1954). The California
court also noted that Hispanics are frequently categorized by the
term "Spanish surname" in government forms and other statistical
forms. Thus, there was binding authority to hold that the term
"Spanish surname" categorized Hispanics as a cognizable class.
The court analyzed the facts and found that the prosecutor did, in
fact, abuse his use of the peremptory challenge. The prosecutor removed all potential Hispanic jurors (six of them) by peremptory challenge except for one alternate juror who had a Spanish surname.
The Spanish surnamed alternate was left on the panel only after defense counsel asked the court to rule on a Wheeler motion. Therefore, the court had reason to conclude that the prosecutor's
peremptory challenges excluding six Hispanics were based upon a
group bias rather than a specific bias. Because the jury did not represent a cross-section of the community, as required by the California
Constitution, Trevino's murder conviction was reversed.
Regarding defendant Rivas, the court affirmed the trial court's
finding that there was insufficient evidence as a matter of law to convict him. The primary evidence that connected Rivas with the murder was that he had been seen with Trevino the day of the murder.
The court found this evidence highly speculative, and thus, affirmed
Rivas' acquittal.
MIssY KELLY BANKHEAD

XV.

JUVENILE LAW
Juvenile's record insufficient to outweigh a Youth
Authority recommendationfor commitment in lieu of
state prison: People v. Javier A.

In People v. Javier A., 38 Cal. 3d 811, 700 P.2d 1244, 215 Cal. Rptr.
242 (1985), the court found the trial court abused its discretion in rejecting the recommendation for Youth Authority commitment of a
juvenile who had committed murder. The court ruled that there
were no legal grounds to reject the defendant's Youth Authority
treatment. Under People v. Carl B., 24 Cal. 3d 212, 218, 594 P.2d 14,
17, 155 Cal. Rptr. 189, 192 (1979), it must be determined on appeal
"whether there was substantial evidence to support the trial court's
implied finding of defendant's unamenability or unsuitablity 'to training and treatment offered by the Youth Authority.'" CAL. WELF. &
INST. CODE, § 707.2 (West 1984). The decision to sentence a defend-

ant to prison instead of the Youth Authority cannot be founded upon
hostility toward the Youth Authority's mission of rehabilitating serious offenders or doubt as to its ability to perform that mission. See
In re Jeanice D., 28 Cal. 3d 210, 216, 617 P.2d 1087, 1089-90, 168 Cal.
Rptr. 455, 457-58 (1980) (defendant guilty of murder given Youth Authority commitment). The court also stressed that this decision cannot be based upon fear that the period of the Youth Authority
confinement will be too short to protect society's interests. The court
must assume that the Youth Authority will properly perform its
function.
The appellate court found that the trial court had based its rejection of Youth Authority confinement upon the inadequacy of the facility to train and treat serious offenders, and upon its desire to
impose a substantial period of confinement upon the defendant. The
countervailing considerations provided by the probation officers were
insufficient to overcome the recommendation of the Youth Authority. Consequently the court found that the lower court believed that
a vicious murderer deserves nothing less than a prison sentence.
This, the court concluded, was inconsistent with the rehabilitative
philosophy of juvenile law and thus an abuse of discretion. See CAL.
WELF. & INST. CODE § 202 (West 1984).
DAYTON B. PARCELLS III
XVI.

LABOR LAW
A. Even if a union has not won a secret ballot election the
ALRB has authority to certify the union and to issue a
bargainingorder to remedy an employer's egregious
unfair labor practices: Harry Carian Sales v. Agricultural
Labor Relations Board.
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Harry CarianSales v. AgriculturalLabor Relations Board,' the
Agricultural Labor Relations Board (hereinafter the ALRB) cited an
employer for thirty unfair labor practices and ordered the employer
to bargain with the union. The employer challenged the board's authority to issue such an order. The supreme court held that the
ALRB has authority to issue bargaining orders and that the present
1. 39 Cal. 3d 209, 703 P.2d 27, 216 Cal. Rptr. 688 (1985). The majority opinion was
written by Justice Grodin with Justices Broussard, Reynoso, Levins, and Acting Chief
Justice Kaus concurring. There was a separate dissenting opinion by Justice Mosk,
with Justice Lucas concurring. Justice Levins was assigned by the Acting Chairperson
of the Judicial Council. The ALRB had never before issued a bargaining order. Id. at
218, 703 P.2d at 32, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 693.
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ALRB order wes valid.2 Although the Agricultural Labor Relations
Act (hereinafter the ALRA) expressly states that a union may only
be recognized by a secret ballot election, 3 the court found that the
California Legislature intended to prevent employers from voluntarily recognizing unions without employee consent, and not to prohibit
bargaining orders. 4 Federal precedent supported the bargaining order.5 Since the employer's past unfair labor practices made a fair rerun election unlikely, union authorization cards showing employee
sentiment were sufficient to support the bargaining order.6
The court held that a reviewing court should not consider events
subsequent to an order (e.g., passage of time and employee turnover).7 It also reaffirmed that an agency's findings should not be overturned if substantial evidence supports those findings.8
II.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Harry Carian Sales (hereinafter HCS) grows table grapes in the
Coachella Valley. In January, 1977, the United Farm Workers (hereinafter the UFW) began an organizational campaign among HCS employees. The UFW soon filed charges that HCS was committing
unfair labor practices in violation of the ALRA, section 1153, subdivisions (a) and (c). 9 While the decision of an administrative law judge
of the ALRB was pending, the UFW filed a certification petition and
held a secret ballot election among HCS employees. Both HCS and
the UFW filed objections to the election1o
2. Id. at 218, 703 P.2d at 32-33, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 693-94.
3. "Representatives designated or selected by a secret ballot for the purposes of
collective bargaining by the majority of the agricultural employees in the bargaining
unit shall be the exclusive representatives ....
CAL. LAB. CODE § 1156 (West Supp.
1985). For an overview of the ALRA, see 41 CAL. JUR. 3D Labor §§ 214-25 (1984).
4. Harry Carian, 39 Cal. 3d at 224, 703 P.2d at 37, 688 Cal. Rptr. at 697.
5. Id. at 227, 703 P.2d at 39, 688 Cal. Rptr. at 699. See NLRB v. Gissel Packing
Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969).
6. Harry Carian, 39 Cal. 3d at 236, 703 P.2d at 45-46, 688 Cal. Rptr. at 706.
7. Id. at 238, 703 P.2d at 47, 688 Cal. Rptr. at 707.
8. Id. at 219, 703 P.2d at 34, 688 Cal. Rptr. at 694.
9. Id. at 218, 703 P.2d at 33, 688 Cal. Rptr. at 693. Section 1153 reads: "It shall be
an unfair labor practice for an agricultural employer to do any of the following: (a) To
interfere with, restrain, or coerce agricultural employees in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed in Section 1152. (b) . . . (c) By discrimination in regard to the hiring or
tenure of employment, or any term or condition of employment, to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization." CAL. LAB. CODE § 1153 (West Supp.
1985).
10. Harry Carian, 39 Cal. 3d at 218, 703 P.2d at 33, 688 Cal. Rptr. at 693. This first
administrative judge eventually found that HCS had committed many of the 23 unfair

In December, 1978, a second administrative law judge found several
unfair labor practices and recommended UFW certification and a bargaining order." In October, 1980, the ALRB affirmed and modified
the decisions of the administrative law judges. After finding thirty
unfair labor practices, the Board certified the UFW as the employee's
sole bargaining representative and ordered HCS to bargain with the
UFW.12 HCS appealed, challenging the ALRB's authority to issue
13
the order to remedy unfair labor practices.
III.
A.

THE MAJORITY OPINION

The Standardof Review for Agency Findings

The supreme court stated that it would uphold the ALRB's findings concerning unfair labor practices if substantial evidence supported those findings.' 4 The Board's findings needed only a plausible
basis and would not be disturbed unless the testimony was "incredible or inherently improbable."' 5 Applying this review standard, the
16
court found substantial evidence to support the Board's findings.
B.

The ALRB's Authority to Issue BargainingOrders

The court looked to the United States Supreme Court decision in
NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co.17 as the primary authority on bargaining
orders. Gissel affirmed that the National Labor Relations Board
(hereinafter the NLRB) may issue bargaining orders where an employer commits unfair labor practices that make a fair election unlikely or that undermine a union's majority and cause an election to
8
be set aside.'
labor practices alleged by the UFW. Id. The election showed 80 votes for and 88 votes
against the UFW; 142 ballots were challenged. Id.
11. Id. at 219, 703 P.2d at 33, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 693. This second judge stated that
the election should be set aside and that HCS's conduct precluded a fair rerun election.
Id.
12. Id. The unfair labor practices included "surveillance of union activities; unlawful interrogation of HCS employees; threats of discharge and deportation; discriminatory hirings, layoffs and discharges; acts of violence against UFW organizers; an
illegal wage increase; and election-eve promises made to HCS employees." Id. See also
id. at 241-52, 703 P.2d at 48-56, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 709-16.
13. Id. at 219, 703 P.2d at 34, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 694.
14. Id. at 220, 703 P.2d at 34, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 694. The court respected the
ALRB's expertise and thus gave special deference to the ALRB's findings. Id. See
Rivcom Corp. v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd., 34 Cal. 3d 743, 756-58, 670 P.2d 305,
312, 195 Cal. Rptr. 651, 658, cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 2345 (1983).
15. Harry Carian, 39 Cal. 3d at 220, 703 P.2d at 34, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 694. See
Montebello Rose Co., Inc. v. ALRB, 119 Cal. App. 3d 1, 20, 173 Cal. Rptr. 856, 866
(1981).
16. Harry Carian, 39 Cal. 3d at 220, 703 P.2d at 34, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 694.
17. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969).
18. Id. at 610. See Levine & Martin, The Gissel Doctrine Revisited: Should
N.L.R.B. Bargaining Orders or Representation Elections Determine Union Status?, 34
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For determining whether a bargaining order may be issued when a
union has not won an election, the Gissel Court divided unfair labor
practices into three categories. First, in "exceptional" cases of "outrageous" or "pervasive" unfair labor practices, the NLRB may issue a
bargaining order even if the union has not shown a card majority.' 9
Second, in cases of less pervasive practices, the Board may issue a
bargaining order if (1) the union once enjoyed a majority, and (2) the
Board finds that past unfair labor practices make a fair rerun election unlikely and that a bargaining order best protects employee sentiment expressed through cards. 20 Third, in cases of minor or less
extensive unfair labor practices, an election is hardly affected and a
21
bargaining order is not allowed.
The court stated that the ALRA, like the National Labor Relations
Act (NLRA), neither expressly authorized nor prohibited the Gissel
bargaining order.22 The ALRB had relied on its general remedial authority to justify a bargaining order. 23
HCS contended that the legislative intent behind the ALRA precluded issuing Gissel bargaining orders. HCS noted that the ALRA
specifies the secret ballot as the method by which a union becomes
the exclusive bargaining representative of a group of employees. 24
Moreover, in legislative committee hearings, the drafters of the
ALRA indicated that a union could be recognized under the ALRA
only if it won a secret ballot election. 25
LAB. L.J. 371 (1983); Note, The Gissel BargainingOrder, the NLRB, and the Courts of
Appeals: Should the Supreme Court Take a Second Look?, 32 S.C.L. REV. 399 (1980).
19. Gissel, 395 U.S. at 613-14. See United Dairy Farmers Co-op. Ass'n v. NLRB,
633 F.2d 1054, 1066, 1069 (3d Cir. 1980) ("card majority" means that a majority of the
employees sign cards authorizing a union to represent them in collective bargaining);
Harry Carian,39 Cal. 3d at 221 n.4, 703 P.2d at 35 n.4, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 695 n.4.
20. Harry Carian, 39 Cal. 3d at 221, 703 P.2d at 35, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 695. See Salem, Nonmajority Bargaining Orders: A Prospective View in Light of United Dairy
Farmers, 32 LAB. L.J. 145 (1981); Note, N.L.R.B. BargainingOrders in the Absence of a
Union Majority: Time to Enforce Gissel, 26 N.Y.L. SCH.L. REV. 291 (1981).
21. Harry Carian, 39 Cal. 3d at 221, 703 P.2d at 35, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 695.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 221-22, 703 P.2d at 35, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 695. Section 1160.3 allows the
ALRB to issue cease and desist orders, to reinstate employees, and "to provide such
other relief as will effectuate the policies of this part." CAL. LAB. CODE § 1160.3 (West
Supp. 1985).
24. Harry Carian, 39 Cal. 3d at 222, 703 P.2d at 35, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 696. See supra
note 3.
25. Harry Carian, 39 Cal. 3d at 222, 703 P.2d at 35-36, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 696. In
hearings before the Senate Industrial Relations Committee on May 21, 1975, Chief Justice Bird, then Secretary of Agriculture and Services, stated, "under our Act, we only
allow one way of recognition and that's through a secret ballot election." Id. Senator
Dunlap, an author of the bill, said that under the ALRA, unlike the NLRA, "there is a

While agreeing that a union can only gain recognition through a secret ballot election, the court held that "limiting the means of union
26
The
recognition was unrelated to the issue of bargaining orders."
court stated that the ALRA should be interpreted to promote and
not defeat the general purpose of the Act. 27 This purpose was to
keep agricultural employees "free from the interference, restraint,
and coercion of employers" in selecting a union. 28 The court feared
that if the ALRB could not issue bargaining orders, employers would
commit egregious unfair labor practices to defeat union organization. 29 According to the court, the secret ballot requirement was not
orders but was intended to prevent
concerned with bargaining
"sweetheart" deals.30 The court stated that bargaining orders did not
conflict with worker self-determination where an employer's conduct
31
precluded employees from having a fair election.
The court next decided that Gissel was applicable precedent even
though the NLRA implicitly allows certification without a secret ballot election,3 2 and the ALRA limits certification to a secret ballot
secret ballot [election] in all cases." Id. A labor consultant to the Agriculture and
Services Agency in drafting the ALRA, Professor Herman M. Levy wrote, "The sole
means by which a labor organization can achieve certification as bargaining representative is to win a secret ballot election conducted by the board." Id. See Levy, The Agricultural Labor Relations Act of 1975-La Esperanza De California Para El Futuro,
15 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 783, 789-90 (1975).

26. Harry Carian,39 Cal. 3d at 223, 703 P.2d at 36, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 696.
27. Id. See People v. Centr-O-Mart, 34 Cal. 2d 702, 214 P.2d 378 (1950).
28. Harry Carian, 39 Cal. 3d at 223, 703 P.2d at 36, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 697. Section
1140.2 reads more fully, "[T]he policy of the State of California [is] to encourage and
protect the right of agricultural employees to full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of their own choosing ... and to be free from
the interference, restraint or coercion of employers ... in the designation of such representatives ...." CAL. LAB. CODE § 1140.2 (West Supp. 1985).
29. Harry Carian,39 Cal. 3d at 223-24, 703 P.2d at 36-37, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 697. The
court believed that no other sanction was sufficient to deter employers. Id. at 224, 703
P.2d at 37, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 697. See also supra note 23.
30. Id. In a "sweetheart" deal, an employer voluntarily recognizes a union which
lacks employee support. Id See Englund v. Chavez, 8 Cal. 3d 572, 504 P.2d 457, 105
Cal. Rptr. 521 (1972) (employees were not consulted when growers recognized the
Teamsters Union; violence then broke out between the UFW and the Teamsters);
Highland Ranch v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd., 29 Cal. 3d 848, 633 P.2d 949, 176
Cal. Rptr. 753 (1981) (held that section 1153, subdivision (f) of the ALRA prohibits
"sweetheart" deals). See also Comment, California's Attempt to End Farmworkers
Voicelessness: A Survey of the Agricultural Labor Relations Act of 1975, 7 PAC. L.J.
197, 206-11, 221-23 (1976).
31. Harry Carian,39 Cal. 3d at 226, 703 P.2d at 38, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 698-99.
32. Id. at 227, 703 P.2d at 39, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 699. It is "an unfair labor practice
for an employer... (5) to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his
" 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1982).
employees, subject to the provision of Section 159(a) ....
"Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining by
the majority of the employees ... shall be the exclusive representatives of all the employees .. .for the purposes of collective bargaining ...." 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1982).
The "designated or selected" language in Section 159 (a) is not specific and thus suggests that a union can be certified without a secret ballot election. Harry Carian, 39
Cal. 3d at 226-27, 703 P.2d at 39, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 699.
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election.33 In upholding the NLRB's authority to issue bargaining orders, Gissel had not relied on its conclusion that the NLRA allows
union recognition without a secret ballot.34 Although Gissel involved
an unlawful refusal to bargain, the court cited numerous cases where
bargaining orders were issued to remedy violations of NLRA sections
35
identical to ALRA section 1153, subdivisions (a) and (c).
The court rejected several other arguments advanced by HCS. One
argument it rejected was that the legislature's failure in 1979 to enact
a bill expressly authorizing the ALRB to issue bargaining orders
36
showed that the ALRA does not permit such orders.
C. The Propriety of This BargainingOrder
Courts normally reverse the Board's remedy only for abuse of discretion; 37 however, courts must examine a bargaining order more
critically because it is an extraordinary remedy. 38 The court in this
case found the bargaining order appropriate because it fit Gissel's
"second category." 39
HCS argued unsuccessfully that the authorization cards signed by
over half HCS's employees were improperly admitted into evidence
by the administrative law judge.40 HCS also urged that the cards did
not reliably show majority support. To conclude that the cards estab33. See supra note 3.
34. Harry Carian,39 Cal. 3d at 228, 703 P.2d at 39, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 700. The court
stated that Gissel had conducted two independent inquiries: "whether an employer's
duty to bargain under NLRA section 8(a)(5) can arise without a Board election, and, if
so, whether a bargaining order is an appropriate remedy where an employer rejects a
card majority and refuses to bargain . . ." and commits unfair labor practices. Id. at
227, 703 P.2d at 39, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 699. In the second inquiry, the NLRB did not rely
on section 159(a). Id. at 228, 703 P.2d at 39, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 699-700.
35. Id. at 228, 703 P.2d at 40, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 700.
36. 1& at 230, 703 P.2d at 41, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 701. The court countered that the
legislature's action in 1979 revealed nothing about legislative intent in 1975. Moreover,
the legislature may have considered the 1979 bill unnecessary because the ALRA section 1148 requires the Board to follow applicable precedent and "bargaining orders
were already well-established precedent under the NLRA." Id. at 231, 703 P.2d at 42,
216 Cal. Rptr. at 702.
37. Id. at 232, 703 P.2d at 42, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 702. See Butte View Farms v.
ALRB, 95 Cal. App. 3d 961, 967, 157 Cal. Rptr. 476, 479 (1979). Because the ALRB
draws on its knowledge and expertise, the court respected the ALRB's choice of remedy. Harry Carian,39 Cal. 3d at 232, 703 P.2d at 42, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 702.
38. Harry Carian,39 Cal. 3d at 232 n.17, 703 P.2d at 42 n.17, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 702
n.17.
39. Id. at 232, 703 P.2d at 43, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 703. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
40. Harry Carian,39 Cal. 3d at 233, 703 P.2d at 43, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 703. Although
the UFW never alleged majority status in its complaint, the court held that since the

lished a majority, the ALRB had relied on NLRB v. Cumberland
Shoe Corp.,4 1 which held that an unambiguous card would be used
solely to obtain an election. 42 While Gissel cautioned against applying
Cumberland Shoe too mechanically,4 3 the court had only to decide
whether the cards were "reliable enough to support a bargaining order" where a fair election was improbable or where an election had
been set aside.44 The cards were pronounced reliable because the
HCS employees had been told the cards indicated support for the
45
UFW as well as for an election.
The court next held that a reviewing court should not consider
events occurring subsequent to an employer's unfair bargaining practices.46 HCS had contended that a bargaining order was not needed
because the passage of time and employee turnover had erased the
effects of past unfair labor practices. 47 Citing NLRB v. L. B. Foster
Company,48 the court explained that if courts considered worker
turnover, employers would prolong litigation until the effects of unfair labor practices dissipated.49 This reasoning was especially relevant to the ALRA because agricultural employees often work for
several employers annually and frequently do not work for the same
50
employers each year.
The court noted a potential conflict between bargaining orders and
an employee's free choice. However, it valued the deterrent effect of
bargaining orders and remarked that employees could decertify an
51
unwanted union.
IV.

THE DISSENT

Justice Mosk accused the majority of violating longstanding princiALRB has broad discretion in choosing a remedy and is not limited by the ALRA to
remedies requested in a complaint, evidence as to a potential remedy is relevant. Id.
41. NLRB v. Cumberland Shoe Corp., 144 N.L.R.B. 1268 (1963), enforced, 351 F.2d
917 (6th Cir. 1965).
42. Harry Carian, 39 Cal. 3d at 234, 703 P.2d at 44, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 704. See Gissel, 395 U.S. at 584.
43. Gissel, 395 U.S. at 608 n.27.
44. Harry Carian,39 Cal. 3d at 236, 703 P.2d at 45-46, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 706 (quoting
Gissel, 395 U.S. at 601 n.18).
45. Id. at 236, 703 P.2d at 46, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 706.
46. Id. at 237-38, 703 P.2d at 46, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 707.
47. Id. at 237, 703 P.2d at 46, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 706. See Comment, "After All, Tomorrow is Another Day": Should Subsequent Events Affect the Validity of Bargaining
Orders?, 31 STAN. L. REV. 505, 512-21 (1979).
48. 418 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 990 (1970).
49. Harry Carian, 39 Cal. 3d at 238, 703 P.2d at 46, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 707. The employer "will have ... an ally, in addition to the attrition of union support inevitably
springing from delay in accomplishing results, the fact that turnover itself will help
him, so that the longer he can holdout the better his chances of victory will be." Id.
(quoting Foster, 418 F.2d at 5).
50. Harry Carian, 39 Cal. 3d at 239, 703 P.2d at 47, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 708.
51. Id. at 239-40, 703 P.2d at 48, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 708.
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ples of statutory construction to justify a punitive action against an
employer who committed egregious unfair labor practices. 52 One
such principle is that courts should not interpret clear, unambiguous
statutory language. 5 3 Another is that legislative intent is of prime
importance, 54 and a third is that specific statutes prevail over general
provisions. 55 Mosk believed that sections 1156.3 and 1159 clearly
mandated that bargaining agents can be selected only through secret
6
ballot elections.5
Mosk also argued that Gissel was inapposite because the NLRA
does not specify how to choose bargaining representatives, and thus
an employer must bargain whenever a union presents "convincing evidence of majority support."57 In contrast, the ALRA requires a bargaining representative to be chosen by secret ballot. Mosk argued
that the NLRB derives its authority to issue bargaining orders solely
from the NLRA's ambiguity as to how representatives are to be chosen. 58 Thus, it follows that the ALRB lacks authority to designate
59
representatives.
V.

CONCLUSION

The authority to issue bargaining orders gives the ALRB a potent
new remedy to an employer's unfair labor practices. But it is unclear
how frequently the ALRB will employ this remedy. One suspects
that bargaining orders will be reversed for egregious employer conduct such as in this case. However, since the Gissel tests of "outrageous" unfair labor practices and the improbability of fair rerun
elections are highly subjective, the ALRB may issue bargain orders
to less culpable employers. Yet, because the courts scrutinize extraordinary remedies closely, the ALRB will probably not become
overzealous.
Employers should be substantially deterred from committing unfair labor practices. Because California courts will not consider
52. Id. at 252, 703 P.2d at 56, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 716 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
53. Id. See supra note 3.
54. Harry Carian,39 Cal. 3d at 253, 703 P.2d at 56, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 717 (Mosk, J.,
dissenting). See supra note 25.
55. Id. at 252-53, 703 P.2d at 57, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 717. See supra note 3 (the specific
statute) and note 23 (the general provision).
56. Harry Carian, 39 Cal. 3d at 252-53, 703 P.2d at 56, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 716-17
(Mosk, J., dissenting).
57. Id. at 253-54, 703 P.2d at 57, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 717.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 254, 703 P.2d at 58, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 718.

events occurring subsequent to unfair labor practices, employers now
have less incentive to prolong litigation and incur additional legal
fees. Finally, the ALRA's "secret ballot election" language is not
dead. It still acts to discourage "sweetheart" deals that deny employees the right to freely choose a union.
MARK S. BURTON
B.

Agent shop service fees may be required to be put in
escrow to insure that the constitutionalrights of
objecting members will not be violated by contributions
unrelated to collective bargaining: San Jose Teachers

Association v. Superior Court.
I.

INTRODUCTION

San Jose Teachers Association v. Superior Court1 arose when the
San Jose Teachers Association (hereinafter the Association) and San
Jose Unified School District entered into a collective bargaining
agreement in 1981. Under the terms of the agreement every employee was required to become a member of the Association or pay a
"service fee" to the union.2 A number of members refused to join
the Association or pay the service fee. 3 The Association then brought
suit to collect these fees. 4 The Association filed a motion for summary judgment which the lower court denied. After the court of appeal refused to enter a writ of mandate, the Association petitioned
the supreme court for a hearing. 5

II.

THE COURT'S ANALYSIS

The unanimous court first recognized that under the United States
Supreme Court ruling in Abood v. Detroit Board of Education,6 a
union or agency shop agreement in the field of public employment
does not violate constitutional rights of association. To comply with
1. 38 Cal. 3d 839, 700 P.2d 1252, 215 Cal. Rptr. 250 (1985). The majority opinion
was authored by Justice Grodin with Justices Mosk, Kaus, Broussard, Reynoso, Lucas,
and Chief Justice Bird concurring.
2. Id. at 842, 700 P.2d at 1253, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 251. The service fee was an
amount equal to unified membership dues, initiation fees and general assessments payable to the association. Id. The provision for a service fee was authorized by the Educational Employment Relations Act (EERA). CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 3540-3349.3 (West
1980 and West Supp. 1983).
3. The members alleged that some amount of this money would be used for political and ideological purposes unrelated to collective bargaining. The members argued
that such a use would violate their rights of free expression and association guaranteed
by the 1st and 14th amendments to the Constitution.
4. The fee alleged to be owing from each defendant was $302, with the exception
of eight defendants who owed half that amount.
5. San Jose Teachers, 38 Cal. 3d at 843-44, 700 P.2d at 1254, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 252.
6. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
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Abood a union service charge must be used to finance collective bargaining, contract administration or grievance adjustment functions.7
While the collection of these fees may interfere somewhat with
constitutional rights, the court indicated that under Railway Employees Department v. Hanson8 and Machinists v. Street9 such an interference is justifiable. A contrary rule would result in confusion and
conflict since a number of unions might seek agreements with terms
different from those of the same school district.' 0
The court recognized that employees working under such an agreement would have the first amendment right to object to the use of
funds for ideological or political purposes that they oppose." The
difficulty would lie in determining which activities constituted collective bargaining and which were unrelated. 12 An additional problem
would be devising methods by which employees could object to political uses of their fees.' 3
After an exhaustive analysis of federal authority, the court made
its decision. The court sought a practical compromise between the interests of dissident employees, who were entitled not to finance political or ideological purposes which they opposed, and unions, which
were entitled under collective bargaining agreements to collect service fees. i 4 The court held that the union had to make a good faith
effort to estimate the amount used for non-collective bargaining purposes. The union was then required either to provide a reduction in
the service fee for dissident employees or to adopt a procedure for a
7. 1& at 234-35.
8. Railway Employees Dep't v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225 (1956). Hanson involved a
union shop agreement made pursuant to the Railway Labor Act, which authorized
such agreements. The agreement was ruled valid because the provisions of the Act authorizing it did not violate any state or federal constitutional provisions.
9. Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740 (1961). In Street a number of railroad employees sued to enjoin enforcement of a union shop agreement. The Supreme Court
held that the agreement itself was not unlawful and the employees remained obligated
as a condition of employment to make the payments called for in the agreement.
10. San Jose Teachers, 38 Cal. 3d at 845, 700 P.2d at 1255, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 253.
11. Id. at 846, 700 P.2d at 1256, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 253. In Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S.
1, 22-23 (1976), the Supreme Court held that the first amendment protected the freedom to contribute to an organization for the purpose of spreading a message. The
Supreme Court recognized in Abood that compelling contributions for political purposes works no less an infringment of first amendment rights than does prohibiting
one from making political contributions of his choice. Abood, 431 U.S. at 234.
12. Based on the case of the same name, the term "Abood amount" refers to that
portion of a union service fee used for ideological or political activities unrelated to collective bargaining.
13. San Jose Teachers, 38 Cal. 3d at 847, 700 P.2d at 1257, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 255.
14. Id. at 850-57, 700 P.2d at 1259-64, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 259-62.

"reasonably prompt and efficient determination of this amount."' 15
The teachers contended that the Association could not obtain relief
until the Aboodl6 amount had been determined.17 The court rejected
their contention. It noted that the United States Supreme Court in
Street and Allen was concerned that releasing employees from paying
their service fees, pending litigation of the Abood amount, would
shackle the union in its collective bargaining.S The court understood
the Supreme Court's decisions to mean that the union was entitled to
the full agency fee, provided they place in escrow or deduct in advance that portion of the objecting employees' fee that the union estimated would be spent for political and ideological purposes. The
union would then additionally provide a fair procedure for determining the Abood amount and rebating it to the employee.1 9
The advantages of placing a portion of the service fee in an escrow
account are twofold: 1) the employee's constitutional rights are protected since the union cannot spend this portion for political or ideological purposes, and 2) the union still has access to that portion
20
estimated to be used for collective bargaining purposes.
Since the union is entitled to collect the entire service fee, it makes
no difference what the Abood total is eventually determined to be.
The Abood amount is therefore not a triable issue of material fact
that would preclude a summary judgment. The teachers' contention
that they were entitled to withhold the service fee pending litigation
of the Abood amount was thus not valid.21
The court's opinion next focused on who was best suited to determine the Abood amount.22 The court noted that it had previously
held that the Public Employment Relations Board (PERB) had to
hear a grievance where the conduct in question was "arguably protected or prohibited by the EERA [Educational Employment Relations Act]" and where the PERB could furnish the equivalent relief
as a court. 23 The court also noted that state appellate courts had de15. Id. at 857, 700 P.2d at 1264, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 262.
16. See supra note 12.
17. The teachers argued that in Street, Allen and Abood the Court held that a
plaintiff in an agency fee action could not obtain relief until the Abood amount had
been determined by the court. The plaintiffs in those cases were teachers, but in this
case the union is the plaintiff.
18. San Jose Teachers, 38 Cal. 3d at 859, 700 P.2d at 1265, 215 Cal. Rptr at 263. The
court pointed out in a footnote that the issue of withholding agency fees during the
determination of the Abood amount was not raised by the court in Abood. San Jose
Teachers, 38 Cal. 3d at 859 n.10, 700 P.2d at 1265 n.10, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 263 n.10.
19. Id. at 859-60, 700 P.2d at 1266, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 264.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. See also El Rancho Unified School Dist. v. National Educ. Ass'n, 33 Cal. 3d
946, 663 P.2d 893, 192 Cal. Rptr. 123 (1983); San Diego Teachers Ass'n v. Superior
Court, 24 Cal. 3d 1, 593 P.2d 838, 154 Cal. Rptr. 893 (1979).
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termined that disputes involving the collection and use of agency fees
from non-members concerns conduct "arguably protected or prohibited by the EERA" and therefore must be initially adjudicated by the
PERB.24 The PERB has also recognized that disputes as to the
Abood amount and adequacy of escrow and rebate procedures are
25
within its jurisdiction.
In light of the judgments of the court of appeals, PERB and the
court's own prior decisions, the court decided that the PERB was in
the best position to decide which union activities were reasonably related to collective bargaining. The court also stated that having the
PERB decide the issue would further the policy of uniformity in the
remedies and administration of the EERA.26
III.

CONCLUSION

The court's opinion protects both the employees' constitutional
rights and the unions' ability to continue to participate in collective
bargaining. By placing an amount in escrow, employees are assured
that their funds are only being used for collective bargaining purposes and not for ideological or political purposes they oppose. The
union, on the other hand, receives its funds without delay and can
still bargain collectively. The court, in deciding that the PERB is the
appropriate body to determine the Abood amount, not only chose the
agency possessing the most knowledge on the subject, but also insured that the lower courts would not be the tribunal to decide this
question.
KEITH

XVII.

F.

MILLHOUSE

PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
Court reporters required to diligently comply with
deadlines for transcriptpreparation: In re Watson.

In re Watson, 38 Cal. 3d 655, 699 P.2d 869, 214 Cal. Rptr. 485 (1985)
arose out of a certified shorthand reporter's failure to timely prepare
and deliver a transcription of a lower court proceeding to a court
24. Two California Court of Appeal decisions reaching the same conclusion are
Link v. Antioch Unified School Dist., 142 Cal. App. 3d 765, 191 Cal. Rptr. 264 (1983),
and Leek v. Washington Unified School Dist., 124 Cal. App. 3d 43, 177 Cal. Rptr. 196
(1981).
25. Kings City Joint Union High School Dist., 6 P.E.R.B. 13065 (1982).
26. San Jose Teachers, 38 Cal. 3d at 863, 700 P.2d at 1268, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 266.

clerk. The case came before the California Supreme Court because
the proceedings being transcribed involved an automatic capital
appeal.
The supreme court issued an order directing the reporter to show
good cause why he should not be declared incompetent to act as an
official reporter in any court. After many delays, the reporter finally
filed all portions of the transcript for which he was responsible.
Thus, the case became technically moot, and the orders to show cause
were discharged.
The supreme court reiterated the importance of a court reporter's
diligent compliance with deadlines for transcript preparation, especially where a capital appeal is involved. The court also admonished
Watson, indicating that unreasonable delays in preparing the transcripts could not and would not be tolerated.
KEITH F. MILLHOUSE
XVIII.

PUBLIC UTILITIES
In a proceeding to change a public utility's customer
ratesfor the purpose of taking significant and
unforeseeable economic changes into account, the
Public Utilities Commission may consider data which
is more recent than that used in the general rate
proceeding: City and County of San Francisco v. Public
Utilities Commission.

In City and County of San Francisco v. Public Utilities Commission, 39 Cal. 3d 523, 703 P.2d 381, 217 Cal. Rptr. 43 (1985), the California Supreme Court reviewed the issue of whether the Public Utilities
Commission (hereinafter the P.U.C.) acted properly in granting a
rate increase to the Pacific Telephone and Telegraph Company
(hereinafter the Pacific). The rate increase was granted to offset the
effects of an accounting revision by the Federal Communications
Commission (hereinafter the F.C.C.). The City and County of San
Francisco and the City of San Diego (hereinafter the cities) petitioned the supreme court for a writ of review to contest the actions of
the P.U.C.
The case arose in August 1980, when Pacific filed an application for
a general rate increase. Such applications may be initiated once
every three years by a public utility to raise its rates. See generally
53 CAL. JUR. 3D Public Utilities §§ 54-63 (1979). In a general rate
setting proceeding, the P.U.C. relies on historical data to set a rate
which will fairly approximate the utility's cost and allows a fair rate
of return during the next few years. In an offset proceeding, the
P.U.C. may allow a rate increase between general rate proceedings
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to compensate for significant and unforeseeable economic changes in
the utility's operating expenses. The P.U.C. in this case authorized a
rate increase of $160 million in the general rate proceeding. The
P.U.C. recognized that Pacific would lose $63.7 million in installation
revenues due to the increasing public use of phone-center stores,
which would allow a greater number of consumers to install their
own phones. However, it failed to consider the fact that the use of
phone-center stores would reduce installation costs. Because of this
oversight, the cities applied for a rehearing with the P.U.C. The application was denied in October, 1981.
The California Supreme Court granted a petition for a writ of review to examine the P.U.C.'s findings. However, before the case
could be heard on oral argument, Pacific settled with the cities. Pacific agreed to reduce its rate increase to account for the reduction of
installation costs resulting from the use of phone-center stores.
While the general rate increase was being contested by the cities,
another problem arose. The F.C.C. adopted a decision in 1980 which
altered the accounting procedures for telephone companies. The
F.C.C. changes provided for the treatment of installation costs as current expenses rather than capital expenditures resulting in an immediate increase in Pacific's installation costs. These costs were to be
immediately tabulated as costs of service instead of being recognized
over time as capital costs. Therefore, the F.C.C. accounting changes
created an immediate need for an increase in revenue to offset the
increased costs.
Pacific initiated the present offset proceeding by filing an application for increased revenues to offset the increased costs arising from
the accounting revisions. The P.U.C. agreed with Pacific and allowed
a rate increase of $264 million. The cities then applied for a rehearing alleging that the offset rate increase could be affected by the then
pending general rate proceeding. In 1982, the P.U.C. denied the cities' application for rehearing and declined to reduce the additional
rate increase. The supreme court granted the cities' application for a
writ of review.
In its majority opinion, the supreme court emphasized that there is
a strong presumption favoring the validity of a P.U.C. decision. Furthermore, the court's review of P.U.C. decisions is limited to a determination of whether the P.U.C. "has regularly pursued its authority,
including a determination of whether the order or decision under review violates any right of the petitioner under the Constitution
.
" City and County of San Francisco, 39 Cal. 3d at 530, 703 P.2d

at 384, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 46 (quoting CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 1757
(West 1975)). The court held that the cities failed to carry their burden of proof in showing that the P.U.C. had abused its authority.
Therefore, the court affirmed the P.U.C. decision.
In affirming the P.U.C. decision, the court systematically rejected
four contentions made by the cities. They were all based on the allegation that the offset rate increase was unreasonably high. First, the
court rejected the cities' claim that the offset rate increase should automatically be reduced by the same amount that the general rate increase was reduced in the settlement between Pacific and the cities.
The court pointed out that the offset and general rate proceedings
were separate and distinct actions based on different sets of data. Because the data used in the offset proceeding was current and took
into account the effect of the phone-center stores, the cities did not
show that the error in the general rate proceeding automatically affected this offset rate proceeding.
Second, the cities did not show that the installation cost estimate
was unreasonable in itself. The P.U.C.'s estimate was supported by
testimony and the cities presented virtually no evidence to support
its lower estimate.
Third, the cities contended that the P.U.C. findings were inconsistent regarding the installation costs and revenues in the offset proceeding because it took into account the cost of installation rather
than the revenues generated. The court held that the accounting revision, which gave rise to the offset rate proceeding, merely treated
installation costs as an expense item. Therefore, it only effected
costs, not revenue.
Finally, the court rejected the cities' contention that the P.U.C.
may not use estimates based on different sets of data in different proceedings. The court held that the P.U.C. properly used the more recent data in the offset proceedings in order to get as close an estimate
of future conditions as possible. Also, the court held that the P.U.C.
should not have used the higher estimate of installation revenues
that could have been contrived from the more recent data in the general rate proceeding because to do so would have reopened the general rate proceeding. The general rate proceeding was a final
decision not subject to review. This reopening would have posed a
threat of impermissible, retroactive ratemaking. Thus, the court affirmed the P.U.C. decision.
JOHN THOMAS McDOWELL
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XIX.

REAL PROPERTY LAW
A.

If a city ordinance regulating the conversion of
apartments is reasonably related to the
accomplishment of a legitimate governmental objective
within the scope of the city's police power, it does not
violate due process nor constitute a confiscatory
taking: Griffin Development Co. v. City of Oxnard.
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Griffin Development Company v. City of Oxnard,1 the court decided whether an Oxnard ordinance, which required that conversions
of apartment buildings to condominiums conform to the standards
applicable to new condominiums, is a valid exercise of municipal authority. The appellant argued that the ordinance was invalid for
three reasons: 1) it violated the California Subdivision Map Act;2 2) it
was inconsistent with the requirements of due process; and 3) it resulted in a confiscatory "taking" of the appellant's property.
II.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The appellant, Griffin Development Company, owned a seventytwo unit apartment complex in the City of Oxnard. When the complex was completed in 1979, it complied with all city standards applicable to apartments and condominium projects. In 1980, Oxnard
adopted new standards for new condominium projects. Oxnard eventually applied these standards to condominium conversions as well.
The regulations required that a special use permit be obtained from
the city before conversion would be allowed. To obtain such a permit, the applicant had to show that the project met certain
mandatory requirements and "substantially conformed" to other ad3
visory standards.
1. 39 Cal. 3d 256, 703 P.2d 339, 217 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1985). The majority opinion was
written by Justice Kaus with Chief Justice Bird and Justices Broussard, Reynoso, and
Grodin concurring. There was a dissenting opinion by Justice Mosk with Justice Lucas
concurring.
2. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 66410 (West 1983). The term "subdivision" includes
condominium projects in California. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 66424 (West 1983). See also
Note, MunicipalRegulation of Condominium Conversions in California,53 S. CAL. L.
REV. 225, 230 (1979).
3. Griffin, 39 Cal. 3d at 260, 703 P.2d at 340, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 2. The advisory
standards apply to new condominiums as well as condominium conversions. These
standards require that,
(1) A housing unit shall contain not less than two separate bedrooms; (2) a
housing unit shall not be smaller than 1,000 square feet; (3) each unit shall

Griffin applied for a special use permit to convert the apartment
complex to a condominium complex. Because the complex did not
conform to the parking requirements nor substantially conform to
the advisory standards, Oxnard denied Griffin's application. Griffin
then petitioned for a writ of mandate to compel the City to allow the
conversion. The trial court determined that Oxnard had authority to
regulate condominium conversions. It also held that the regulations
neither deprived Griffin of its constitutional rights nor conflicted
with the Subdivision Map Act.
III.
A.

THE MAJORITY OPINION

The CaliforniaSubdivision Map Act

The court quickly dismissed Griffin's claim that the Subdivision
Map Act preempted the Oxnard condominium conversion ordinance.
Because the state constitution gives all cities and counties the power
to make and enforce ordinances and regulations that do not conflict
with general laws, 4 a city may adopt an ordinance which involves
matters covered in the Map Act. The adopted ordinance, however,
5
may not conflict with any of the provisions of the Map Act.
The Map Act limits the power of local governments to disapprove
final or tentative maps of a condominium or community apartment

project on the basis of design or location of the buildings. 6

However,

this limitation is only effective in the absence of an ordinance to the

contrary. 7 The court concluded that although the Oxnard ordinance
deals with condominiums (which are mentioned in the Map Act), the
ordinance does not conflict

with any provision of the Map Act.

contain adequate space for a washer, dryer, and water heater; (4) parking
shall be provided at a ratio of two spaces in a garage per dwelling unit, such
parking to be located no further than 50 feet from the unit served; (5) visitor
parking shall be required at a ratio of one space per dwelling unit, such parking to be located no further than 100 feet from any unit; (6) major entrances
to residences shall be separated from entrances of adjacent units; and (7) a
private storage area shall be provided each residence.
Id.
4. Griffin, 39 Cal. 3d at 261, 703 P.2d at 341, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 3 (citing CAL.
§ 7).
5. Griffin, 39 Cal. 3d at 261, 703 P.2d at 341, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 3 (citing Friends of
Lake Arrowhead v. Board of Supervisors, 38 Cal. App. 3d 497, 505, 113 Cal. Rptr. 539,
543-44 (1974)). The court stated, "The power to adopt supplemental ordinances or regulations in connection with matters covered by the act, though not expressly granted,
may also be implied provided they bear a reasonable relation to the purposes and requirements of the act and are not inconsistent with it." Friendsof Lake Arrowhead, 38
Cal. App. 3d at 505, 113 Cal. Rptr at 543-44 (citations omitted).
6. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 66427 (West 1983). See Griffin, 39 Cal. 3d at 262, 703 P.2d
at 341, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 3.
7. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 66427 (West 1983). The code states, "Nothing herein shall
be deemed to limit the power of the legislative body to regulate the design or location
of buildings in such a project by or pursuant to local ordinances." Id.
CONST. art. XI,
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Therefore, the Oxnard ordinance regulating condominium conversions was not preempted by state law.8
B.

The Authority of Oxnard to Regulate Condominium
Conversions

Griffin's main contention was that a conversion is simply a change
in the form of ownership, not a change in use. Thus, because its
changes to the apartment complex involved no change in use, the
city's requirement of a special use permit amounted to a violation of
due process of law.9
The court began its analysis of whether regulation of condominium
conversions is consistent with the requirements of due process by
pointing out that "[s]o far as the requirement of due process is concerned, and in the absence of other constitutional restriction, a state
is free to adopt whatever economic policy may reasonably be deemed
to promote public welfare, and to enforce that policy by legislation
adapted to its purpose." 10 The court elaborated that unless a city regulation infringes upon a fundamental constitutional right or relies
upon a suspect classification, the regulation is generally upheld as
consistent with the requirements of due process." Consequently,
California courts have consistently held that condominium conversion regulations are a legitimate exercise of police power.12 The
court stressed that Griffin's claim was not based on any violation of a
fundamental right such as privacy or freedom of expression, but
rather on the infringement upon its property rights.13
A law review commentator has noted that most condominium conversion regulations would be considered a valid application of the
8. Griffin, 39 Cal. 3d at 262, 703 P.2d at 341, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 3. See also Santa
Monica Pines, Ltd. v. Rent Control Bd., 35 Cal. 3d 858, 679 P.2d 27, 201 Cal. Rptr. 593
(1984) (held that the Subdivision Map Act did not preempt the city's attempt to regulate condominium conversions in connection with its rent control laws).
9. Griffin, 39 Cal. 3d at 262-63, 703 P.2d at 342, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 4.
10. Id. at 263, 703 P.2d at 342, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 4 (quoting Birkenfeld v. City of
Berkeley, 17 Cal. 3d 129, 155, 550 P.2d 1001, 1020, 130 Cal. Rptr. 465, 484 (1976)). See
Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 537 (1934).
11. Griffin, 39 Cal. 3d at 263, 703 P.2d at 342, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 4.
12. See Santa Monica Pines, Ltd. v. Rent Control Bd., 35 Cal. 3d 858, 679 P.2d 27,
201 Cal. Rptr. 593 (1984) (condominium conversion regulations upheld as part of the
city's rent control laws); Kalaydjian v. City of Los Angeles, 149 Cal. App. 3d 690, 197
Cal. Rptr. 149 (1983) (an ordinance requiring landlords who convert apartments to condominiums to pay relocation costs to displaced tenants upheld); Soderling v. City of
Santa Monica, 142 Cal. App. 3d. 501, 191 Cal. Rptr. 140 (1983) (the imposition of special
requirements for condominium conversions upheld as a valid exercise of police power).
13. Griffin, 39 Cal. 3d at 264, 703 P.2d at 343, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 5.

city's police power under a "rational basis" test. 14 That test requires
the exercise of the police power to be reasonably necessary to accomplish a legitimate governmental purpose. 15 Generally, those purposes
involve the public health, safety, morals or general welfare of the
people of the community.16 The Griffin court used that test to review the legitimacy of the Oxnard regulation and found the ordinance a valid exercise of the police power to restrict property
17
rights.
The policies which the court expressed in upholding the Oxnard
regulations emphasized the necessary and legitimate governmental
purposes behind the ordinance. First, Oxnard had an interest in
maintaining a healthy supply of rental housing for residents who cannot afford to purchase property.B Second, the ordinance had the reasonable goal of assuring high construction standards and adequate
facilities in develolping residential areas. 19
The court based its findings on a memorandum from the Oxnard
planning director to the city attorney. The planning director claimed
that auto ownership statistics showed that the average owner has
more than one car and that burglaries can be directly related to open,
as opposed to enclosed, parking structures. These statistics supported
the parking requirements in the ordinance. Furthermore, because
condominiums provide low and moderate income families with
owner-occupied housing, the planning director argued that a two bedroom requirement was necessary. 20
To counter Griffin's argument that condominiums are merely a
change in ownership, the court pointed out that the legitimate concerns which prompt a city to regulate condominium conversions
could not be overlooked.21 The argument that the conversion was
not a change in use "simply ignore[d] the legitimate concerns which
may prompt a city to regulate condominium conversions." 22 The
court stated that the police power, in addition to promoting public
peace, safety, health and welfare, is an elastic concept that may be
14.
15.
16.
17.

Note, supra note 2, at 239.
Miller v. Board of Public Works, 195 Cal. 477, 484, 234 P. 381, 383 (1925).
IdGriffin, 39 Cal. 3d at 266, 703 P.2d at 344, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 6.

18.

Id. at 265, 703 P.2d at 343, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 5. See also Santa Monica Pines, 35

Cal. 3d at 869, 679 P.2d at 34, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 600 (an ordinance restricting the removal of apartments from the rental housing market through condominium conversion upheld as a valid exercise of police power).

19. Grfin, 39 Cal. 3d at 265, 703 P.2d at 343, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 5.
20. Id. The court pointed out in its own footnote that there is no meaningful distinction between Griffin's inability to convert its apartment complex and the mobility

of any other landowner who is using his building for one purpose to upgrade or modify
his building to some other use. Id. at 265 n.7, 703 P.2d at 344 n.7, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 6 n.7.
21. Id. at 265, 703 P.2d at 344, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 6.
22. Id.
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expanded to meet the changing conditions of modern life.23

The

court held that a city's desire to grow at an orderly pace and manner
comes within the concept of public welfare. 24 It was convinced that a
city's interest in maintaining an adequate supply of rental housing
and in controlling its growth rate at an orderly pace are legitimate
governmental purposes. Therefore, it concluded that the ordinance
was a valid exercise of Oxnard's police power.
C. Confiscatory Taking
Griffin contended that the ordinance prevented it from using its
land as it wished and, therefore, mandated a confiscatory "taking."
The court dismissed this contention, stating that "[a] land use measure may be unconstitutional and subject to invalidation 'only when
its effect is to deprive the landowner of substantially all reasonable
use of his property.'"25 Because Griffin could continue to rent its
apartments, it was not deprived of all reasonable use of its
26
property.
The court suggested that a taking might be found under a diminution in value theory. 27 However, it quickly closed that avenue by
stating most land use regulations "have the inevitable effect of reducing the value of regulated properties."28 The mere fact that property
values are reduced by an ordinance does not render the ordinance
23. Id. at 266, 703 P.2d at 344, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 6 (citing Birkenfeld, 17 Cal. 3d at
160, 550 P.2d at 1023, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 487).
24. Griffin, 39 Cal. 3d at 266, 703 P. 2d at 344, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 6. See Dateline
Builders, Inc. v. City of Santa Rosa, 146 Cal. App. 3d 520, 528, 194 Cal. Rptr. 258, 264
(1983) (a city's refusal to allow a builder to connect its housing development beyond
city limits to the existing sewer system upheld).
25. Griffin, 39 Cal. 3d at 266, 703 P.2d at 344, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 6-7 (quoting Agins
v. City of Tiburon, 24 Cal. 3d 266, 598 P.2d 25, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372 (1979), affd, 447 U.S.
255 (1980)). The court held that zoning ordinances permitting owners of valuable unimproved land to devote their land only to one-family dwellings, accessory buildings,
and open space uses did not effect a "taking" without just compensation in violation of
the fifth and fourteenth amendments. Id. See also Comment, Fifth Amendment Takings and Condominium Conversion Regulations that Restrict Owner Occupancy
Rights, 62 B.U.L. REV. 467 (1982).
26. Griffin, 39 Cal. 3d. at 267, 703 P.2d at 344-45, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 6-7. See Penn.
Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). The Supreme Court held
that because the owners of Grand Central Station could continue to use their property
as a train station, the New York law which prohibited the building of an office complex over the station did not effect a "taking." 438 U.S. at 137-38.
27. Griffin, 39 Cal. 3d at 267, 703 P.2d at 345, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 7.
28. Id. (quoting Fisher v. City of Berkeley, 37 Cal. 3d 644, 686, 693 P.2d 261, 264,
209 Cal. Rptr. 682, 715 (1984)).

unconstitutional.29 Even significant diminution in value has consistently been held to be insufficient to establish a confiscatory taking. 30
Therefore, because Griffin was left with the right to continue renting
its apartments and the diminution in value of Griffin's property due
to the condominium conversion restriction was not substantial, the
court held that the ordinance did not result in a "taking" of property.
IV.

THE DISSENT

Justice Mosk's dissent charged the Oxnard ordinance with turning
the American dream of home ownership into a nightmare.3 1 He
claimed that the ordinance would have a harmful effect on "those
frugal families who prefer at the end of the year to have an enhanced
32
equity in a piece of property instead of 12 rent receipts."
Justice Mosk contended that the City of Oxnard did not establish
the rational basis necessary to uphold the ordinance. The city relied
solely on the experience and opinions of the Planning Director, not
on statistics. Justice Mosk stated that an ordinance may impose new
requirements on property when it is converted from an apartment
complex to a condominium complex "only if conversion has adverse
effects that justify the imposition of such requirements under the police power." 33 He saw no way in which a change in the form of ownership could affect the health, safety, or welfare of the city.34 Mosk
used the following example to stress his point: "[T]oday the John
Doe family occupies the corner apartment on the second floor as a
renter; tomorrow the John Doe family occupies the corner apartment
on the second floor as an owner."3 5
In addressing the due process issue, Justice Mosk argued that the
city's power to establish zoning ordinances and interfere with a property owner's rights, restricting the character of the land use, is limited.36 He pointed out that the chief limitations on the exercise of
29. Griffin, 39 Cal. 3d at 267, 703 P.2d at 345, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 7.
30. Id. See Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1976) (a 75 percent reduction in value because of a zoning law insufficient to establish a taking); Hadacheck v.
Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) (a 90 percent reduction considered insufficient).
31. Griffin, 39 Cal. 3d at 268, 703 P.2d. at 345, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 7 (Mosk, J.,
dissenting).
32. Id.
33. Id. at 268, 703 P.2d at 346, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 8. See Note, supra note 2, at 238-55.
Although Mosk refers to this law review article in support of his statement, the article
conceded that "courts generally require only that the act have some rational tendency
to promote the public health, safety or welfare even if that tendency is quite speculative and tenuous .... In light of this judicial posture, very few condominium conversions will be invalidated ... " Note, supra note 2, at 239-40.
34. Griffin, 39 Cal. 3d at 268, 703 P.2d at 346, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 8 (Mosk, J.,
dissenting).
35. Id. at 269, 703 P.2d. at 346, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 8.
36. Id. at 270, 703 P. 2d at 347, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 9. See Nectow v. Cambridge, 277
U.S. 183, 188 (1928).
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the police power are the due process and equal protection clauses of
the federal and state constitutions. 37 To clarify this, he stated,
"Where the exercise of that power results in consequences which are
oppressive and unreasonable, courts do not hesitate to protect the
rights of the property owner against the unlawful interference with
his property." 38 Stated another way, if an ordinance is arbitrary, unreasonable and is not substantially related to a legitimate
39
governmental objective, it is invalid.
Justice Mosk argued that although fundamental rights are sometimes considered more important than property rights in zoning
cases, the protection of property rights is also a legitimate constitutional right.40 He emphasized the fact that courts have held that
where constitutional rights are at issue, a zoning authority "'must be
prepared to articulate, and support, a reasoned and significant basis
for its decision. This burden is by no means insurmountable, but
neither should it be viewed de minimus.' "4 Mosk contended that
the bare conclusions of a city engineer formed an insubstantial basis
to authorize the deprivation of Griffin's constitutionally protected
42
property rights.
Finally, Mosk concluded that a conversion is a mere change of
ownership, not a change in occupancy or use.4 3 The word "use" does
not pertain to the ownership of a building, but to the physical use of
the building.44 Whether Griffin's building remained an apartment
building or was converted to a condominium, the property would continue to be used as dwelling units. The special use permit was an unreasonable requirement and the trial court's decision should have
37. Griffin, 39 Cal. 3d at 270, 703 P.2d at 347, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 9 (Mosk, J., dissenting). Article I, section 7 of the California Constitution states, "A person may not be
deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law or denied equal protection of the laws." CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.

38. Griffin, 39 Cal. 3d at 270, 703 P.2d at 347, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 9 (Mosk, J., dissenting) (quoting Skalko v. City of Sunnyvale, 14 Cal. 2d 213, 215-216, 93 P.2d 93, 95-96
(1939)).
39. Id. at 272, 703 P.2d 348, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 10.
40. Id. See also id. at 273-74, 703 P.2d at 349, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 11.
41. Id. at 274, 703 P.2d at 349-50, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 11-12 (quoting Schad v. Mt.
Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 77 (1981)). Although Schad was concerned with the right of free
speech rather than property rights, Mosk believed that the principles of the case were
applicable to the Griffin case. Griffin, 39 Cal. 3d at 273, 703 P.2d at 349, 217 Cal. Rptr.
at 11 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
42. Id. at 274-75, 703 P.2d at 350, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 12.
43. Id. at 278, 703 P.2d at 352, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 14.
44. Id. at 278-79, 703 P.2d. at 353, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 15.

been reversed. 45
V.

CONCLUSION

Griffin signals the court's willingness to expand a municipality's
powers. A city may, to further the public health, safety and welfare,
institute reasonable restrictions on conversions so long as there are
no constitutional violations.
JOHN THOMAS McDOWELL

B.

The summary nature of unlawful detainer actions
must give way to "good cause" requirementsfor
franchise termination which are establishedfor the
protection of a franchise: E.S. Bills, Inc. v. Daniel
Tzucanow.

E.S. Bills, Inc. v. Daniel Tzucanow, 38 Cal. 3d 824, 700 P.2d 1280,
215 Cal. Rptr. 278 (1985), involved an unlawful detainer action
brought by a franchisor to recover possession of a gasoline station
leased to the franchisee. Under California Code of Civil Procedure
section 1174(a), CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1174(a) (West 1982), a petroleum distributor may not recover possession from a gasoline dealer in
an unlawful detainer action without establishing good cause for termination or nonrenewal. See also CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 2099.1
(West Supp. 1985).
Prior to termination of the franchise, a dispute arose between the
parties as to the "applicable Dealer Purchase Price" for gasoline
under the franchise agreement. The franchisee filed suit for breach
of contract claiming that the franchisor's price was not fixed in good
faith in accordance with reasonable commercial standards. He
claimed the franchisor's prices were too high for achieving a profit.
When the franchisor refused to sell gasoline at the price demanded,
the franchisee purchased gasoline from another supplier. The
franchisor informed the franchisee that the agreement was to be terminated, but when the franchisee continued to operate the gasoline
station the franchisor filed the action for unlawful detainer.
The issue at trial was whether the franchisee's refusal to pay the
"applicable Dealer Purchase Price" had given franchisor "good
cause" to terminate the franchise agreement. The franchisee offered
evidence of retail prices at stations operated directly by the
franchisor (claiming the retail prices were lower than the dealer
price charged to him) and the Lundberg report on refiner's prices;
the trial court refused to admit any of that evidence. It limited evi45. Id. at 279, 703 P.2d at 353, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 15.
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dence to the dealings between the parties and the prices the
franchisor charged in other lessee dealerships. The trial court's decision was based on the concern for preserving the summary nature of
unlawful detainer actions to ensure timely restoration of possession.
The supreme court stated that the "good cause" requirement is not
just a defense to be balanced against preserving the summary nature
of unlawful detainer actions. Rather, it is a prerequisite to such a
judgment. Section 1174(a) was amended to assure the gasoline dealer
a trial on the merits concerning his rights under the franchise before
the franchisor may retake possession. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE
§ 1174(a) (West 1982). The court's interest in the summary nature of
an unlawful detainer action must give way to this policy.
The franchisee's proffered evidence was relevant to whether the
franchisor's fixed prices were in accordance with the reasonable standard. If these prices are found to be unreasonable then the franchisee's failure to purchase did not give the franchisor the "good
cause" required to terminate the agreement. Consequently, it was
prejudicial error for the trial court to exclude the proffered evidence.
JESSICA A. LEMOINE

C. In a nonjudicialforeclosure a trustee has no common
law duty to make reasonableefforts to provide a trustor
actual notice; Civil Code section 2924(6) alone defines a
trustee's duties to give notice: I.E. Associates v. Safeco
Title Insurance Co.
In I.E. Associates v. Safeco Title Insurance Co., 39 Cal. 3d 281, 702
P.2d 596, 216 Cal. Rptr. 438 (1985), the trustor partnership received
no notice of default before its property was sold through nonjudicial
foreclosure. Although the deed of trust and the grant deed listed addresses for the trustor, notices sent to these places were returned
"address unknown." The trustee also searched the telephone book
for the trustor's address and posted a notice of sale on the property.
Even though each partner had signed the deed of trust, the trustee
never attempted to find any partner's address. The trustor sued for
damages, but the trial court granted summary judgment for the
trustee.
The supreme court affirmed, holding that the trustee had satisfied
the notice requirements of California Civil Code section 2924b. CAL.
CIV. CODE § 2924b (West Supp. 1985). Section 2924b requires a
trustee to mail notices to the trustor's last known address. The

trustee will have actual knowledge if he has received express information about the address. Id. The signatures on the deed of trust did
not supply the actual knowledge of the partners' addresses required
by the statute, though they may have been sufficient to give constructive knowledge of the addresses.
The court also stated that common law imposes no duty upon a
trustee to make reasonable efforts to provide actual notice to a defaulting trustor. Rather, a trustee's rights, duties, and liabilities emanate solely from the nonjudicial foreclosure statutes. Id. §§ 2924 2924(i). By drafting comprehensive, detailed statutes the legislature
intended these statutes to wholly replace the common law in this
area. See 27 CAL. JUR. 3D Deeds of Trust § 211 (1976).
The court cited several policies against expanding a trustee's statutory duties. In drafting the nonjudicial foreclosure statute, the legislature carefully balanced the interests of beneficiaries, trustors, and
trustees. Moreover, trustees need clearly defined responsibilities in
order to perform their duties officially and avoid litigation. Finally,
costs and time are spared if the trustor has the duty to notify the
trustee of an address change.
MARK S. BURTON

D. In prejudgment condemnation cases, an award of
interest at the legal rate violates constitutionaljust
compensation if this rate is lower than the prevailing
market rate: Redevelopment Agency of Burbank v.
Gilmore.
In Redevelopment Agency of Burbank v. Gilmore, 38 Cal. 3d 790,
700 P.2d 794, 214 Cal. Rptr. 904 (1985), the court held that in condemnation proceedings involving the prejudgment taking of property, an
award of "legal interest" at a rate lower than the prevailing market
rate is unconstitutional. Additionally, the calculation-of the prevalent market rate of interest is to be based on the rates that a reasonably prudent investor can obtain.
As permitted by "quick-take" provisions of California eminent domain law, the Redevelopment Agency (hereinafter the Agency) deposited "probable compensation" with the court for Gilmore's
condemned property and took possession of the land prior to trial
and judgment. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1255.010 (West 1982). At trial
it was determined that the value of the property was significantly
greater than the amount deposited by the Agency. The trial court
awarded Gilmore the difference between the court determined value
of the land and that deposited by the Agency; it also awarded interest
at the "legal rate" of seven percent from the date the Agency took
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possession. At that time the prevailing market rate was significantly
higher than the "legal rate." Gilmore appealed, challenging the legality of the statutory interest rate. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE
§ 1268.310 (West 1982). He claimed that the statute which set interest
rates was inconsistent with the just compensation clauses of the
United States and California Constitutions. See U.S. CONST. amend.
V, cl. 4; CAL. CONST art. I, § 19.
The court based its decision on the United States Supreme Court
decision of Seaboard Airline Railway v. United States, 261 U.S. 299,
304 (1923), which held that when property is taken for public use
"[tihe just compensation to which the owner is constitutionally entitled is the full and perfect equivalent of the property taken ....
[This] means substantially that the owner shall be put in as good position pecuniarily as he would have been if his property had not been
taken." Redevelopment Agency, 38 Cal. 3d at 797, 700 P.2d at 799, 214
Cal. Rptr. at 909 (quoting Seaboard Airline Railway v. United States,
261 U.S. 299, 304 (1923) (emphasis added and citations omitted)).
When the application of the statutorily defined lower ceiling on interest rates denies the condemnee the full equivalent of his property's value, it falls short of constitutionally required just
compensation.
The calculation of interest compatable with just compensation is
left to the discretion of the trial court. That determination, however,
should be based upon the rate which would have been earned by "a
reasonably prudent person investing funds so as to produce a reasonable return while maintaining safety of principal ... ." Washington
Metropolitan Area Transit Authority v. One Parcel of Land, 706 F.2d
1312, 1322 (4th Cir. 1983). The court should also consider the prevailing rate on all money market obligations, governmental or private,
which prudent depositors and investors normally purchase for income purposes and whose terms or maturities fall within the period
the condemnation payment was delayed. Applying these principles
to the case at bar, the court reversed the lower court but denied Gilmore's motion for costs and attorney's fees. Gilmore had not shown
that the Agency's condemnation offer was not reasonable. See CAL.
CIV. PROC. CODE § 1250.410 (West 1985).
DAYTON B. PARCELLS III

XX.

TAXATION
A taxpayer who makes a partialpayment to a taxing
authority cannot sue for a refund until he has paid all
amounts claimed due for the reportingperiod: State
Board of Equalization v. Superior Court.

In State Board of Equalization v. Superior Court, 39 Cal. 3d 633,
703 P.2d 1131, 217 Cal. Rptr. 238 (1985), it was held that a taxpayer
who makes a partial payment to a taxing authority cannot bring an
action for a refund until he has paid all amounts claimed due for the
reporting period. This holding was based on the section of the California Constitution which bars courts from issuing any "legal or equitable process... against this State or any officer thereof to prevent
or enjoin the collection of any tax." CAL. CONST. art. XIII, § 32. Public policy demands that revenue collection continue during litigation
so that essential public services are not interrupted. Moreover, res
judicata would force a taxing authority to raise all claims during the
litigation or to forego the right to ever collect taxes from the disputed period.
O'Hara & Kendall Aviation, Inc. (hereinafter O'Hara) sold small
aircraft and held a seller's permit as required by Revenue and Taxation Code section 6066. See CAL. REV. & TAX CODE § 6066 (West
1970). Customers are required either to pay a California sales tax or
to execute a written declaration that the conditions for exemption
are met. To be exempt, a customer must be a non-resident of California, and must not use the aircraft in California except to remove it
from the state. Id. § 6366. Section 6421 provides that a seller has no
sales tax liability if he in good faith accepts the customer's written
declaration. Id. § 6421 (West Supp. 1985).
The Board of Equalization (hereinafter the Board) sent O'Hara a
notice of determination that it owed approximately $187,000 for several quarterly reporting periods. It further stated that thirty-one
sales for which O'Hara had claimed sales tax exemptions under section 6366 were taxable. O'Hara filed a petition for redetermination
and insisted that each disputed sale was sufficiently documented to
be exempt under section 6366. O'Hara also sent the Board a $250
check as partial payment of the determination and requested in a letter that the $250 be apportioned according to the amount of tax
claimed due on each sale. The Board accepted the check but did not
expressly agree to apportion the money. O'Hara later claimed that
the $250 was an overpayment, demanded a refund, and filed a complaint in the superior court. The case finally reached the supreme
court.
The California Constitution, article XIII, section 32 allows one to
sue to recover on an allegedly excessive tax bill after paying the tax,
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and bars courts from issuing any "legal or equitable process . . .
against this State or any officer thereof to prevent or enjoin the collection of any tax." CAL. CONST. art. XIII, § 32. The court construed
these provisions to mean that section 32 makes postpayment refund
actions the only way to resolve tax disputes.
The public policy behind section 32 demands that "revenue collection.., continue during litigation so that essential public services dependent on the funds are not unnecessarily interrupted." Pacific Gas
& Electric Co. v. State Board of Equalization,27 Cal. 3d 277, 283, 611
P.2d 463, 467, 165 Cal. Rptr. 122, 126 (1980). Section 32 is construed
broadly to bar injunctions and any other prepayment judicial declarations or findings that hinder prompt tax collection. Modern Barber
College v. California Employment Stability Commission, 31 Cal. 2d
720, 192 P.2d 916 (1948). Likewise, O'Hara was not allowed to sue because a court ruling exempting the disputed sales would in effect enjoin tax collection. See 56 CAL. JUR. 3D Sales and Use Taxes §§ 22-23
(Supp. 1985).
The court reasoned that, if O'Hara could bring a prepayment judicial action, the court would have to determine the tax due in order to
rule whether tax paid exceeded tax due. Thus, res judicata would
bar the Board from later litigating the validity of the unpaid tax.
Pope Estate Co. v. Johnson, 43 Cal. App. 2d 170, 110 P.2d 481 (1941),
was cited as holding that a refund claim opens all questions about a
given tax year, and that neither taxpayer nor the taxing authority
may split up these questions among separate suits. Since the Board
would have to litigate fully all questions concerning the unpaid taxes,
tax collection would be unconstitutionally delayed. However, the
court added that the Board could still accept partial payments.
JOHN EDWARD VAN VLEAR

xxi. TORTS
A. Section 877 of the California Code of Civil Procedure
does apply to alter ego situations;an employee's
settlement with a subsidiary does not release the parent
corporationfrom liability: Mesler v. Bragg Management
Co.
The plaintiff in Mesler v. Bragg Management Co., 39 Cal. 3d 290,
702 P.2d 601, 216 Cal. Rptr. 443 (1985), after having part of his arm
amputated by a dozer's engine fan, sued several parties, including the

dozer's previous owner, Bragg Crane. Two years after the plaintiff
filed his complaint, discovery revealed that Bragg Crane was a
wholly owned subsidiary of Bragg Management. The plaintiff attempted to amend his complaint in order to assert the liability of
Bragg Management as the alter ego of Bragg Crane.
The trial court denied the plaintiff's request to amend and granted
a summary judgment for the defendant. The plaintiff appealed.
Bragg Management argued that the plaintiff's appeal was moot since
he had previously settled the claim against Bragg Crane. The plaintiff responded that his action against the parent corporation was still
viable under California Code of Civil Procedure section 877. CAL.
CIV. PROC. CODE § 877 (West 1980). That section abrogates the common law rule that a settlement with one alleged tortfeasor releases
all other tortfeasors implicated in the same claim. The court determined that if section 877 applied to alter ego situations, then the
plaintiff's suit would be allowed.
The court laid the ground work for its decision by defining the
scope of California's alter ego theory. It stated that the alter ego theory rested on the assumption that two corporate entities were really
one, and in order to "pierce the corporate veil," there must be such a
unity of interest and ownership that the separate personalities of the
two corporations can no longer exist. The court questioned the federal district court's analysis of the alter ego theory in Fuls v. Shastina Properties,448 F. Supp. 983 (N.D. Cal. 1978). There the district
court found that a release of one corporation required the dismissal
of both corporations. However, the supreme court held that the Fuls
decision misinterpreted California law; when a California court finds
that the subsidiary and parent corporations are really one, it does not
dissolve the corporation. Thus, the alter ego theory allows a finding
that the parent corporation is liable as a separate entity for the acts
of its subsidiary.
The court next examined the history of section 877 and discovered
legislative intent to expand the application of section 877 beyond
mere tortfeasors. It analogized a principal's vicarious liability for the
torts of his agent with a parent corporation's liability for the acts of
its subsidiary. To support its expansion of section 877, the court
stated that since the legislature had acquiesced in the application of
section 877 to agency law, the doctrine should also apply to the analogous alter ego situations. It found acquiescence in the fact that the
legislature, when it enacted the section, had not overturned Ritter v.
Technicolor Corp., 27 Cal. App. 3d 869, 103 Cal. Rptr.. 686 (1972),
which applied section 877 to agency situations.
The court further supported the application of section 877 to alter
ego situations by examining the policies behind the provision. First, a
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plaintiff must receive full recovery to the extent that others are responsible for his injuries. Thus, the dismissal of an alter ego corporation, which is based on a settlement with its subsidiary, would
frustrate that purpose. Moreover, there is an increased danger of unfairness in settlement if a subsidiary is undercapitalized. Second, the
statute was designed to facilitate early and final settlement of claims.
Hence, by including both corporations in the settlement, multiple
tortfeasors may avoid indemnity problems. Third, since equity is required as between defendants, a settling subsidiary cannot be allowed
to shift a disproportionate burden of payments to any remaining defendants by having its settlement fulfill the obligations of two corporations, itself and the parent corporation.
JOHN EDWARD VAN VLEAR

B. Recovery for emotional distress possible when mother is
foreseeably present to observe defendant's act of
negligently failing to provide necessary medical care to
her son: Ochoa v. Superior Court.
I.

INTRODUCTION

The Dillon v. Legg' requirements for recovery for negligent infliction of emotional distress were reinterpreted in Ochoa v. Superior
Court.2 A youth in a juvenile detention infirmary was negligently
denied treatment, despite his mother's plea for a physician. The
mother watched her son's condition degenerate while those in charge
of health care did very little to assist. On a motion for demurrer the
supreme court held that the mother's presence while this was taking
place was sufficient to state a cause of action, even though the injury
was not inflicted in a sudden occurrence. Additionally, the parents
were allowed to pursue a claim for cruel and unusual punishment
under the survival statute.
Rudy Ochoa, the thirteen-year-old son of the plaintiffs, was in the
custody of the Santa Clara County Juvenile Hall when he became ill
with an apparent cold. Two days later Rudy was admitted to the ju1. Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968). See also
Annot., 29 A.L.R.3D 1337 (1970).
2. 39 Cal. 3d 159, 703 P.2d 1, 216 Cal. Rptr. 661 (1985). The opinion was written
by Justice Broussard with Justices Mosk, Kaus, Reynoso, and Girard concurring.
There was a separate concurring opinion by Justice Grodin and a concurring and dissenting opinion by Chief Justice Bird. Justice Girard was assigned by the Chairperson
of the Judicial Council.

venile hall infirmary with a temperature of 105 degrees. His mother
came to visit him and saw that he was going into convulsions and
hallucinating.
Being very concerned, Mrs. Ochoa requested that her son be taken
to the family physician. This request was denied until the probation
officer could be contacted. Mrs. Ochoa applied cold compresses and
tried to reassure her son, but his condition worsened. He began
vomiting, coughing up blood and complained of intense pain in the
chest area. Mrs. Ochoa was eventually required to leave, but was assured that her son would be cared for by a doctor. Rudy was eventually diagnosed as having bilateral pneumonia, and died that night
after his mother left. The complaint alleged that Rudy Ochoa's needs
were completely ignored, and that his mother experienced extreme
mental distress during the entire period she was with him.
II.
A.

NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS

Recovery under Dillon v. Legg

The plaintiff's first cause of action was for negligent infliction of
emotional distress. 3 For the mother to recover as a bystander, she
must have shown that her presence at her son's bedside was foreseeable under the following guidelines established in Dillon: (1) The
nearness of the plaintiff to the scene of the accident, (2) whether the
shock resulted from the contemporaneous observance of the accident
and (3) the closeness of the relation between the plaintiff and
victim. 4
There was no question about the plaintiff's ability to meet the first
and third Dillon guidelines. However, prior interpretations of the
contemporaneous observance factor could be used to deny Mrs.
Ochoa recovery. In Jansen v. Children's Hospital Medical Center,5
the court found that Dillon required observance of an injury being
inflicted in a sudden occurrence for the plaintiff to recover for
3. Plaintiffs also asserted a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
The court distinguished the intentional and negligent torts as completely different. To
recover under the intentional count there must be outrageous conduct especially calculated to cause very serious mental distress. Id. at 165 n.5, 703 P.2d at 4 n.5, 216 Cal.
Rptr. at 664 n.5.
4. Id. at 166, 703 P.2d at 5, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 665 (citing Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d
728, 740-41, 441 P.2d 912, 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 80 (1968)). For a discussion and comparison of the relationship necessary in order to be allowed recovery, see Leong v. Tuksaki, 55 Hawaii 398, 520 P.2d 758 (1974). See also Annot., 94 A.L.R.3D 486 (1979).
5. 31 Cal. App. 3d 22, 24, 106 Cal. Rptr. 883, 884-85 (1973). The plaintiff in Jansen

was denied recovery because her observance of her daughter's deterioration due to
negligent misdiagnosis was not in keeping with Dillon's contemporaneous observance

requirement. The event causing the injury was not a sudden occurrence and was not
subject to sensory perception. Jansen was implicitly approved in Justus v. Atchison, 19

Cal. 3d 564, 565 P.2d 122, 139 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1977).
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mental distress. Rudy Ochoa's injury was not the result of a sudden
occurrence, but allegedly from lack of medical attention.
The court stated that any implication that Dillon requires a sudden
occurrence is unwarranted. Such a restriction arbitrarily limits recovery even when mental distress flowing from a natural event is
highly foreseeable. A degree of flexibility is required in applying the
Dillon guidelines. 6 Recovery for emotional distress will be permitted
when the plaintiff observes the defendant's action or inaction that
causes injury to the victim. The plaintiff need only have a contemporaneous awareness that the observed behavior is the cause of the in7
jury to meet the second Dillon guideline.
The court overruled the previous distinction between the voluntary
and involuntary presence of the plaintiff at the scene of the injury.
All that is necessary is that the plaintiff be at the scene of the injury
in the ordinary course of events.8 Mrs. Ochoa's presence at her son's
bedside was therefore sufficient to permit relief for negligent infliction of emotional distress.9
B. Recovery as a direct victim
In Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals,lO the plaintiff was a
married man whose wife was negligently misdiagnosed as having
syphillis. As this would foreseeably be the source of marital discord
and emotional anguish, the court allowed the husband to recover for
mental distress, even though he did not observe the tortious conduct.
The reasoning was that the negligent act was, by its very nature, di6. Ochoa, 39 Cal. 3d at 168, 703 P.2d at 7, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 667.
7. Id at 170, 703 P.2d at 8, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 668. Compare Annot., 5 A.L.R.4TH
833 (1981) (immediacy of observation of injury affecting right to recover for emotional
distress).
8. Ochoa, 39 Cal. 3d at 171, 703 P.2d at 9, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 669. Justus was the
particular case being partially overruled. However, the Ochoa court did not remove
the possibility of a voluntary bystander assuming the risk of traumatic shock. Emphasis was put on the plaintiff's presence being in the natural course of events.
9. Ochoa, 39 Cal. 3d at 171-72, 703 P.2d at 9, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 669. To give their
only answer to the criticism that anything less than a strict application of Dillon will
result in infinite liability, the court cited Dillon:
"[We] should be sorry to adopt a rule which would bar all such claims on
grounds of policy alone, and in order to prevent the possible success of unrighteous or groundless actions. Such a course involves the denial of redress
in meritorious cases, and it necessarily implies a certain degree of distrust,
which [we] do not share, in the capacity of legal tribunals to get at the truth in
this class of claim."
Id (quoting Dillon, 68 Cal. 2d at 744, 441 P.2d at 923, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 84.)
10. 27 Cal. 3d 916, 616 P.2d 813, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831 (1980). See also Annot., 16
A.L.R.4TH 537 (1982) (necessity of physical injury to recover for loss of consortium).

rected at the husband as well as the wife. The Ochoa court held that
Mrs. Ochoa did not fall into the direct victim category. In Molien the
wife had to tell her husband of the disease and ask him to subject
himself to tests. Mrs. Ochoa, in contrast, was only a foreseeable,
helpless bystander in watching her son suffer mistreatment.'"
III.

CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT

Mrs. Ochoa also brought an action as special administrator of her
son's estate. She sought recovery on the theory that having medical
treatment withheld while being detained for a criminal offense constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. The right to bring this claim
was based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983.12
Because section 1983 is silent on the question of survival of claims,
courts must refer to state law in making the determination.13 California Probate Code section 573 allows for survival of all causes of action.14 However, not every claim of inadequate medical care rises to
the level of cruel and unusual punishment. There must be a deliberate indifference to the serious medical needs of the prisoner to constitute the prohibited mistreatment.' 5
The court cited a litany of cases that discussed standards for recovery under section 1983. Care that is woefully inadequate may result
in the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment. Based upon the allegations of the complaint, there was no question that Rudy Ochoa's
care was woefully inadequate. Therefore, the allegation was deemed
sufficient to state a cause of action under section 1983.16
IV.

SEPARATE OPINIONS

Justice Grodin offered a short concurrence to focus some attention
on the policy considerations he deemed important in the development of the relevant law. 17 The Dillon rules were not intended to be
rigid but were to set flexible guidelines for limiting liability. However, mechanical application of Dillon has led to arbitrary limitations
that are not consistent with the principles of foreseeability in the
11. Ochoa, 39 Cal. 3d at 172-73, 703 P.2d at 10, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 670.
12. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982). Cruel and unusual punishment is prohibited under
federal and state constitutions. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 17.
13. Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584, 588-90 (1978) (construing 42 U.S.C. § 1988
(1982)).
14. CAL. PROB. CODE § 573 (West Supp. 1985). See also 4 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF
CALIFORNIA LAW §§ 14-15 (8th ed. 1974 & Supp. 1984).
15. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976).
16. Ochoa, 39 Cal. 3d at 176-77, 703 P.2d at 13, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 673. See also Annot., 28 A.L.R. FED. 279 (1976) (see particularly section 10 for cases discussing recovery
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982)).
17. Ochoa, 39 Cal. 3d at 178, 703 P.2d at 14, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 674 (Grodin, J.,
concurring).
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decision.1S

The Justice stated that one alternative to the confusion that has resulted in the law would be to treat emotional distress like any other
tort injury and base recovery on negligence, foreseeability and proximate cause. 19 Such an approach would be consistent with the English approach to the problem of having the court determine the
elements of foreseeability. Mental injury would have no more limita20
tions of recovery than does physical injury.
Another suggested rule would be to only limit the amount that a
plaintiff may recover for emotional distress to economic loss. 2 1 A return to the zone of danger rule has also been advocated on the theory
that it is better to arbitrarily restrict liability than to have no limit.22
Chief Justice Bird concurred in the result but dissented on the
ground that the majority's new guidelines of liability for emotional
distress are no clearer than before. Though the separate opinion was
lengthy, the main thrust was to cite examples showing the arbitrariness and inconsistencies reached with liability limiting devices. Her
suggestion was that restrictions placed on recovery for mental injuries should be removed to the same extent that they are for physical
injuries.
Citing Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals,23 the Chief Justice
suggested that the fairest analysis would be to view those who suffer
emotional distress in terms of whether or not the defendant owed the
plaintiff a duty to use reasonable care. 24 As exemplified in the Eng18. Id. at 179, 703 P.2d at 15, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 675.
19. Id. See Diamond, Dillon v. Legg Revisited: Toward a Unified Theory of Compensating Bystanders and Relatives for Intangible Injuries, 35 HASTINGS L.J. 477
(1984). This article was extensively relied on by Chief Justice Bird in her separate
opinion.
20. McLoughlin v. O'Brian, [1982] 2 All E.R. 298. The solution would not be entirely parallel in the American system because the British courts usually do not employ a jury. Ochoa, 39 Cal. 3d at 179, 703 P.2d at 15, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 675 (Grodin, J.,
concurring).
21. Ochoa, 39 Cal. 3d at 180, 703 P.2d at 16, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 676 (Grodin, J., concurring). See Miller, The Scope of Liability for Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress: Making the Punishment Fit the Crime, 1 U. HAWAII L. REV. 1 (1979) (recovery
limited to medical expenses and disability).
22. Ochoa, 39 Cal. 3d at 180, 703 P.2d at 16, 216 Cal Rptr. at 676 (Grodin, J., concurring). See Pearson, Liability to Bystanders for Negligently Inflicted Emotional
Harm-A Comment on the Nature of Arbitrary Rules, 34 U. FLA. L. REV. 477 (1982).
23. 27 Cal. 3d 916, 616 P.2d 813, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831 (1980). Bird accused the majority of limiting Molien to its facts. Ochoa, 39 Cal. 3d at 190, 703 P.2d at 23, 216 Cal. Rptr.
at 682 (Bird, C.J., concurring and dissenting).
24. Ochoa, 39 Cal. 3d at 191, 703 P.2d at 23, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 683 (Bird, C.J., concurring and dissenting).

lish House of Lords opinion cited by Justice Grodin, 25 common law
principles of reasonable foreseeability can be used to determine when
this duty exists. Space, time and family relationship are not legal
limitations; they are factors to be weighed when the foreseeability
2
test is applied. 6
To answer the charge of opponents that this approach will open
the flood gates of liability, the answer in the majority opinion was
again articulated. 27 Bird's primary argument was that the jury, as
representative of a cross section of society, is in the best position to
determine the particular circumstances under which society should
permit recovery for mental distress. 28 Hawaii's experience in this
area is very instructive. In the most recent Hawaii Supreme Court
opinion, it recognized that the fears of unlimited liability from removal of the arbitrary limiting devices have not proven to be true.2

9

Stating that the majority opinion only adds another layer of confusion to the formula for recovery, the Chief Justice suggested that all
distinctions between direct victims and bystanders be removed. Recovery should be allowed if (1) the emotional distress was reasonably
foreseeable, and (2) the distress suffered was serious. These factors
considered together will not only serve to protect against unlimited
liability, but will provide a principled basis for finding recovery.
"Dillon should remain a guidepost to assist the trier of fact in deter30
mining liability."
V.

CONCLUSION

The majority opinion established relaxed guidelines for recovery of
negligent infliction of emotional distress. It is no longer necessary
for a plaintiff to show that he witnessed a sudden occurence of injury. A contemporaneous observance of the defendant's behavior
with an understanding that it is causing the injury is all that a person
25. McLoughlin v. O'Brian, [1982] All E.R. 298, 311.
26. Id.
27. Ochoa, 39 Cal. 3d at 194, 703 P.2d at 26, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 686 (Bird, C.J., concurring and dissenting). See supra note 9, for the now famous quote used as a rationale for extending liability.

28. Ochoa, 39 Cal. 3d at 194, 703 P.2d at 26, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 686 (Bird, C.J., concurring and dissenting) (citing Rodriguez v. State, 52 Hawaii 156, 472 P.2d 509 (1970)).

29. Ochoa, 39 Cal. 3d at 195, 703 P.2d at 26, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 686 (citing Campbell
v. Animal Quarantine Station, 63 Hawaii 557, 632 P.2d 1066 (1981) (award for mental

distress upheld for plaintiffs who were told on the telephone about how their dog was
killed the day before while en route to the veterinarian)).
30. Ochoa, 39 Cal. 3d at 196, 703 P.2d at 27, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 687 (Bird, C.J., concurring and dissenting). The Chief Justice also dissented from the majority's holding
that Mrs. Ochoa had failed to state a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Stating that the intentional count can rest on conduct that is in reckless disregard of the plaintiff's emotional well-being, the Chief Justice thought denial
of recovery on this basis is inconsistent with the approval of the action for cruel and

unusual punishment. Id. at 196 n.13, 703 P.2d at 27 n.13, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 687 n.13.
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closely related to the victim need show.31
Recovery is also possible for cruel and unusual punishment to a
person under legal custody who is negligently denied medical care.
The required showing is that the care received by the detainee was
woefully inadequate under the circumstances.
JAMES B. BRISTOL

XXII.

WORKERS' COMPENSATION
Failure to notify an employee of his workers'
compensation rights will toll the statute of limitations,
even when the party bringing the suit is the medical
provider: Kaiser Foundation Hospitals v. Workers'
Compensation Appeals Board.

In Kaiser FoundationHospitals v. Workers' Compensation Appeals
Board, 39 Cal. 3d 57, 702 P.2d 197, 216 Cal. Rptr. 115 (1985), the court
determined that tolling the one year statute of limitations in workers' compensation cases is the proper remedy where an employee has
not been notified of his rights. For more than two months the employer failed to give the required notice of legal rights to an injured
employee. Further, there was no evidence that the employee was actually aware of his rights, so the court held that the medical provider
was not barred from initiating the suit fourteen months after the
injury.
On February 25, 1981, Marvin Martin injured his leg while employed at Daly City. Kaiser Hospital treated Martin and then filed
an injury report with the insurance adjuster for the city on April 23.
31. Negligent infliction of emotional distress is a topic that has received a great
deal of attention in legal periodicals. In addition to the articles cited infra, the following is a partial list of studies that have appeared most recently: Bell, The Bell Tolls:
Toward Full Tort Recovery For Psychic Injury, 36 U. FLA. L. REV. 333 (1984); Bell, Reply to a Generous Critic, 36 U. FLA. L. REV. 437 (1984); Pearson, Liability for Negligently Inflicted Psychic Harm: A Response to Professor Bell, 36 U. FLA. L. REV. 413
(1984); Nolan & Ursin, Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress: Coherence Emerging From Chaos, 33 HASTINGs L.J. 583 (1982); Comment, Recovery of Damagesfor the
Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress in Products Liability Cases, 8 AM. J. TRIAL
ADVOC. 137 (1984); Note, Limiting Liabilityfor the Negligent Infliction of Emotional
Distress: The "Bystander Recovery" Cases, 54 S. CAL. L. REV. 847 (1981); Comment,
Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress: Development in the Law, 14 U. BALT. L.
REV. 135 (1984); Comment, After the Impact Rule- Limiting Defendant's Liability in
Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress Cases: Bass v. Nooney Co., 18 U. RICH. L.
REV. 413 (1984).

Daly City sent Martin and Kaiser a letter on July 2, that rejected this
claim and also advised Martin of his legal rights.
After considering the Labor Code, CAL. LAB. CODE § 5405 (West
1971) and Reynolds v. Workmen's Compensation Appeals Board, 12
Cal. 3d 726, 527 P.2d 631, 117 Cal. Rptr. 79 (1974), the supreme court
determined that the appropriate remedy for an employer's breach of
duty in this area was to toll the statute of limitations until proper notice was given. The rationale for the decision was to avoid unfair
prejudice to the employee who has no knowledge of his rights.
Therefore, notice is not necessary when the employee already has
such knowledge.
In this case, the party actually bringing the claim may have been
aware of the employee's workers' compensation rights. However, the
rights of Kaiser as a lien claimant were derived solely from those of
the employee. In bringing the lien claim, Kaiser stood in the shoes of
the injured employee. The court therefore held that the statute of
limitations was tolled at least until July 2, 1981, when the employee
received notice, making Kaiser's claim of April 15, 1982 timely. For
more information, see Mastoris, The Statutes of Limitation in Workers' Compensation Proceedings, 15 CAL. W.L. REV. 32 (1979), and 2 B.
WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW §§ 233-246 (8th ed. 1973 &
Supp. 1984).
JAMES B. BRISTOL

